RAJIV SHARMA, J.

(1.) Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the Central Government issued notification on 17.2.1992 enhancing the royalty from Rs. 10 to 25 per tonne. Petitioner-company challenged the validity of this notification by way of CWP No.857 of 1992. Interim orders were passed by the Court on 17.11.1992, 6.1.1993 and 27.9.1993. CWP No. 857/1992 was dismissed by this Court on 13.11.1997. The respondents made a demand for Rs. 10,25,54,854/- on account of balance royalty through communication dated 17.12.1997. Petitioner-company deposited a sum of Rs. 10,08,54,854/- on 24.2.1998. The respondents demanded interest @ 24% per annum on the belated payment of royalty vide communications Annexure P-7, P-8 and P-9. Petitioner-company denied its liability to pay interest vide communications dated 10.3.1999, 20.11.1999, 31.3.2000, 13.9.2000, 14.11.2000 and 4.4.2001. The demands to pay the interest were reiterated by the respondents on 18.1.2001 and 12.3.2001. Petitioner-company filed CWP No. 332/2001 challenging the demand of interest. The petitioner-company had also challenged the validity of rule 64-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. CWP No. 332/2001 was dismissed by the Court on 23.12.2008. Petitioner-company claimed to have deposited a sum of Rs. 6,10,77,761/- on 12.3.2009. The company was served with a demand notice on 24.3.2009 to pay a sum of Rs. 21,97,13,228/-. Petitioners sought details and particulars of the calculations made by the respondent-State in impugned demand dated 24.3.2009. Petitioners have assailed the issuance of Annexure P-1 dated 24.3.2009 by way of present petition.

(2.) Mr. S.K. Mukherjee, Senior Advocate with Mr. K.D. Sood has vehemently argued that the petitioner- company has deposited a sum of Rs. 10,08,54,854/- on 24.2.1998 and another sum of Rs. 6,10,77,761/- on 12.3.2009 and the issuance of Annexure P-1 is not warranted in these circumstances. Mr. Mukherjee has also argued that the demand raised by the respondents was not in accordance with rule 64-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. He further contended that the respondent-State is demanding interest on interest, which is not permissible under law.

(3.) Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned Advocate General has strenuously argued that the issuance of demand notice vide Annexure P-1 is in accordance with law.

(4.) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings carefully.

(5.) It will be appropriate at this stage to quote rule 64-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which reads thus: "64-A-. The State Government may, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Act or any other rule in these rules, charge simple interest at the rate of {twenty-four percent} per annum on any rent, royalty or fee (other than the fee payable under Sub-rule (1) of rule54) or other sun due to that Government under the Act or these rules or under the terms and conditions of any prospecting licence or mining lease from the sixtieth day of the expiry of the date fixed by that Government for payment of such royalty, rent, fee or other sum and until payment of such royalty, rent, fee or other sum is made. "

(6.) The notification issued by the Central Government enhancing the royalty from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 25/- per tonne on 17.2.1992 was challenged by way of CWP No. 857/1992. The same was dismissed on 13.11.1997. The respondents have demanded interest @ 24% interest vide Annexures P-7 to P-9. Petitioner-company has denied its liability as per Annexures P-10 to P-15, respectively. The demand was reiterated on 18.1.2001 and 12.3.2001. The company again approached this Court by way of CWP No. 332/2001 whereby the validity of rule 64-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 was challenged.

(7.) The writ petition was dismissed on 23.12.2008 after relying upon South Eastern Coal Fields Limited versus State of M.P. and others, (2003) 8 SCC 648. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have upheld the validity of rule 64-A. Their Lordships have held that in view of sections 4 and 13 (1) and (2) (g), (i) and (r) and 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and rules 64-A and 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 there is a statutory rule for providing payment of simple interest at the rate of 24% per annum on the amount of any royalty or other sum which remained unpaid. Their Lordships have further held that interest is also payable in equity in certain circumstances and in the absence of prohibition either in law or in the contract entered into between the two parties, there is no reason why the Coalfields should not be compensated by payment of interest for the period for which the consumers/purchasers did not pay the amount of enhanced royalty which is constituent part of the mineral for the period for which it remained unpaid. Their Lordships have held as under:

"13. It is not disputed that the Coalfields have executed lease deeds in Form 'K' wherein the above said two clauses, i.e. Part V, Clause 3 and Part-VI, Clause 3 are both incorporated. There is the statutory rule providing for payment of simple interest at the rate of 24% per annum on the amount of any royalty or other sum which remains unpaid. Also, the contract in the statutory form entered into between the parties contains a recital consistent with Rule 64A obliging the Coalfields to pay such interest. Thus, the liability of the Coalfields to pay interest to the State is statutory as well as contractual.

15. We have carefully perused all the three decisions. All these decisions relate to recovery of tax whereon interest was sought to be levied for delayed payment. The Court chose to assign a literal meaning to the provisions of the substantive law as opposed to a liberal interpretation, and hold that to empower levy of interest for delayed payment of tax there must be a substantive provision in the taxing statute. All the cases relied on by Shri S. Ganesh, the learned senior counsel, are such cases wherein the levy of interest was sought to be justified by reference to some provision made in the rules, which provision was held to be beyond the rule making power as delegated by the parent statute and the statute itself did not make a provision for payment of interest. The levy of such interest was held to be ultra vires the power of the authority levying the interest. Such is not the case before us. Here it is clear from the several provisions of the Act and the rules quoted hereinabove, no mining operation is permissible except in accordance with the terms and conditions of a mining lease and the rules made under the Act. The rules clearly provide for payment of interest. The lease deed executed by the Coalfields incorporates a recital for the payment of interest. It is one of the terms and conditions of obtaining a mining lease that any delay in payment of royalty, referable to a period beyond the sixtieth day of the expiry of the date fixed by the Government for payment of such royalty, shall carry a liability to pay simple interest calculated at the rate of 24% per annum on such amount of royalty. Rule 64A has been framed in exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by S. 13 of the Act. The terms for payment of royalty, and for payment of interest for the period of delay, are authorized by the power to make rules for regulating the grant of mining lease. That apart, interest is included within the expression 'other charges' -the phrase as employed in clause (i) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 13 of the Act. A decision by a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh in Suvarna Cements Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2002 AP 244 has been brought to our notice. The Division Bench has held "It cannot be said that the term 'charges' occurring in S. 13(2)(i) does not include 'interest'. Undoubtedly, interest payable by a lessee for delayed payment is a financial liability on the lessee and, therefore, a debt. It may also be construed as a cost or price or compensation payable to the contracting State authority for delay in payment of dues such as cess, royalty, etc." We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view of the law so taken by the High Court.

16. The Central Government can, in exercise of delegated power of legislation, make provisions for payment of interest on the amount of royalty for the period of delay in payment. Rule 64A has been validly enacted. The mining lessees, that is the Coalfields, having entered into mining lease contracts with full knowledge of terms and conditions thereof and having taken advantage thereunder of operating the mines, they cannot be subsequently allowed to wriggle out of the contractual obligations incurred by them, including the one for payment of interest, by executing the mining leases. The proposition is so well settled that it hardly needs any authority in support thereof. Yet, reference may be had to Har Shankar and Ors. v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner and Ors. (1975)1 SCC 757 and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Lal Chand and Ors. (1984)3 SCC 634 , and the several decisions cited therein.

17. In sum, we are of the opinion that the Coalfields, i.e. the mining lessees, are bound to pay interest as per the terms of mining leases incorporating the clause for payment of interest consistently with R. 64A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Liability of the consumers/purchasers to pay interest to the Coalfields: (a) (for the period for which there was no restraint order on recovery passed by the Court) 21. Interest is also payable in equity in certain circumstances. The rule in equity is that interest is payable even in the absence of any agreement or custom to that effect though subject, of course, to a contrary agreement (See : Chitty on Contracts, Addition 1999, Vol. II, Part 38248, at page 712). Interest in equity has been held to be payable on a market rate even though the deed contains no mention of interest. Applicability of the rule to award interest in equity is attracted on the existence of a state of circumstances being established which justify the exercise of such equitable jurisdiction and such circumstances can be many. 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the absence of there being a prohibition either in law or in the contract entered into between the two parties, there is no reason why the Coalfields should not be compensated by payment of interest for the period for which the consumers/purchasers did not pay the amount of enhanced royalty which is a constituent part of the price of the mineral for the period for which it remained unpaid. The justification for award of interest stands fortified by the weighty factor that the Coalfields themselves are obliged to pay interest to the State on such amount. It will be a travesty of justice to hold that though the Coalfields must pay the amount of interest to the State but the consumers /purchasers in whose hands the money was actually withheld be exonerated from liability to pay the interest. 26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word 'restitution' in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the Court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (See Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, U. P. and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 39). In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, P. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that 'restitution' is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done. "Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. ............... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed." The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in S. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 of the C. P. C. speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the Court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the Court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case,

the restitution would far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the Court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the Court at the stage of final decision, the Court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the inte

rim order would not have existed." (8.) Respondent-State has raised the demand on 24.3.2009 after the dismissal of the writ petition in CWP No. 332/2001 whereby a sum of Rs. 21,97,13,228/- as on 23.12.2008 was to be paid by the company (Annexure P-1). Petitioner-company sent a communication to the respondents on 1.4.2009 seeking details of calculations. The details were made available to the petitioner-company on 23.4.2009. Respondents have issued demand notice to the petitioner-company for paying the interest @ 24% initially with effect from November 1992 to 13.11.1997 and thereafter upto 23.12.2008. The respondents have placed on record the details of calculations made by the Chartered Accountant. (9.) We have gone through the calculations made by the Chartered Accountant. A bare perusal of these details makes it clear that the respondents have not charged any compound interest as argued by Mr. Mukherjee. It is simple interest, which the company is bound to pay as per the mandate of rule 64-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Mr. Mukherjee has failed to establish that the interest charged was in fact compound interest. The interest has been calculated after giving grace period of 60 days to the company. The interest has been charged month-wise. We see no illegality in the demand raised by the respondents vide Annexure P-1. (10.) Accordingly, in view of the observations made hereinabove, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. Interim order passed from time to time stands vacated. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.