Common Order:

1. The Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner to quash the University Order No.964/2014 (C) dated 19.11.2014 passed by the 2nd respondent based on the Resolution No.73 dated 07.11.2014 by the 1st respondent, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner as the Assistant Professor in History in the University by the appointment order No.678/2008(C) dated 11.11.2008 without conducting any enquiry and even before the cancellation of his SSLC certificate by the 3rd respondent and also for a consequential direction to the respondents 1 and 2 to reinstate the petitioner into service with effect from 19.11.2014 with back wages continuity of service and grant all other attended benefits.

2. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing on 19.12.2014, this Court was pleased to pass an interim order, which reads as follows:

'It appears that no enquiry has been conducted against the petitioner. Therefore, sending him unceremoniously, without holding enquiry and without giving him any opportunity whatsoever, prima facie may not suit in line with equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitioner should be allowed to continue until further orders.'

Since the said interim order has not been complied with, the petitioner has filed the Contempt Petition, seeking to punish the respondents/respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition for disobedience of the order passed by this Court (supra) . Hence, both the writ petition and the contempt petition were clubbed together for hearing and final disposal.

3. The case of the petitioner in nutshell is as follows:

i) The petitioner appeared for the SSLC examination held in March, 1996 as a private candidate and the 3rd respondent issued him the Hall Ticket bearing Reg.No.112922, permitting him to write the SSLC examination at S.N.Govt.Hr.Sec.School, Virudhunagar. He secured 250 marks out 500 in the SSLC examination and his Secondary School Leaving Certificate bearing Certificate S.No.AA3789137 (TMR Code No.A106614 dated 17.06.1996) was sent by the 3rd respondent to him on 16.09.1996

ii)It is submitted by the petitioner that thereafter, he continued his education at Gandhiniketan Higher Secondary School, T. Kallupatti and passed Higher Secondary Course Examination in March, 1998, by securing 894 marks out of 1200. Subsequently, he came out successful in B.A. History (III Class), M.A. History (II Class) at Annamalai University and M.Phil. History (I Class) through Distance Education at Alagappa University, Karaikudi. Apart from the above, he also completed Hindi Courses viz. , Praveshika Examination (equivalent to SSLC), Rashtrabhasha Visharad (equivalent to Inter) and Rashtrabhasha Praveen (equivalent to B.A.) out of his own interest.

iii)It is also submitted by the petitioner that he was temporarily appointed as Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in History wing of the Directorate of Distance Education of Annamalai University carrying the scale of pay of Rs.8000-275-13500 with admissible allowances vide Appointment Order No.678 dated 11.11.2008 by the 2nd respondent. Due to his unblemished, untainted, sincere and hard work, his service was regularized with effect from 16.06.2011 in the pay bank of Rs.15,600-39,100 vide University Order No.568/2012 (C) dated 20.04.2012 passed by the 2nd respondent and that he was placed on probation.

iv)In the meantime, on 19.09.2014, the 2nd respondent directed him to produce all his original educational certificates immediately, pursuant to which, he submitted about 16 original certificates on the very same day. Subsequently, on the night of the said date viz. , 19.09.2014, he was intimated that he produced a forged SSLC certificate and as per the record of the Directorate of Government Examinations, one Mr. T. Senthilkumar with Date of Birth 16.07.1982 has been issued such SSL certificate bearing Regn.No.112922/Mar, 1996, Certificate Sl.No.AA3789137 and TMR Code No.A106614 (total marks-250). Since the petitioner has changed the entries in the SSLC Certificate and produced the forged SSLC certificate, 4th respondent has directed the 2nd respondent to initiate departmental action against the petitioner and to make Police complaint against him, based on which, the 2nd respondent directed him submit his reply before 26.09.2014 as to why further action should not be taken against him.

v)It is stated by the petitioner that on 22.09.2014, the petitioner submitted his explanation showing the proof of his completion in all the educational qualifications upto M.Phil. and also the Hindi Examinations. Further, it is stated that the candidate compared with him has completed only 13 years of age as on 16.07.1982 and it is not permissible for him to write SSLC examinations in that age and therefore, the petitioner requested the 2nd respondent to clarify the genuineness of the SSLC certifciate of the said T. Senthilkumar and also requested the 2nd respondent to desist from taking action against him till the genuineness of the SSLC certificate of T. Senthilkumar is confirmed in a Court of Law through the appropriate Court proceedings by the 4th respondent.

vi)It is further stated by the petitioner that meanwhile, he traced out the Hall Ticket issued to him by the Department of Government Examination to appear for SSLC March, 1996 examinations and also the postal envelope, vide which his SSLC certificate was despatched. The 2nd respondent issued the Office Memorandum No.Estt./C7/2014 dated 29.10.2014 directing him to produce the original hall ticket and postal envelope and the same were submitted on 03.11.2014 through the Director, DDE, Annamalai University. However, to his shock and surprise, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order dated 19.11.2014 cancelling his appointment with reference to the Resolution No.73 dated 07.11.2014 and he was relieved from the service with immediate effect by duly reserving the right to pursue criminal and other action against him.

vii)According to the petitioner, the order passed by the 2nd respondent would go to show that the 5th respondent has sent a letter dated 08.10.2014 certifying the genuineness of his SSLC mark sheet, but whereas in the same order, the genuineness certificate given by the 5th respondent has been denied by the 4th respondent. Without properly looking into the contradictory reports given by the respondents 4 and 5, the 2nd respondent passed the impugned order even before getting a definite report from the 3rd respondent, who only issued him the SSLC certificate. The petitioner also stated that the 2nd respondent did not conduct any enquiry with him as required under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India before passing the Resolution No.73 dated 07.11.2013 and the consequential impugned order dated 19.11.2014, which is in violation of principles of natural justice.

viii)The petitioner has reiterated that the 4th respondent has also not conducted any enquiry with him before sending the report dated 18.09.2014 and 13.10.2014 to the 2nd respondent alleging his SSLC certificate to be forged one and thus, the 4th respondent has taken a decision against him behind his back and has also kept him in dark. He has stated that the 3rd respondent did not cancel the SSLC certificate issued to him by means of a specific order and under the due process of law and hence, his SSLC certificate stands valid as on date and thus, cancellation of his appointment is premature and without any basis and illegal. It is the submission of the petitioner that when the respondents 4 and 5 have given different versions with regard to the genuineness of the SSLC certificate, the 1st respondent ought to have conducted enquiry over the said reports. Therefore, the petitioners prayed for setting aside the order of cancellation passed by the 2nd respondent.

4. The second respondent has filed a counter along with a petition to vacate the interim order granted by this Court, in which it has been stated as under:

i)The 2nd respondent has denied the allegations levelled by the petitioner stating that the petitioner was involved in serious malpractices and irregularities in the University and therefore, the State Government has appointed a Senior IAS Officer as Administrator of the University on 04.04.2013 under Sub-Section (4) of Section 28 of the Annamalai University Act, 1928 (TN Act 1 of 1929). Then, the Government of Tamil Nadu enacted the Annamalai University Act, 2013 (TN Act 20 of 2013) by repealing the Annamalai University Act, 1928 (TN Act 1 of 1929) and the said Act came into force on 25.09.2013. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 55 of the Annamalai University Act, 2013, the State Government have again appointed the same IAS Officer as Administrator to discharge the function of the Vice Chancellor. Even since the appointment of Administrator, Several measure have been taken to set right the irregularities and to streamline the administration of the University. One such measure is verification of genuineness of the educational certificates furnished by all the employes at the time of their joining in the University, because several petitions were received from various quarters stating that some employees have obtained employment based on fake or forged educational certificates.

ii)Therefore, the 2nd respondent sent the certificates to the 3rd respondent, submitted by 22 employees to verify the genuineness of the same. The SSLC certificate of the petitioner was one among them. On verification, the 4th respondent found that the Mark List with Reg.No.A106614/March, 1996 was issued to one Thiru T. Senthilkumar and not this petitioner and that he has unilaterally used the particulars contained in that SSLC certificate for preparation of a fake/bogus certificate. The 4th respondent also addressed a letter dated 18.09.2014 to the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, Cuddalore in this regard with a copy to the 2nd respondent.

iii)It is submitted by the 2nd respondent that based on the report of the 4th respondent, the respondent University issued a show cause notice to the petitioner directing him to submit his explanation to the show cause notice. In his explanation, the petitioner pleaded innocence and furnished all his other certificates, such as +2, UG Degree, PG Degree and Hindi Certificates. However, production of all other certificates by the petitioner has no relevance to the genuineness of his SSLC certificate. The statement of the petitioner that the SSLC Certificate of Thiru T.Senthilkumar was not bonafide , was verified with the 4th respondent vide letter dated 01.10.2014, who in turn have stated that they are maintaining Master Mark list of various years confidentially and the genuineness of the certificate of the petitioner was verified from the said mark list. On verification, it was found that the certificate with Reg.No.112922/March 1996 was issued to Thiru. T. Senthilkumar, who has studied in St.Britto Higher Secondary School Madurai and not to the petitioner.

iv)It is stated by the 2nd respondent that the 4th respondent has also added that during 1995-1996, Register Numbers from 002001-495462 were allotted to regular candidates and Register Numbers from 500001 to 616694 ABC were allotted to private candidates. Hence, according to them, it is clear that the petitioner has forged the SSLC certificate of T. Senthilkumar, a regular student with Reg.No.A106614 and therefore, it was pleaded that the petitioner should be subjected to criminal action. The contention with regard to the age of Mr. T. Senthilkumar that he is only 13 years and 8 months on the date of exam and as such, only the certificate of Mr. T. Senthilkumar is fake has been refuted in the counter stating that the said Mr. T. Senthilkumar got age relaxation upto 6 months to write examinations vide G.O.Ms.No.1906, School Education dated 22.08.1977 and therefore, the stand of the 2nd respondent with reference to the report of the 4th respondent is that the reply to the show cause notice is not true and reliable.

v)It is also stated that surprised over the sudden development and considering the contrary reports received from the Directorate of Government Examinations, a copy of the said letter dated 08.10.2014 was immediately faxed to the 4th respondent and a report was also sought from the 4th respondent. In response to the same, the 4th respondent in his letter dated 13.10.2014 has stated that the 5th respondent vide its proceedings dated 19.12.2014 has also confirmed that the SSLC certificate furnished by the petitioner is fake and moreover, the 5th respondent is not the competent authority in this regard.

vi)Finally, it is submitted in the counter by the 2nd respondent that after carefully examining the explanation dated 13.10.2014 and his further explanation dated 03.11.2014 and also after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, the first respondent Syndicate in its Resolution No.73 dated 07.11.2014 has resolved to cancel the appointment of the petitioner forthwith. Therefore, the said order needs no interferecne by this Court and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. The fourth respondent has filed a counter, wherein it has been stated as under:

i)Based on the letter submitted by the Annamalai University dated 18.09.2014, the 4th respondent has reported that the certificate submitted by the University in respect of the petitioner is a forged one and the fourth respondent has also given a tabular comparison of the original certificate of Mr. T. Senthilkumar and the duplicate certificate of the petitioner as under:

'Tamil'

Thus, it is stated by the 4th respondent that from the above, it is clear that the SSLC certificate produced by the petitioner with Reg.No.112922 March 1996 is a bogus one and accordingly, the 4th respondent sent a report to the 2nd respondent. Except the date of birth, the petitioner has fabricated the SSLC certificate of another school candidate, namely, Mr. T. Senthilkumar, who studied at St.Britto Higher Secondary School and the said school was allotted Register Numbers from 112816 to 113107. Though the office of the Directorate of Government Examinations conducts exams for the private as well as regular candidates simultaneously, the range of Register Numbers allotted to school candidates varies from the range allotted to private candidates. During March, 1996, the range of Register Number allotted to school candidates was 002001 to 495462, whereas for private candidate the range of Register Numbers allotted was 500001 to 616694. Since the Reg.No.112922/March 1996 belongs to a school candidate, the SSLC certificate produced by the petitioner is a fake one.

6. The fifth respondent has filed a counter, in which the stand of the fifth respondent is as follows:

i)It is stated by the 5th respondent that in this case the petitioner has produced a forged genuineness report having the details of SSLC certificate, as if signed by the Joint Director (Hr.Secondary)/5th respondent. The Joint Director (Hr.Secondary) is not the authority to sign the report. Therefore, the genuineness intimation letter dated 08.10.2014 with a forged signature is also a bogus one. The petitioner has forged the standard format of verification report used in Directorate of Government Examinations. Hence, the intimation letter alleged to be sent by the 5th respondent is not a real verification report, sent from the Directorate of Government Examinations.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that the petitioner has not been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself, has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131 : (2010) 2 SCC 772 : 2010-II-LLJ 334 : (2010) 3 MLJ 742, wherein it has been held as under:

'27. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the employee.

36. The proposition of law that a government employee facing a department enquiry is entitled to all the relevant statement, documents and other materials to enable him to have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the department enquiry against the charges is too well established to need any further reiteration. Nevertheless given the facts of this case we may re-emphasise the law as stated by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram (1975) 1 SCC 155 :

'The State contended that the respondent was not entitled to get copies of statements. The reasoning of the State was that the respondent was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and during the cross-examination the respondent would have the opportunity of confronting the witnesses with the statements. It is contended that the synopsis was adequate to acquaint the respondent with the gist of the evidence.

The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges on which inquiry is held. The government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the government servant. Unless the statements are given to the government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination.

It is unjust and unfair to deny the government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken.'

8. However, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because in that case, the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with regard to the removal of the appellant therein from service, who challenged the order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, In the case on hand, the petitioner was neither removed nor dismissed from service, but his appointment order itself was cancelled with immediate effect for the alleged misconduct and irregularities committed by him for production of forged SSLC certificate.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gayatrilaxmi Bapurao Nagpure v. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1996 SC 1338 : (1996) 3 SCC 685 to contend that concerned authorities must also play a role in assisting the Syndicate to arrive at a correct decision. This decision is also not helpful to the petitioner, as the concerned authorities, who have to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate in question, have been added as formal parties to this writ petition and they, on verification of their confidential mark register, enunciated that the SSLC certificate furnished by the petitioner is forged. The reason for such firm decision is that the Register Number 112922/March 1996, as shown in the SSLC certificate was originally allotted to one Mr. T. Senthilkumar, a regular candidate studied in St.Britto Higher Secondary School, Madurai, whereas different numbers were allotted to private candidates for the particular year.

10. On the contrary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that there is no necessity to go into the question whether there is any violation of principles of natural justice or not, because the authorities, who are vested with quasi judicial power are not bound to follow the exact judicial procedure, namely, examination of witnesses or hearing of the parties orally. Once the competent authority, on verification of the genuineness of the certificate, declares that the said certificate is a fake one, then the usual procedure of conducting enquiry does not arise at all at any stretch of the imagination.

11. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 has also quoted the following judgments in support of his case:

i)a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Others, AIR 1981 SC 136 : (1980) 4 SCC 379.

' 24) The matter has also been treated as an application of the general principle that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Jackson’s Natural Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a very interesting discussion of the subject. He says:

'The distinction between justice being done and being seen to be done has been emphasised in many cases.

The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may be regarded as a general principle which in some cases can be satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery C.J’s judgment in R. v. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Hosenball (1977) 1 W.L.R. 766, 772, whereafter saying that 'the principles of natural justice are those Fundamental Rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done' he went on to describe the maxim as 'one of the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural justice'.

It is the recognition of the importance of the requirement that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision alleged to be vitiated by a breach of natural justice would still have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial tribunal. The maxim is applicable precisely when the Court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice, or possible injustice. In Altco Ltd. v. Sutherland (1971) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 515 Donaldson J said that the court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator had not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether a further hearing would produce a different or the same result. It was important that the parties should not only be given justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had justice or 'to use the time hallowed phrase' that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done. In R. v. Thames Magistrates Court, ex.p. Polemis (1974)1 W.L.R. 1371, the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relief because the applicant had no defence to the charge.

'It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the afternoon in question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant to say: ‘Well, even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same’. That is mixing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery C.J. at p. 1375)'.

In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.'

ii)Another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. and Others v. Shyama Pardhi and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2219 : (1996) 7 SCC 118:

'5. It is now an admitted fact across the Bar that the respondents had not possessed the pre-requisite qualification, namely, 10 + 2 with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as subject. The Rules specifically provided that qualification as a condition for appointment to the post of ANM. Since prescribed qualification had not been satisfied, the initial selection to undergo training is per se illegal. Later appointments thereof are in violation of the statutory rules. The Tribunal, therefore, was not right in directing the reinstatement of respondents. The question of violation of the principles of natural justice does not arise. The ratio of Shrawan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 309, strongly relied on, has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case where appellants possessed initial qualifications but they did not undergo the training. Since the appointment was set aside on the ground of want of training, this Court interfered with; directed the Government to reinstate them into service and further directed them to send the appellants therein for training.'

iii)yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1999 SC 2583 : (1999) 6 SCC 237 ;

'20. It is true that in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) A.C. 40, it has been held that breach of principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need be shown. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this court in several cases, but we might point out that this court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J., in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1980 (4) SCC 379 . After stating (page 395) that 'principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed' and that ‘non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to a man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary’, Chinnappa Reddy, J., also laid down an important qualification (page 395) as follows :

'As we said earlier, where on the admitted or indisputable facts, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice, but because courts do not issue futile writs.'

21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice.

22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases, there is a considerable case law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of ‘real substance’ or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1578 (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University (1971) 1 W.L.R. 87, Cinnamond v. British Airport Authority (1980) 1 W.L.R. 582 and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Eating Magistrates’ Court ex p Fannaran 1996 8 Admn LR 351 (358) (see DeSmith, Suppl., page 89) 1998 where Straughton, LJ, held that there must be ‘demonstrable beyond doubt’ that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan (1987) A.C. 625 (862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand court in McCarthy v. Grant 1959 NZLR 1014, however, goes half way when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is ‘real likelihood - not certainty - of prejudice’. On the other hand, Garner’s Administrative Law, 8th Edition, 1996, pages 271-272, says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1960) A.C. 40 ), Megarry, J., in John v. Rees (1970) Ch. 345, stating that there are always ‘open and shut cases’ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J., has said that the ‘useless formality theory’ is a dangerous one and, however’ inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms’. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the ‘useless formality’ theory in R v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Force ex p Cotton 1990 IRLR 344, by giving six reasons. (See also his article ‘Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary ?’ 1991 PL 64 ). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the ‘useless formality theory’ has been made much (of) earlier in ‘Natural justice, Substance or Shadow’ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pages 27-63) contending that Malloch (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1578) and Glynn (1971) 1 W.L.R. 87) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edition, 1996, pages 323), Craig Administrative Law, 3rd Edition, page 596, and Others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision making authority. De Smith, 8th Edition, 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036, says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade Administrative Law, 5th Edition, 1994, pages 526-530, say that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a ‘real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their ‘discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364, Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1996) 5 SCC 460, that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.

23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the ‘useless formality’ theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as, in the case before us, ‘admitted and indisputable’ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.'

iv)The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Superintendent of Post Offices and Others v. R. Valasina Babu (Appeal (civil) 5868 of 2006) decided on 14.12.2006, has held as follows:

'The question in regard to effect of obtaining appointment by producing false certificate came up for consideration in State of Maharashtra and Others v. Ravi Prakash Babulasing Parmar and Another , (2006) 10 SCALE 575, wherein this Court opined that the concerned authorities would have jurisdiction to go into the said question and pass an appropriate order. The effect of cancellation of such Caste Certificate had also been noticed in the light of two Judge Bench decision of this Court in Bank of India and Another v. Arinash D. Mandirkar and Others , (2005) 7 SCC 690, wherein it was held that if the employee concerned having played fraud in obtaining an appointment, he should not be allowed to get the benefits thereof, as the foundation of appointment collapses.

In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, it might not have been necessary to initiate any disciplinary proceeding against the respondent.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed. No costs.'

12. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the material documents available on record.

13. The question to be decided in this case is as to whether the SSLC certificate produced by the petitioner is a forged or fake one and whether the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement.

14. The petitioner, who was temporarily appointed as Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in History wing of the Directorate of Distance Education of Annamalai University on 11.11.2008. Subsequently, he was regularized in service with effect from 16.06.2011. Pursuant to the new Act, namely, Annamalai University Act, 2013 (TN Act 20 of 2013), which came into force with effect from 25.09.2013, by repealing the old Act, viz. , Annamalai University Act, 1928 (TN Act 1 of 1929), as per the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 55 of the Annamalai University Act, 2013, the State Government appointed a Senior IAS Officer as Administrator to discharge the function of the Vice Chancellor. The Administrator, as a renovative measure to elevate the University to the respectable status by streamlining the administration of the University, has decided to verify the genuineness of the educational certificates furnished by all the employees at the time of their joining the University on account of receipt of several petitions in this regard. At that time, the fraud played by this petitioner came into light.

15. The petitioner assailed the order of cancellation of his appointment, mainly on the ground that the said order amounts to his removal from the service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution and was therefore, void, because no enquiry had been conducted before taking such decision by the 2nd respondent. A careful scrutiny of records, it is seen that the allegation against the petitioner is that he obtained the employment on production of a false SSLC Certificate, pursuant to which, a show cause notice was issued to him and on receipt of his explanation dated 13.10.2014 and further explanation dated 03.11.2014, based on the resolution by the respondent-Syndicate, the impugned order was passed. Thus, it is clear that the requirements of natural justice were fully complied with. Moreover, the very cancellation of appointment on the ground of its being void ab initio is entirely different from dismissal or removal of an employee from service, as visualised in Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The decisions relied upon by the petitioners are not applicable for deciding the issue of appointment or cancellation of appointment, as the genuineness of the certificate is found to be fake and obtained by fraud.

16. It is pertinent to mention here that the respondent-Syndicate had not taken the decision to cancel the appointment of the petitioner in one fine morning or in hasty manner, rather reports were called for from the 4th and 5th respondents with regard to the genuineness of the SSLC Certificate furnished by the petitioner, who in turn confirmed that the SSLC certificate incorporating the Reg.No.112922/March 1996 does not belong to the petitioner at all, but to one Mr. T. Senthilkumar, a regular student, coupled with the fact that during the year 1996, Registration Numbers 002001 to 495462 were allotted to regular candidates and there is no possibility of the petitioner, who claimed himself to be a private candidate, getting such Registration Number, because Register Numbers 500001 to 616694 ABC were allotted to private candidates for the particular year. Therefore, looking at any angle, it has been proved beyond doubt that the petitioner obtained employment by forging and fabricating the SSLC certificate.

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India and Another v. Arinash D. Mandirkar and Others AIR 2005 SC 3395 : (2005) 7 SCC 690 has clearly held that if an employee concerned having played fraud in obtaining an appointment, he should not be allowed to get the benefits thereof, as the foundation of appointment collapses and it was also held therein that

fraud vitiates everything and no protection can be extended to a person, who obtains employment on fraud, nor any benefit can be extended based on such recruitment. 18. From the tabular column of the 4th respondent in the counter, who is the competent authority to decide on the issue of genuineness of the certificate and also from the Tabulor Mark Register (TMR) a permanent record being maintained by the Directorate of Government Examinations (Page No.2415), the Register Number 112922 was actually allotted to Mr. T. Senthilkumar. The contention of the petitioner that there were contradictory versions between the 4th and 5th respondents has been controverted by the respondents stating that the intimation letter produced by the petitioner, as if it was furnished by the 5th respondent is itself a fabricated one, because the 4th respondent alone is empowered to issue such genuineness certificate and the petitioner has forged the standard format of the verification report used in Directorate of Government Examinations. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 319 has defined the word 'Fraud' as under: '15. ..... 'Fraud' as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio . Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata .' 20. Teaching profession is a noble profession, imparting yeomen service to the future generation of the country and contributing much to the development of the nation. In its broadest sense, teaching is a process that facilitates learning and is the specialized application of knowledge, skills and attributes are designed to provide unique service to meet the educational needs of the individual and of society. Teachers are employing practices that develop positive self-concept in students. If a teacher like the petitioner is allowed to continue in the job, it will definitely be a threat to the whole society and the students who are taught by him, will be misguided and influenced by his attitude. The continuation of fraud in this renowned profession will result in devil to pay and also pouring a drop of venom into the pot of milk. Such awkward position should not be allowed and encouraged and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief much less reinstatement in service. 21. In the result, this Writ Petition is dismissed as devoid of merits with the cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) payable by the petitioner to the Government Rehabilitation Home for Leprosy, Y. Pudupatti, Madurai. However, it is needless to mention that it is open to the respondents to proceed with the criminal action against the petitioner, if so advised. 22. In view of the dismissal of writ petition, this Court is of the opinion that nothing survives for consideration in the Contempt Petition and therefore, the Contempt Petition is closed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Petition dismissed with costs.