H. SURESH, J.


The petitioner is an Association of Co-operative Banks. It has about 90 Member-Banks in Greater Bombay area. The Association has been representing its members in all disputes relating to wage scales and other service conditions of the employees of various Co-operative Banks. It is the case of the Association that the 1st respondent Union is not prepared to negotiate with it in respect of their charter of demands and is not recognising the Association. Therefore, the Association passed a Resolution dated 12th July 1987, which is as follows:


"Resolved that the Executive Committee should finalise the Wage Report as prepared by the Association after considering the views expressed by the representatives of the Banks and the report so finalised should be forward to employees union and to the Commissioner of Labour through the Notice of Change and further action should proceeded with. It is further resolved that the member Banks should not make individual agreement and should make it only through the Association."


Since the respondent Union was not agreeable to abide by the said Resolution and to negotiate with the said Association, the Association filed a complaint in the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, being Complaint (U.L.P.) No.556 of 1989, alleging that the respondent-Union and its office bearers are indulging in unfair labour practices under Items 1, 3 and 5 of Schedule III of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "MRTU & PULP Act").


2.The Court initially passed an ad-interim order as follows;


"(b) Pending hearing and final disposal of the complaint, this Honourable Court be pleased to restrain the respondent Union, its Officers, members, agents and servants from in any manner raising and/or settling any demands/issues covered under Resolution dated 12-7-1987 with individual member Banks of the complainant Association.


(c) Pending hearing and final disposal of the complaint, this Honourable Court be pleased to restrain the respondent Union, its officers, servants, members and agents from in any manner coercing, threatning or pressurising the individual member Banks, of this complainant, its officers, loyal employees and customers."


However, after hearing both the parties, the Court made it clear that there is no restraint on the respondent Union from raising any demands or charter of demands as and when required, against individual member Banks, but only directed that copies of such demand should be forwarded to the petitioner Association. Further, it confirmed the order of injunction granted in terms of prayer (c), which restrained the respondent Union, its officers, servants, members and agents from in any member cocercing, threatening or pressurising the individual member Banks of the Association, its officers, loyal employees and customers. This was on 7th of September 1989.


3.It is the grievance of the petitioner Association that despite the above order, the respondent Union on 7th November 1989 served an individual charter of demands on Yeshwant Sahakari Bank Ltd., a Member Bank of the petitioner Association, without sending a copy thereof to the petitioner Association. It appears that the matter had been taken to conciliation and finally it has been referred to the Industrial Court.


4.The petitioner says that the respondent Union thereafter gave a strike notice dated 22nd August 1990. The petitioner Association informed the respondent Union by its letter dated 28th August 1990 that the said strike notice was illegal and improper and bad in law and in any event it is in violation of the order dated 7th September 1989 passed by the Industrial Court. Since the respondent Union persisted in their conduct, the petitioner Association filed this contempt petition on or about 4th September, 1990 alleging that the respondents have committed contempt of the orders of the Industrial Court and that they be directed to purge the contempt by withdrawing the strike notice dated 22nd August 1990, and pending the hearing and final disposal of this contempt petition, the petitioner Association wanted a restraint order as against the respondents from resorting to the strike as per the strike notice dated 22nd August 1990.


5.After filing the petition, they moved this Court for an ad-interim order, which was not granted. Thereafter, respondents 2, 3 and 4 as also the other members of the 1st respondent, being employees in the said Yeshwant Sahakari Bank Ltd. went on indefinite strike with effect from 10th September, 1990. It appears about 86 employees of the said Bank have proceeded on strike. The petitioner submits that the aforesaid strike is purely as and by way of an attempt to pressurise and/or coerce the individual Member Bank of the petitioner Association to accept the Union's charter of demands dated 8th November 1989. The petitioner Association submits that by reason of the aforesaid strike, the entire banking activities of the Bank have came to a standstill. This has resulted in a loss of transaction to the extent of Rs. 10 lakhs per day, which cannot be compensated in terms of money, in case the petitioner succeeds. Hence it took out the aforementioned civil application with the prayer that the respondents be directed to withdraw the said strike and also to restrain them from continuing the strike which has been commenced with effect from 10th September 1990.


6.The respondents have filed two affidavits- one by the President of the Union on 20th September, 1990 and the other by the General Secretary of the Union, dated 25th September 1990. They have denied the various allegations made against them. They have stated that the strike is not covered by the said order passed by the Industrial Court. They also state that in any event the Court cannot pass any order restraining the respondents from resorting to strike, which is a legitimate act on the part of the Union. They have further stated that they were not a party to any resolution dated 12th July 1987 and that, therefore, they were not bound to comply with the said resolution. However, without prejudice they say, there have been number of negotiations and settlements between the petitioner Association and the respondent Union in respect of various individual Member Banks. But as far as Yeshwant Sahkari Bank Ltd. is concerned, the service conditions of the employees had not been revised for over seven years and the management was, in fact, exploiting the employees. Hence they had raised the said demands. They further state that negotiations with the said Bank were in progress and they were about to sign a settlement regarding wage scales and other service conditions of the employees. However, one Prataprao Salunke, who is the present Director of the said Bank and also the Vice President of the said Association, refused to settle the just, fair and reasonable demands of the employees of the said Bank and victimised 14 employees by passing orders of dismissal. The respondent Union had, therefore, sent a letter dated 20th December 1989 to the petitioner Association to look into their grievance against the said Yeshwant Sahakari Bank Ltd. However, the Association was not very helpful, mainly because of the advice that the Association had taken from the said Mr. Salunke. As a result of this attitude on the part of the management, the Union was left with no choice but to give the notice of strike in accordance with the MRTU & PULP Act. They submitted, that this right of the Union of giving notice of strike and to go on strike would, in no way, constitute, in law, pressure tactics or any unfair labour practice or any coercive measure. They further submit that even after the strike notice period had elapsed, an appeal was made by them to the Bank and the Association to see reason and to negotiate. But their request was turned down and, therefore, the Union had no choice but to resort to strike, which is lawfully resorted to.


7.Therefore, they submit that if one has regard for the order passed by the Industrial Court, it becomes clear that the petitioner Association themselves had not pressed their complaint in respect of Item No.1 of Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act, which is the provision that deals with the question of strike. The learned Judge has also made it clear that he was not dealing with such complaint, inasmuch as, there was no strike or threat of any kind at that time. The complaint, therefore, mainly remained with regard to the alleged unfair labour practices in respect of Item 3 and 5 of Schedule III of Act and, therefore, the Union submits that there is no breach of any order, which has been passed by the Industrial Court. There is nothing to show that the Union had indulged in any Unfair labour practice, either under Item 3 or Item 5 of Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act. They, therefore, submit that the petition is misconceived and the same be dismissed.


8.Mr. Cama, appearing for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Industrial Court clearly restrains the respondents from in any manner "cocercing, threatening or pressurising the individual Member Banks". He, therefore, submitted that assuming that the strike is lawful, it is in breach of the Court's order, inasmuch as, the strike is a measure of coercion or a threat or in any event an act to pressurise the individual Member Bank. He submitted that this petition has been filed mainly to see that the Union is not allowed to continue with their coercive act. He submitted that the Union itself has stated that they have no other choice but to resort to strike, which being coercive in nature, must be considered as an act in breach of the order and that, therefore, they are liable for punishment.


9.Mr. Cama further submitted that even though there are provisions under the MRTU & PULP Act for the purpose of punishing a person who has committed a breach of order by filing a complaint, as provided therein, there is no provision whereby the strike called by the respondent Union can be restrained or whereby the Union can be made to purge the contempt. The Industrial Court may punish the contemners, but still, for the purpose of taking further action, the Industrial Court may have to refer the matter to the High Court and on such report being made by the Industrial Court to the High Court, the contemners shall be dealt with as if they have committed contempt of the High Court itself. Mr. Cama submitted that it is not necessary that the petitioners should wait till this procedure is adopted. He submitted that instead the petitioners can come directly to this Court and complain about it, inasmuch as, it has been held that this remedy is an additional remedy and the contemners can be dealt with under the contempt of courts Act, itself.


10.In this connection, Mr. Cama drew my attention to the case of Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar v. Sophy Keely, reported in 1987 Vol. II Current Labour Reports 512. That was a case in respect of an order passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulations Act, 1977, whereby the Tribunal had allowed the appeals of the petitioners whose services were illegally terminated by the management and the Tribunal had directed the respondents to reinstate them in service with all benefits due to them from the date of termination till they were allowed to resume their duty. The order was to be given effect to within forty days. The management did not comply with the said order, did not even offer to pay the salaries. Various technical arguments were advanced when the petitioners complained to this Court by filing the contempt petition. However, the Court negatived the same and came to the conclusion that was a case of contumacious and wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court and that there was no repentance or regret on the part of the contemners. In that context, the Court did not hesitate to punish the contemners, despite an argument that other remedies were available. The Court held that the provisions of the contempt of Courts Act are in addition to the provisions contained in any law for the enforcement of the orders and directions given by the Courts. I agree. If I come to the conclusion that the act of the respondents in resorting to strike amounts to contempt, of course, they can be dealt with under the law of contempt.


11.As against this, Mr. Bukhari for the respondent cited an unreported judgment of Daud, J., dated 21st November 1986 in the case of Shri Ismail Abdul Kadir v. Ms. Best Cotton Rope Manufacturing Company & others, being Contempt Petition No.146 of 1985, wherein it has been observed that each case has to be considered on the basis of the degree of contumacy. Otherwise, cognisance of contempt being discretionary, the Court may not take any action if there are any other appropriate means to enforce any order passed by the Tribunal. In that case, the employees had made a grievance that despite the order passed by the Tribunal directing the Management to give arrears of salaries, etc., the management had not given. But the Court did not take any action under the Contempt of Courts Act, but instead directed the employees to adopt suitable proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act, etc.


12.Mr. Bukhari also drew my attention to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court, being the case of Wazirkhan Sherkhan v. Shrikrishna Gyanodaya Cottage Industries, reported in 1979 (II) L.L.R. 41. Here again, the Court did not take any action in contempt, mainly because under the MRTU & PULP Act there were appropriate provisions for filing a complaint and, therefore, the petitioners should first comply with the requirements of those provisions and exhaust their remedies before they come to the Court on a contempt petition. In the present case, Mr. Bukhari, has submitted that if the grievance of the petitioner Association is that the Union had committed the contempt of the order, the Association can complain under section 48 of the MRTU & PULP Act to the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court can take cognizance of the same. He submitted that it is appropriate that the Industrial Court should inquire and investigate inasmuch as, the law in its wisdom has provided a remedial process which cannot be ignored.


13.In other words, in the matters of industrial relations, where it is very often a question of collective bargaining as against a possible exploitation, the parties must be relegated to resolve their dispute through the provisions of Labour Law itself, the object being industrial peace through compassionate adjudication. Strike, till such time it is declared as illegal, is to secure justice for themselves. There is no defiance of or disrespect for the Court. An action in contempt is against contumacious conduct which disregards justice. A mere breach of the order is not contempt. It must amount to disdainful disregard of process of justice.


14.Mr. Bukhari, submitted that it has been held by various Courts that the strike simplicitor cannot be considered as a coercive act at all. In this connection, he drew my attention, firstly, to the case of M/s. Blaze Advertising Private Limited, Bombay v. Blaze Advertising and Allied Companies Employees' Union, reported in 1985 Labour and Industrial Case, 1015. That was a case dealing with Item 5 of Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act. The relevant portion on which Mr. Bukhari relies is at page 1017 and it is as follows :


"It is more than clear that it does not refer to and is not intended to refer to all coercive actions, for even a legal strike which is the ultimate weapon in the armoury of the employees is a coercive action. Certainly, it cannot be suggested that a legal strike would fall within the said item. So also, such actions as orderly and peaceful demonstrations, however coercive they may look, cannot be said to be included in the said item. This is so not because peaceful demonstrations are protected by Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution as held in A.I.R. 1962, Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, but also because the immediately following item 6 in the said schedule lists demonstration at the residence of the employers and managerial staff alone as unfair labour practice. Hence it will have to be held that Item 5 intends to refer not to all but only to some of the coercive actions."


The learned Judge, in the aforesaid judgment, then dealt with the three coercive actions mentioned in item 5 and took note of the fact that they are of disparate nature and effect, although they belong to the same wider genus of "coercive action". In that context, the learned Judge excluded the item of `strike' and further observed as follows:


"Hence the best way to interpret Item 5 is to include in it such forms of coercive actions as are of the same nature and effect as the three actions while excluding from its scope all legitimate trade union activities."


15.Mr. Bukhari, then relied on the case of Engineering & Metal Workers Union v. M/s. Shah & Sanghi, reported in 1985 (II) Current Labour Reports, 378, wherein it has been expressly held that a strike simplicitor cannot be regarded per se as coercive activity on the part of the unions or workmen qua the employer. The relevant observations are at page 384 and they are as follows:


"14. This brings us to the consideration of the question, whether a strike simplicitor can be regarded per se as coercive activity on the part of the unions or workmen qua the employer? As far back as in 1954 a Division Bench of this Court had occasion in Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills Ltd. & others v. Poona Girni Kamgar Union, 1954(1) Labour Law Journal 124, to indicate that the right of employees to strike was a common law right, (see observations at page 127).


15. It is true that in Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post Master General, Central Circle, Nagpur & others, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 311, a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court observed that the right to strike would not be a fundamental right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution but we are not concerned in the instant case with enforcement of the constitutional rights. I think the contention that strike or threat to go on strike per se is coercive action must now be laid to rest bearing in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in a latter case viz. Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union & others, 1976 (1) Labour Law Journal 274. It has been indicated in the said judgment that the concept of illegal strike is a creation of statute and the observations would seem to suggest that apart from illegality which is created by the statutory provision a strike cannot be regarded as obnoxious, perverse or coercive. That it may hurt the purse of the employer is beside the question because that indeed is the object of a strike. In Rohtas case the Supreme Court has further opined that the restriction on the right of strike or circumstances which would render it illegal strike must be found in the statute and therefore would not seem to exist de hors the enactment."


16.There is also another judgment in the case of M/s. Billion Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dyes & Chemical Workers Union & others, reported in 1983 (2) Bom.C.R. 25, wherein the learned Judge of this Court has explained the meaning of the word "strike" as follows:


"Though under the Constitution right to strike is not a fundamental right, the said right is a well recognised right of the workers. It is not that every strike is illegal. In a democratic State workmen have every right to withhold labour in support of their demands and, therefore a legal strike is a legitimate weapon in matters of industrial relations. It is a safety valve in industrial relations when properly resorted to. An illegal strike is a creation of the statute and in the present enactment creation of section 24 of the Act. Legal strike is purely non-violent in character. It is revolt against repression. It is well known method of non-co-operation. It is normally declared to redress a wrong which only amounts to refusal of labour to take part in the wrong and thus leave a wrong doer to his own resources. In other words to enable other side to see fault in continuing the wrong."


17.In this sense, it is possible to say that the strike per se is not a coercive measure at all. It is the stronger that can coerce the weaker, and not vice-versa. Ordinarily, the weaker would succumb unless individually he has the will to resist, or collectively he has the right to bargain. That is why the right to strike is always considered as integral to collective bargaining. When a strike is legal and the management yields and settles, it is not because of any coercion, but only because the demand was just, may be, a belated acknowledgment of the same. If an employer is compelled to do the right and to desist from doing any wrong, by a recognised resistance measure, there is no coercion or threat or pressure which can be restrained.


18.Mr. Cama submitted that whatever be the legal position with regard to a strike, still it must be held that the respondents are resorting to an act of pressure, whereby the individual Member Bank would be compelled to yield to the demands of the Union. He also submitted that under the industrial law, it can be said that strike per se cannot be restrained, still in the realm of contempt of Court, the Court has to consider whether the act is a breach of the order and if that is so, the respondents can be restrained.


19.In order to appreciate this argument, one has to consider initially the scope of the complaint which was before the Industrial Court. It all arose because of the Resolution dated 12th July 1987. To this resolution, the respondent Union was not a party. This Resolution relates to a certain wage report as prepared by the Association, perhaps in 1987 or earlier thereto. I cannot understand as to how it can have any bearing on the demands raised by the Union two years after the passing of the resolution. Mr. Bukhari, submitted that the resolution pertains to a Notice of Change to be given by the employer in Form `K' as per section 42(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, whereas the Union's demands as filed some time in September/November 1989 relate to a Notice of Change to be given by an employee to the employer under form `L', which is altogether a different matter and it has no bearing whatsoever to the resolution that was passed by the Association. Secondly, the Resolution only restrains the Member Banks from entering into individual agreements with the Union. The Union is not concerned with this Resolution at all. It is true, the Association made such a complaint and the complaint is still pending. In the complaint, the Association obtained the above orders. But it is clear that the complaint was in respect of Items Nos. 1, 3 and 5 of Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act. As regards Item No.1, the Association had not pressed for any relief even though it has alleged unfair labour pract

ice under the said Item. As far as Item No.3 is concerned, it relates to refusal of the Union to bargain collectively in good faith with the employer. That is not the complaint in this contempt petition. On the other hand, during this period, the Union has put on record that there have been several settlements with the individual Member Banks through the said Association and in some cases in the presence of the office bearers of the said Association. As far as the last item, namely, Item No.5 is concerned, that relates to coercive actions such as wilful go slow, squatting on the work premises after working hours of "gherao" of any of the members of the managerial or other staff. As has been referred to above our High Court has taken a categorical view that strike is not a matter which would fall within the scope of item No.5 Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act. Therefore, if one has to go by the complaint, it is clear that the order does not cover any strike or threat to strike, at all. 20.Mr. Cama's contention is that whatever be the nature of the complaint, the strike, today, is in defiance of the order, which is in force. According to him, since the strike is to pressurise or coerce the member of the petitioner Association, it becomes a breach of the order. I think, the matter is not so naive as he wants it to be. We are dealing with a dispute relating to unfair labour practice and the order is on a complaint in that behalf. Therefore, the order has to be construed in that context and within the ambit of the power of the Tribunal, in which it has been made. The petitioner Association having given up its complaint under item 1 of Schedule III of the said MRTU & PULP Act, cannot complain about the same by saying that the same would fall within the scope of Item 5 of Schedule III of MRTU & PULP Act. When the Tribunal passed the order restraining the Union from in any manner coercing, threatening or pressurising the individual Member Bank, the same has to be construed in its own terms with reference to the complaint that was before the Tribunal. It was not a general or blanket order without any complaint. The complaint being a complaint of a specified item, the order passed thereon must necessarily mean to cover such coercive actions, as are mentioned in the said Item only. Since, strike is not such an item, there can be no scope for any action under the Contempt of Courts Act. 21.In the result, neither the petition nor the Civil Application survives. Both stand dismissed with costs. Contempt Petition & Civil Application dismissed.