(1.) WE have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

(2.) THE petitioner-Cement Corporation of India has challenged the order dated October 19, 1995 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court/industrial Tribunal, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, whereby despite the objection of the petitioner-Corporation, the application of the workmen for engagement of a legal practitioner was allowed. Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides for representation of parties. Sub-section (4) of Section 36 is as under:

"in any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be. "

(3.) SUB-SECTION (4) of Section 36 of the Act came for consideration of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Their Workmen, (1976-II-LLJ-409) and they have held that for the engagement of a legal practitioner both the consent of other party as well as the permission of the Labour Court/labour Tribunal is required. The observations of the learned judges of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 are relevant. These are: 20. We have given anxious consideration to the above submission. It is true that "and" in a particular context and in view of the object and purpose of a particular legislation may be read as "or" to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. However, having regard to the history of the present legislation, recognition by law of the unequal strength of the parties in adjudication proceedings before a Tribunal, intention of the law being to discourage representation by legal practitioners as such, and the need for expeditious disposal of cases, we are unable to hold that "and" in Section 36 (4) can be read as "or". 21. Consent of the opposite party is not an ideal alternative but a ruling factor in Section 36 (4). The question of hardship, pointed out by the Solicitor-General, is a matter for the Legislature to deal with and it is not for the Courts to invoke the theory of injustice and other consequences to choose a rather strained interpretation when the language of Section 36 is clear and unambiguous".

(4.) IN view of the above law laid down by the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation to h

old that the impugned order passed by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal is wrong, illegal and against Sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Act. Therefore, we allow the Writ petition and quash the impugned order (Annexure P-3). No order as to costs.