1. Petitioners have filed this petition against the notices dated 5-8-2011 and 6-8-2011, Annexure P-1. in regard to removal of construction made in the basement.

2. As per the petitioners they have purchased certain properties as godown situated at Sai Apartment, Jayendraganj, Gwalior on 12-1-1996. Since then, they have been using the property as godown. The petitioners further submitted that respondent No. 5 received permission for construction of godown from the Town & Country Planning on 24-4-1995. The Municipal Corporation also granted permission to the petitioners. Petitioners further submitted that after purchase of the property they have been paying the property tax, however, the Municipal Corporation vide impugned notices directed the petitioners to remove the constructions.

3. The Municipal Corporation, respondent No. 3 in its reply submitted that Town & Country Planning granted permission to respondent No. 5 for construction of basement and as per the sanctioned map the basement can only be used for the purpose of parking, however, respondent No. 5, contrary to the permission as sanctioned by the Town & Country Planning constructed godown in the basement and sold the same in favour of the petitioners, which is contrary to law. It has further been submitted that the Municipal Corporation has not granted any permission in favour of respondent No. 5 for construction of godown nor Municipal Corporation has any power to grant sanction contrary to the permission granted by the Town & Country Planning Department.

4. From the map submitted by the respondent, Corporation, sanctioned by the Town & Country Planning Department in favour of respondent No. 5, it is clear that respondent No. 5 was granted permission by the Town & Country Planning Department for construction of basement for the purpose of parking. Contrary to this, respondent No. 5 sold the property treating it as godown in favour of the petitioners and petitioners have been using the basement as godown.

5. Rule 73 of the Madhya Pradesh Bhumi Vikas Rules, 1984, hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules of 1984' prescribes use of basement. The aforesaid rule is as under : -

"73. Basement.- (1) Basement shall not be used for residential purpose.

(2) The construction of the basement shall be allowed by the Authority in accordance with the land used and other provisions specified under these rules.

(3) Basement may be put to only the following uses to be constructed within the prescribed set backs and prescribed building lines and subject to maximum coverage on Floor 1 (entrance floor) :

(a) Storage or house hold or other goods of ordinarily combustible materials;

(b) Strong rooms, bank cellars;

(c) Air-conditioning equipment and other machine used for services and utilities of the building; and

(d) Parking spaces."

6. It is clear from the aforesaid Rule that the basement cannot be used for residential purposes and the basement can be used for stores or house hold or other goods or strong room, bank cellars and Air-conditioning equipment and other machine used for services and parking space. From the provisions of Rule 73, it is clear that the use of basement for commercial purposes is contrary to the provisions of the rules. The basement can be used as a facility to the residents of the building. It can also be used for parking space.

7. The arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the basement can be used for independent commercial purpose, cannot be accepted because it would be contrary to the Rule 73. Rule 73 (1) clearly prescribes that basement cannot be used for residential purpose.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose and another Vs. Incorporated Law Society, Calcutta High Court and others, AIR 1952 SC 369, has held as under with regard to interpretation of statute : -

"It is a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusages, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute."

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in State of Orissa and others Vs. Joginder Patjoshi and another, AIR 2004 SC 1039, has held as under with regard to interpretation of statute where the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous :

"12. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents' submission that subsequently another department of the State of Orissa intended to grant a higher benefit is of no consequence. In this case, this Court is required to interpret Rule 8 of the Rules as it stood prior to the amendment and not the amended Rules. It is now well settled principle of law that where the language used in a Statute is clear and unambiguous, the question of taking recourse of any principle of interpretation would not arise. In Padma Sundara Rao's case, AIR 2002 SC 1334 = (2002 AIR SCW 1156, Para 13), this Court held :-

"While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it, if a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. [See: Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. Vs. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515]. The Legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6 (1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case, the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6 (1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (1) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 (1), but also by a non- prescribed period. Same can never be the Legislative intent."

10. Similarly, in Hansoli Devi's case, AIR 2002 SC 3240 = 2002 AIR SCW 3755, this Court held:-

"9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The rule stated by Tindal, CJ., in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 CI & Fin 85 = 8 ER 1034, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect (ER P. 1057).

"If the words of the statute are in themselves precises and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver."

It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the Court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the Courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness Vs. John Hudson & Co. Ltd., (1955) 2 All England Reporter 345 = 1955 AC 696 = (1955) 2 WLR 1135, Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that (All ER P. 366 C-D) :

"A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word, which in different contexts is capable or different meanings. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning."

It is no doubt true that if on going through the plaint meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the Court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose Vs. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 = 1953 SCR 1, had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. Vs. Vandry, AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the Legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the Legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the Court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic : on one) who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore. ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay. he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words. it may not be permissible for a land owner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact, in Pradeep Kumari's case, AIR 1995 SC 2259 = 1995 AIR SCW 1834, the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whether after an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, Para 10), "the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collection under Section 18". The expression "did not make an application", as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to the effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly, answer Question 1 (a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."

11. In Dayal Singh's case, AIR 2003 SC 1140 = 2003 AIR SCW 685, a three Judge Bench of this Court, in which both of us were members, observed as under : -

"37. It is a well settled principle of law that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The Court has to find out Legislative intent only from the language employed in the statutes. Surmises and conjectures cannot be restricted to for interpretations cannot be restricted to for interpretation of statutes. I See : Union of India Vs. Filip Tiago De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 = AIR 1990 SC 981].

38. This Court in Bhavanagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 = (2002) 9 Scale 102, has observed (SCC p. 121, Para 25) : -

"25. Scope of the Legislation on the intention of the Legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be constructed according to its plain meaning as no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.

12. The said decision has been followed by this Court in Illachi Devi's case, AIR 2003 SC 3397 = 2003 AIR SCW 4824."

13. Hon'ble the Supreme Court further in Promoters & Builders Association of Pune Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 2007 SC 1956, has held, as under, with regard to interpretation of statute : -

"9. The main challenge of the review petitioners is to the addition of the words "from the very said plot" towards the end of the clause (b) in DCR 2.4.11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners have submitted that in the proposal sent by the Pune Municipal Corporation after following the procedure prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 37 the aforesaid words were not there. However, the State Government while sanctioning the proposal added the said words, which in law it could not do. It has been submitted that the Municipal Corporation had submitted the proposal after inviting objections and after giving an opportunity of hearing and the proposal so made by the Municipal Corporation could not have been modified or altered by the State Government without inviting objections or giving an opportunity of hearing with regard to changes which it proposed to make and which were ultimately made in the notification issued by it. This point has been considered and examined in the judgment and order of this Court dated 5-5-2004. The language of sub-section (2) of Section 37 uses the expression "sanction the modification with or without such changes, and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, or refuse to accord sanction". The language of the Section is very clear and it empowers the State Government to sanction the proposal of the Municipal Corporation regarding modification of Development Control Rules "with or without any changes as it may deem fit". These words are important and cannot be ignored. They have to be given their natural meaning. In Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, it has been held that it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the Court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the Court to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and the policy of the Act. In Nathi Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, it was emphasized that it is well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part of a statute for a purpose and the Legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. In Dr. Ganga Prasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar, (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 192, it has been held that where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Therefore, the view taken by this Court in the judgment and order dated 5-5-2004 that the State Government had full authority to make any changes or add any condition in the proposal of the Municipal Corporation is perfectly correct. In fact, on the plain language of the statute no other view can

possibly be taken." 14. As per the afore quoted law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. in our opinion, the interpretation of Rule 73 (3) of the Rules of 1984, the argument that the basement can be used independently for commercial purpose would be contrary to the rules. The same has been held by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Kunda Manolkar and others Vs. Jagdish Khandelwal and another, reported in 2004(4) M.P.H.T. 9 = 2004 (2) MPLJ 457. It is also a fact that the petitioners have purchased the godown from respondent No. 5, however, on this basis the petitioners could not be granted a right of ownership and use of the basement as godown, which is contrary to Rule 73 of the Rules of 1984 and for that the petitioners may blame themselves only. 15. The petitioners are at liberty to file appropriate proceedings against respondent No. 5 or any other person in accordance with law. However, they cannot be permitted to use the basement for commercial purpose as godown, which was sanctioned by the Town & Country Planning Department for the purpose of parking. Because the petitioners have been using the basement as godown for a long period, hence, in our opinion,-it would be just and proper to grant four weeks' time to the petitioners to vacate the godown. 16. Consequently, the petition of the petitioners is disposed of with the following directions : (1) The petitioners shall vacate the basement area, which is being used by them as godown mentioned in the impugned notices (Annexures P-1 and P-2) within a period of four weeks, failing which the Municipal Corporation shall be at liberty to evict the petitioners from the premises in accordance with the notices (Annexures P-I and P-2). (2) No order as to costs. Order accordingly