VENKATASWAMI J.


The petitioner was the winner of a jackpot ticket in the Madras Race Course On September 6, 1981. The dividend was Rs.9, 361 out of which the second respondent deducted a sum of Rs. 3, 040 towards income-tax and surcharge and paid the balance to the petitioner. The petitioner has come to this court challenging the deduction at source from the amount that he is entitled to as a winner of the jackpot ticket. It appears that he made representations to both the respondents that deduction of income-tax at source is not in accordance with law and he must be given back the amount so deducted. But, the second respondent replied stating that it is a statutory obligation and, therefore, he cannot but deduct the same as required under law. As there was no response from the first respondent, the present writ petition has been filed The petitioner appeared in person and the substance of his argument, as could be gathered from the affidavit, is as follows. According to the petitioner, s. 10(3) of the I.T. Act, 1961, does not contemplate levy of tax on income earned by a hobby or habits and he relied on a decision of this court in Janab A. Syed Jalal Sahib v. CIT in support of his contention. In that judgment, it has been held that though receipts from racing and betting activities are income, the same cannot be exigible to tax in view of s. 4(3)(vii) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. Relying heavily on this decision, the petitioner contends that the deduction at the source in the present case is unsustainable in law.


Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram and Mr. S. V. Subramaniam, learned counsels appearing for the first and second respondents, respectively, brought to my notice the subsequent changes that were brought into effect by the Finance Act, 1972.


"any receipts which are of a casual and non-recurring nature, not being winnings from lotteries, to the extent such receipts do not exceed one thousand rupees in the aggregate." *


From this, it is clear that any receipts of a casual and non-recurring nature over and above Rs. 1, 000 are taken away from the exemption, which was not the case under the old Act, and even under the new Act before April 1, 1972. This important amendment introduced by the Amending Act of 1972 makes all the difference and the reliance placed by the petitioner on Janab A. Syed Jalal Sahib v. CIT will not be of any help or use to him. Again, the other important feature to be noted is s. 56(2)(ib). That provision reads as follows.


" In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the following incomes shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head `Income from other sources', namely.


(ib) income referred to in sub-clause (ix) of clause (24) of section 2


"Income" referred to in sub-cl. (ix) of cl. (24) of s. 2, expressly income from horse races among other things, has been included under the head "Income from other sources" for the purpose of taxation. In the light of these provisions brought out by the Finance Act, 1972, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that the deduction at source by the second respondent is illegal.


Two other important sections which may be of relevance are s. 194BB and s. 203. Section 194BB speaks of deduction, at the source, of income by way of taxation which has been done by the second respondent. The second: respondent has also a statutory obligation to discharge under s. 203. If the grievance of the petitioner is that a larger amount by way of deduction has been taken away by the second respondent, a provision has also been made in the Act, for him to approach the ITO, at the end of the year, by submitting proper returns of income, to get back any excess amount paidOriginally, the petitioner has filed the writ petition for the issue of mandamus forbearing the respondents from deducting or collecting income-tax at source and in view of the fact that deduction had already been made, the petitioner was allowed to convert the petition into one for certiorarified mandamus. In view of the clear position in law, and so long as the provisio

ns are not challenged, it is not possible to give any relief to the petitioner as prayed for. As the petitioner very much relies on the judgment of this court in Janab A. Syed Jalal Sahib v. CIT which, as explained above, cannot be relied upon, in view of the subsequent amendment introduced in the Act, the contentions of the petitioner cannot be accepted. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs.