Proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962, were taken against the petitioner on the ground of seizure of consumer goods of high profit margin like textiles, fountain pens, nail clippers, toilet requisites etc., from inside the fiat car owned by the petitioner. The third respondent on adjudication of the case, by order, dated 29.5.1971 ordered confiscation of the goods. The car owned by the petitioner was also confiscated under Section 115(2) of the Act, but, he was allowed an option to pay a fine of Rs. 15, 000 in lieu of such confiscation. In addition, a penalty of Rs. 20, 000 under Section 112 of the Act was also imposed on the petitioner. The appeal preferred by the petitioner to the second respondent was rejected on 9.12.1975. On the same set of facts and allegations, a criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, convicted the petitioner and passed a sentence of fine on 25.5.1977. There was an appeal by the petitioner in the Court of Sessions, Madras Division and the Appellate Court found, on an assessment of the materials on merits, that the version put forth by the department cannot be believed and further the petitioner was beaten by the Customs Officials and was badly treated and statements were extracted from him by threat and coercion. It held that under the said circumstances, the prosecution must fail and accordingly acquitted the petitioner by judgment, dated 23.1.1978. In the meanwhile, as against the order of the second respondent, dated 9.12.1975, the petitioner preferred a revision to the first respondent and the first respondent by order, dated 11.7.1978 had rejected the said revision. The orders of the respondents are being challenged in the present writ petition.


2.Srimati Ramani Natarajan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would urge that on the same set of facts and allegations, the criminal court has acquitted the petitioner on mertis and hence it is not fair and proper on the part of the department to penalise the petitioner. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relies on two judgments of this Court. The first is that of a Division Bench of this court inD'Silvav. Regional Transport Authority 1952 ILR(Mad) 632. The following observations of the Bench elucidative on the point :-


"We have no hesitation in making it clear that a quasi-judicial Tribunal, like the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal therefrom, cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal courts in respect of an offence, when the Tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence. Let us take the instance before us. The offence consists in smuggling food grains. For that same offence, the petitioner was criminally prosecuted. He has also been punished by his permit being suspended for a period of three months. If the Criminal case against him ends in discharge or acquittal, it means that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence and therefore did not merit any punishment. It would indeed be a strange predicament when in respect of the same offence, he should be punished, by one Tribunal on the footing that he was guilty of the offence and that he should be honorably acquitted by another Tribunal of the very same offence. As primarily the criminal Courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial Tribunals like the Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act." *


3.Ananthanarayanan Offg. Chief Justice, inShaik Kasimv. Superintendent of Post Offices, 1965-2. ML3 90, following the judgment of the Bench of this Court inD'Silvav. Regional Transport Authority, 1962 ILR(Mad) 632, held that where the acquittal is substantially on merits, on identical facts and charges, it will not be proper for disciplinary Tribunal to record a finding of guilt, and to punish thereon, and this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be justified in striking down the action based on such findings, as not in consonance with principles of natural justice.


4.I find that before the proceedings of the departmental authoritie

s got terminated finally, the criminal Court judgment has been rendered by the Sessions Judge, Madras Division, and the said court has acquitted the petitioner not on any technical ground, but, on the merits of the case. Such being the position, the dictum laid down in the above two decisions will squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In this view, I am obliged to interfere in the writ petition and accordingly the petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.