The writ petitioner-Company was a High Tension (HT) Power Consumer bearing HT Sc.No.MDK-171. It used to undertake melt manufacturing of ingots by melting scrap iron for supply to steel rerolling mills. The electric energy service connection of the petitioner unit was inspected on 19.03.1991 at about 11.45 AM by a Divisional Engineer. On finding certain artificial means in the form of sophisticated electric gadgets connected in the potential circuit on the rare side of the meter fixing board, the petitioner was suspected to have pilfered electric energy necessitating further investigation, which revealed the following:

In the meter box (installed for measuring electric energy consumed), the meter fixing board will be fixed to the rare side of the meter box with bolts and seals are fixed to these bolts to prevent any unauthorized person from gaining access to the inside of the metering circuit. In the present case, all the 4 numbers of the meter board fixing bolts seals are found tampered with and artificial means in the form of sophisticated electric circuit consisting of 2 Nos. DC 12 Volts coils, 1 No.110 V/17 V transformer and 1 No. printed circuit board having No. SK (NIC-7501) was found connected between the potential wires of Y & B phases coming from PTs to the test block by meddling thosetential wires. Besides the above, all the 4 Nos. CT secondary wires insulation was found removed for about one inch on each wire and black insulation tape was wrapped around. At that stage, a provisional assessment of loss of energy caused by the petitioner was assessed at Rs.7,78,72,081.60 Ps. and the petitioner was directed to pay 50% of the said provisionally assessed amount for restoration of the power supply. Questioning this provisional assessment notice, the petitioner instituted W.P.No.5657 of 1991 in this High Court and that writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- in four monthly installments of Rs.17,50,000/- each and upon payment of the 1st installment, the power supply was directed to be restored. Since the petitioner paid the amount as directed by this Court in W.P.No.5657 of 1991, the electric energy supply was reconnected on 06.06.1991. Further, the Superintending Engineer/Assessment/ Hyderabad, was directed to conclude he enquiry, preferably, within a period of four months. Thereafter, the Superintending Engineer/Assessment (Special)/Hyderabad took up the enquiry. A show cause notice was issued by the Superintending Engineer/Assessment on 16.04.1991 raising a demand for payment of Rs.7,61,35,973.80 Ps. towards compensation for pilferage of energy + Rs.300/- towards supervision charges anddays time was accorded to the petitioner to make his written submissions. However, after protracted correspondence, the petitioner requested for copies of inspection notes and also for arranging inspection of the dismantled meter box, meter etc., by a team of his Engineers and also sought for permission for cross-examination of Sri K.S.N. Murthy, Divisional Engineer, who carried out the inspection of the unit on 19.03.1991, by his advocate, as also the persons who had disconnected the electric line on 21.03.1991 and removed the meter board and meter box. Accordingly, inspection of the dismantled meter box and meter board was arranged and the petitioner was informed that he could take the copies of the inspection note, panchanama report, etc., on 20.09.1991. However, on 20.09.1991, the writ petitioner did not turn up to avail the opportunity of inspection of dismantled meter box and meter etc. But, he deputed two individuals by names Sri V.R. Veera Swamy and Sri K. Prabhakar with necessary authorization to receive the copies of joint inspection notes and panchanama report. It was informed by them that they were not authorized to inspect dismantled metering equipment, but were authorized only to collect the documents. Accordingly, after furnishing copies of the documents sought for, the petitioner was granted time to submit written representation by 05.10.1991. However, the petitioner sought for extension of this time up to 15.10.1991 on the ground that there was curfew imposed in some parts of Hyderabad city. Finally, a written representation was submitted by the petitioner on 11.10.1991. The petitioner was accorded personal hearing in the matter on 02.12.1991. The petitioner entered appearance through his advocate, Sri D. Manmohan, who sought for adjournment through a junior counsel on the ground of indisposition. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to 16.12.1991. On that day also, a short adjournment was requested as the counsel was held up before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Hence, personal hearing was posted to 19.12.1991. On which day, Sri D. Manmohan assisted by Sri Khazim Mirza, a retired Divisional Engineer of the Electricity Board, appeared and made his submissions. The gist of the contentions canvassed was recorded by the Superintending Engineer and the signature of the advocate was also taken thereon. Sri D. Manmohan, learned Advocate for the petitioner, appears to have requested time till 24.12.1991 to submit written arguments and other related documents. But, no such written arguments or additional supporting documents were submitted. Therefore, on 08.01.1992, the petitioner was informed by the Superintending Engineer that no further information or documents would be taken into consideration. At that stage, the written arguments in the matter were submitted on 09.01.1992 and the turnover certificate of the petitioner company was submitted on 13.01.1992 and they were also taken into consideration by the Superintending Engineer while finalizing the assessment. It was contended before the Superintending Engineer that out of total sanctioned load of 4850 KVA, CMD of 1750 KVA was sanctioned on 24 hours per day basis and the remaining additional load of 3100 KVA was sanctioned on 8 hours working per day basis. Therefore, while estimating the consumption of electric energy, it was urged, erroneously 24 hours working formula has been taken for both the load factors. The Superintending Engineer, in his assessment order dated 31.07.1992, has clearly pointed out as to how the additional load of 3100 KVA was also consumed by the writ petitioner on 24 hours per day basis and has also brought out crisply the various dates during the months of October and December 1987, as to how the petitioner has paid for additional security deposit for the reason that his unit was found consuming the additional load for more than 16 hours per day as revealed by the monthly consumption figures. Thus, the factual controversy racked up with regard to consumption of 3100 KVA load has been set at rest.

On behalf of the petitioner, it was also urged that the formula of levying of penalty at 4 times the normal rate of consumption charge has been adopted illegally. In the assessment order, it was pointed out that the petitioner at the time of securing electric energy supply on 10.11.1998 executed the necessary agreement, which is in accord with Appendix 12 of the revised Terms and Conditions of Supply. As per condition 39.12.1 of the Terms and Conditions of supply notified by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) the value of energy estimated as a result of pilferage of energy shall be charged at special rates as notified by the Board from time to time. Further as per Clause 9 of the agreement, the petitioner has agreed to abide by the Terms and Conditions of supply notified by the Board from time to time. Therefore, as notified, at that point of time by the APSEB levying the penalty at the rate of 4 times the normal consumption charges of energy is perfectly legitimate.

It was also urged that when the meter reading is taken on monthly basis, the fact that the petitioner has planted an artificial material behind the meter board would not have gone unnoticed and hence, the very allegation of pilferage of electric energy is completely wrong. The Superintending Engineer has rightly pointed out that the man, who has been tasked to read the meters, would not have had an opportunity to look for any possible tampering unless there is some material visible for the naked eye to raise his suspicion. The usage of sophisticated artificial material to prevent faithful recording of electric energy consumed came to be detected only on 19.03.1991 when the matter has been inspected by the Divisional Engineer, who noticed the seals being tampered. Further, the circuit behind the meter fixing board could not be seen ordinarily unless the meter board itself is opened and its back side is examined, is the finding of fact recorded by the Superintending Engineer in his assessment order. This finding does not appear to be a perverse one and on the other hand a plausible one at that. Thus, after properly considering the various submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the Superintending Engineer/Assessment (Special)/Hyderabad held the petitioner guilty of theft of energy and assessed the resulted loss sustained by the electricity board on account of pilferage at Rs.6,61,68,347/. While making a demand for payment of the aforementioned money together with Rs.300/- towards supervision charges, the Superintending Engineer granted 30 days time for the petitioner to pay the said amount.

The petitioner has then filed W.P.No.12620 of 1992, against this assessment order. Entertaining the said writ petition, this Court granted stay of further proceedings including disconnection, subject to the condition of the petitioner depositing a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- on or before 30.10.1992 and a further sum of Rs.25,00,000/- on or before 30.11.1992. The petitioner has failed to comply with the conditional order passed by this Court and hence, the service connection for supply of electric energy was once again disconnected on 20.01.1993. Ultimately, W.P.No.12620 of 1992 was dismissed on 15.10.1993 and the Chief Engineer/the appellate authority was directed to finalize the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner against the orders of assessment dated 31.07.1992, within a period of two months. Thereafter, the petitioner filed W.A.No.1316 of 1993 against the judgment rendered in W.P.No.12620 of 1992 and finally that appeal was disposed of on 10.10.2000 with a direction to the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal. Thereafter, the Chief Engineer has considered the appeal of the writ petitioner and dismissed the same on 23.10.2001 while holding that the petitioner herein is liable to pay an amount of Rs.6,55,13,475.80. The order of the appellate authority dated 23.10.2001 has become final as no challenge was made to it.

Along with the counter affidavit, it was brought out that since the petitioner has failed to remit the money as determined by the Chief Engineer on 23.10.2001, the provisions of APSEB (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1984 and the Rules made thereunder have been invoked and accordingly, notice in Form-A dated 06.12.2001 was issued demanding payment of Rs.6,55,13,475.80 within 15 days, failing which action would be taken to recover the amount due under Section 6 of the aforementioned Act. Thereafter, since the demand has not materialized, notice in Form-B on 18.04.2002 was also issued intimating that a further penalty of 2% per month on the amount due becomes liable to be recovered in terms of sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the aforementioned Act and accordingly, a total amount of Rs.6,68,23,745/- due as of then has been demanded by this Form-B notice. Since the petitioner has not paid the said amount, the necessary certificate was issued to the District Collector, Medak District at Sangareddy on 23.08.2002 with a request to invoke the provisions of Revenue Recovery Act for recovering the arrears from the petitioner. For strange and inexplicable reasons, the District Collector, Medak has allowed the claim to hibernate. Based upon the intimation delivered in Form-C, the Deputy Tahsildar, through his notice dated 18.09.2014, called upon the petitioner to pay up the Electricity Board dues, failing which, the provisions of Revenue Recovery Act would be invoked, treating the dues as arrears of land revenue in terms of Section 52-A of the Revenue Recovery Act. It is this notice which triggered the present writ petition. Heard at great length Sri Devineni Vijay, learned senior counsel on behalf of Ms. D. Hamsa Devineni, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned standing Counsel on behalf of the 4th respondent-Superintending Engineer, who was impleaded, as such, on 17.11.2014.

Sri Devineni Vijay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the writ petitioner has been subjected to the ordeal of prosecution in C.C.No.1239 of 1997 and the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sangareddy, by his erroneous judgment dated 21.04.1999, convicted the accused Nos.1 to 5 in that case. But, however, when the matter was carried in appeal in Crl.A.No.64 of 1999 on the file of Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Offence under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-cum-V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Medak, the learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 09.11.2006, rightly acquitted the accused and allowed the appeal. It was also further pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the State has further carried the matter in Crl.A.No.721 of 2008 and this Court by its judgment dated 14.11.2011 dismissed the said appeal confirming the acquittal accorded on merits by the learned Sessions Judge. Therefore, it is contended that, the petitioner cannot be victimized by making a demand for payment of more than Rs.6.5 crores for the alleged pilferage of electric energy, which did not happen at all. It is contended that any action to allow the respondents to recover any such money, based upon an erroneous assessment made by the Superintending Engineer, as confirmed in the appeal by the Chief Engineer, be a patently illegal act in the face of findings recorded by the criminal Court.

Per contra, Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel has pointed out that Clause 39.15 of the revised Terms and Conditions of Supply, by which the writ petitioner is bound authorized the Board to recover the pilferage charges. Clause 39.15 of the Revised Terms and Conditions of supply reads as under:

'Neither failure to launch criminal proceedings nor the acquittal of the consumer in such proceedings on a ground other than that the charge is false shall bar the proceedings under the provision stipulated therein.'

(Underlining is My Own)

And based thereon, it is contended that recovery of penalty for the energy pilferage is a legitimate exercise.

It is true that the Terms and Conditions of electric supply made it clear that neither failure to launch criminal proceedings for pilferage of energy nor acquittal of the consumer in such proceedings on any other ground than that the charge is false shall bar the proceedings for recovery of the charges for pilfered energy. Therefore, the all important question that is required to be answered is whether the petitioner has been acquitted on the ground that the charge laid against him is a false one or not. If he is so acquitted then the contention canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner deserves to be upheld.

The judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, which is placed at page No.32 of the writ petition paper book, in Para 20, the Sessions Court, in the ultimate analysis, recorded its finding as under:

'…In this connection, the defence counsel relied on a decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 849 in Jagannath Singh @ Jainath Singh vs. B.S. Ranmaswamy wherein, it is held that:-

A check meter affords an easy method of proving that the consumer’s meter is recording less than the units consumed and is being used as an artificial means for abstraction of the unrecorded energy. To bring home the charge under S 39 the prosecution must also prove that the consumer is responsible for the tampering.

In the present case, the prosecution has not use the check meter method to know whether really there is abstraction of energy, despite the fact that the check meter was present and it was recording correctly as reflected in the daily log sheets marked as Exs.C1 to C8. So the above-cited judgment is clearly applicable to the present case.

19. Further, the trial court has already stated in its judgment that the APSEB officials were shown callous and careless attitude in obtaining the seals of the meter every month so mechanically without giving due diligence about the aspect of possibility of tampering the meters. The officers who record the consumption every month and who opens the seals every month is not like lineman. They are well educated and having sufficient technical knowledge, they are supposed to pay attention even while recording the monthly consumption and while opening the seals. A simple statement that due to rush of work he could not notice as to the tampering of seals is not sufficient.

20. The learned PP argued that on the basis of the evidence of PPWs 1 to 15 and especially on the basis of the evidence of PW 14 who is an expert, it clearly goes to show that the accused have committed the pilferage of energy. He further stated that though the seals were in tact in the meter box there is possibility for pilferage of energy by the accused through a remote controller and the prosecution has successfully proved the guilt of the accused and the accused are liable for conviction. But for the above, my answer is that it is the duty of the prosecution to seize the said remote controller from the accused. But here in this case, the prosecution has not recovered any remote controller from the accused and hence it has failed to establish that the accused has committed pilferage of energy with a remote controller.

(Underlining is brought out by me)

21. For the foregoing reasons given by me and in view of the evidences of Pws1 to 7 and on the basis of the citation relied upon, I come to the conclusion that when the seals are intact, there is no possibility of pilferage of energy by the accused. Hence I answer this point accordingly in favour of the accused and against the prosecution.

22. In the result, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Addl. Judl. Magistrate of First Class, Sangareddy in C.C.No.1239 of 1997 dated 21-4-1999.'

It is also worth noticing the judgment rendered by this Court in Crl.A.No.721 of 2008, wherein it was clearly held as under:

'……………. If the electronic gadget had been noticed during the inspection in question, there is no reason as to why it escaped the attention of the concerned during the earlier visits, which of course was attempted to be explained away by the trial Court by a process of strained reasoning. While the report of PW.14 was admitted even PW.14 is not supported by reasons, which were sought to be given during the evidence of PW.14 that if excessive pressure is used, the seal bit may appear to be flattened and the impression on the seal depends on the pressure used by the hand. The manner in which PW.14 came to his conclusion was about the possibility of flattening of bits, loosening of wire, reintroduction of the wire and repressing of the same and in equating such a possibility with certainty, the principle that an accused in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved was clearly given a go bye. The possibility suggested by PWs.13 and 14 coupled with the evidence of the persons, who participated in the inspection, might be capable of creating very strong doubts about the complicity of the accused, but they cannot be equated to any legal proof beyond reasonable doubt without an unambiguous answer to the fundamental question as to how any tampering with the meter or any pilferage of energy or any manipulation of the readings would have been possible, when admittedly the seals were in tact and there was no possibility of pilferage even according to PW.1 and when any remote control device was not recovered at the scene or produced before the Court and when the operation of the electronic gadget said to have been found in the photographs was not shown to be the cause for the alleged pilferage. Under the circumstances, the benefit of doubt given to the accused by the appellate Court cannot be interfered with and the possibility of taking a second view on the evidence by itself cannot be a ground to interfere with an acquittal by a final fact finding Court on merits unless its appreciation is perverse and baseless. Therefore, the Criminal Appeal should fall and it is accordingly dismissed.'

(Emphasis is supplied)

From this it becomes more clear that the petitioner herein has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge by extending the benefit of doubt, but not on the ground that the charge laid against the petitioner herein is a false one. This Court has understood the judgment of the Sessions Court as such and extended the benefit of doubt to the accused. It is only appropriate to bear in mind that the petitioner herein is Accused No.1 in the criminal case. It is therefore clear that the recovery proceedings for the pilfered electric energy are not barred against the petitioner, particularly, in view of Clause 39.15 of the revised Terms and Conditions of supply of electric energy. It is also apt to remember that the act of pilferage of electric energy attracts two different and distinct components. Theft of electric energy has come to be recognized as an offence and consequently, any person who has been accused of committing such an offence, becomes liable to be prosecuted and punished. Electric energy which is pilfered also needs to be paid for which is purely a civil consequence and hence as to how much energy has been pilfered and as to how much of penalty should be levied for such a misdemeanor are components which attract purely civil consequence. Therefore, the same act of pilferage of electric energy may have several facets to be taken note of and dealt with. If the Criminal Court upon proper consideration of the material/evidence arrives at a conclusion that the charge of theft of electric energy is a false one, in such a situation, the question of determining the quantum of energy pilfered would not arise. Consequently, levying and penalty gets ruled out. Otherwise than the ground of laying a false charge, any other kind of acquittal would not come to the aid of the consumer. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the petitioner before competent criminal Court would not automatically enure to the benefit of the petitioner to avoid the civil consequences arising from out of the act of pilferage of electric energy. This apart, the standard of proof normally adopted by the criminal Court is proof beyond all reasonable doubt. If a doubt persists in the mind of the Court as to whether the accused person has actually committed the offence alleged against him or not, then, the Criminal Court would acquit such an accused person and let him go unpunished, whereas for purpose of finalizing the quantity of pilfered energy, a standard procedure and method has been evolved and as per that method the penalty becomes liable to be imposed by the competent authority. Accordingly, in the instant case, the Superintending Engineer/ Assessment (Special)/Hyderabad, by his proceedings dated 31.07.1992, has made an assessment that the petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs.6,61,68,347/- towards pilfered energy component. In appeal preferred by the petitioner, the Chief Engineer, while dismissing the appeal has reduced the said amount to that of Rs.6,55,13,475.80 and this order in appeal of the Chief Engineer, has not been challenged by the petitioner and hence, it has attained finality. Since the petitioner has accepted the said order by not calling it in question there is no escape for the petitioner from paying up the said amount.

Now comes the crucial question raised by Sri Devineni Vijay, learned senior counsel, who contended that the amount determined by the Chief Engineer on 23.10.2001 having not been acted upon, no such money can be recovered, as any such claim is barred by limitation. It was also further contended that the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act cannot be invoked at all for recovering the dues from the petitioner.

In so far as the contention relating to the applicability of the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, it is only appropriate to notice the fact - as pointed out by Sri O. Manohar Reddy - that the State Legislature enacted the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1984, Act No.28 of 1984. Section 2(2) of this Act defined dues as meaning a sum payable to the APSEB on account of consumption of electric energy supply including the minimum charges payable after disconnection and other charges payable under the terms and conditions of supply. The expression debtor is defined in Section 2(2) of this Act as meaning any consumer or other person by whom any dues are payable to the APSEB. Accordingly, the writ petitioner being a consumer of electric energy and having fallen in arrears of payment of consumption charges of electric energy together with the penalty imposed thereon under the terms and conditions of supply, answers the description of debtor and the sum payable by him becomes ‘dues’. Subsection (1) of Section 3 of this Act required a bill to be raised on the debtor in the prescribed form specifying the amount of dues and the date by which such dues are required to be paid. Along with the counter affidavit, the notice issued in Form-A, as prescribed vide Rule 4(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Sate Electricity Board (Recovery of Dues) Rules, 1985, has been raised on 06.12.2001 requiring full settlement of dues within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. Subsection 2 of Section 3 further made it clear that if the dues are not paid by such date, the debtor shall be liable to pay in addition such penalty as may be prescribed. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 clearly laid down that the penalty leviable is at the rate of 2% per month or part thereof for the delay beyond the due date. Section 5 of this Act spelt out that when a notice of demand has been served upon a debtor or his authorized representative, and if he denied his liability to pay the dues, penalty or costs or any part of any of them, he may institute a suit within six months from the date of service of the notice of demand. Thereafter, Subsection (1) of Section 6 of this Act made it clear that if the aggregate amount of dues, penalty and costs is not paid within three months of the date of service of notice, or such extended period the prescribed authority may from time to time allow, the debtor shall be continued to be in default in respect of such amount and the same shall be recoverable as if it were in arrears of land revenue, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. It is, therefore, clear that if a debtor commits default of clearing the dues, such a debtor is deemed as a defaulter in respect of such amount and the same becomes liable to be recovered as if it were in arrears of land revenue. In this context, it will be appropriate to notice that Entry No.38 of List III of the VII Schedule to the Constitution dealt with the field of ‘Electricity’ and consequently, the State Legislature has the competence to make laws with respect to the matters concerning recovery of consumption charges, including any penalty leviable for pilferage of electricity.

So long as no inconsistency is demonstrated between a parliamentary enactment and the provision contained under Subsection (1) of Section 6, this enactment which provides for treating the dues of the writ petitioner herein as arrears of land revenue, shall hold the field.

The learned Senior Counsel has drawn my attention to the various provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, Act No.36 of 2003, in support of his plea that the impugned action is not in conformity with the provisions of this enactment.

The Indian Electricity Act, 1910, created the basic framework for electric supply industry. It provided for licenses to supply electricity in a specified area. The said Act also created appropriate legal framework for laying down of wires and other works relating to the supply of electricity. The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, called for creation of a State Electricity Board and to entrust it with the responsibility of arranging the supply of electricity in each State. After each State established electricity boards, a phenomenal growth of infrastructure relating to generation, transmission and supply of electricity was noticed. However, when the performance of electricity boards has been reviewed, it was noticed that some of the decisions taken by the boards, particularly, such as fixation of tariff were found to be lacking any professional approach. There was also growing dependence of the Boards on the support of the State Governments. With a view to address this particular issue and also for distancing the respective State Governments from determination of tariffs, the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 was brought in. However, some of the States, starting with the State of Orissa including Andhra Pradesh, have undertaken wholesome reforms and for achieving the same, broughtforth Reforms Act through the respective State Legislatures. These reforms have brought forth unbundling of the State Electricity Boards into separate generation, transmission and distribution companies. With a view to harmonize and rationalize the provisions contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998, the Parliament enacted the Electricity Act, 2003 to bring forth a self-contained comprehensive legislation taking care of all relevant aspects. By Section 185 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 are repealed. Subsection (2) of Section 185 of Electricity Act, 2003, saved from such repeal anything done or any action taken including any inspection, order or notice made or issued under the repealed laws shall, in so far as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. The provisions of Section 1 to 120 and 122 to 185 of this Electricity Act, 2003, have been brought into force on 10.06.2003. Learned Senior Counsel would point out that under Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, only disconnection of supply for default of payment is contemplated. It was also pointed out that Section 126 prescribed as to how, if on an inspection of any place or premises or after inspection of the equipments, gadgets, machines, devices found connected or used and if the assessing officer comes to the conclusion that such person is indulging in unauthorized use of electricity, he shall provisionally assess to the best of his judgment the electricity charges payable by such person and also provide for a detailed procedure in that regard.

Under Section 127 of this Act, a provision to prefer an appeal to an Appellate Authority to any person aggrieved by a final order made under Section 126 is provided. Section 135 of this Act recognized theft of electricity as an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both and Section 138 also recognized any unauthorized interference with meters or works of a licencee as an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to Rs.10,000/- or with both and under Section 143 for purposes of adjudging the cause, the Appropriate Commission shall appoint any of its Members to be an adjudicating officer for holding an enquiry, after giving any person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard for purposes of imposing any penalty. Section 147 has also specifically recognized that the penalties imposed under this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any liability in respect of payment of compensation. It was next contended that under Section 153 of this Act, the State Government was required to constitute as many Special Courts as may be necessary for speedy trial of offences prescribed under Section 135 to 140 and Section 150 of the Act. The procedure and power of the Special Courts has been spelt out in detail in Section 154. The learned Senior Counsel would place reliance upon Subsection (5) of Section 154 which spelt out that the Special Court shall determine the civil liability against a consumer in terms of money for theft of energy which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to two times of the tariff rate applicable for a period of twelve months preceding the date of detection of theft of energy and the amount of civil liability so identified shall be recovered as if it were a decree of Civil Court. Therefore, it is contended that only by taking recourse to a Special Court constituted by the State Government under Section 153, the recovery can be affected in the matter. The learned Senior Counsel would also point out that under Section 170 of this Act any penalty payable by a person under this Act, if not paid may be recovered as if it were in arrear of land revenue. It was also urged by the learned Senior Counsel that by virtue of Section 173 and 174, the provisions of this Act have been given primacy and they shall prevail over any other law for the time being in force. It is appropriate to notice that Sections 173, 174 and Subsection (2) of Section 185 when read together, it clearly emerges that the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 will have primacy if there is anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. As pointed out supra, the provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1984, are no way inconsistent with the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, nor does Section 52-A of the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, can be construed as inconsistent with Section 153 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Hence, there is no necessity for the respondents to initiate the proceedings all over under this Act.

Section 52-A has been introduced to the A.P. Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, by the State Amending Act No.18 of 1977. This provision authorized recovery of sums due to certain banks and other public bodies as arrears of land revenue. If public corporations are left to a remedy of a civil suit the recovery is bound to be delayed considerably. It is with the object of avoiding the unusual delay which normally takes place in the civil courts the expeditious remedy by enacting Section 52-A has been provided. In this context, it is appropriate to notice that the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. G.N. Venkataswamy and others (AIR 1995 SC 21), while reversing the judgment of the Madras High Court held that the Tamil Nadu Legislature could enact a similar provision - which was also incidentally numbered as Section 52-A - of Tamil Nadu Recovery Act, under Entry 11-A of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in the following words, after considering the earlier judgment of Constitution Bench in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai (1951 SCR 51):

"12. It is no doubt correct that with the coming into force of Entry 11-A List III it is no more the exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate under the said entry but 'administration of justice' and 'constitution and organization of all courts' are the subjects on which the State Legislature can legislate. These expressions have been authoritatively interpreted by this Court in Narothamdas case. It is, therefore, settled that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has the power to make laws thereby enlarging or reducing the powers of the Courts. The State Legislature can create new courts, recognize the existing courts, provide jurisdiction to the said courts and also take away the existing jurisdiction if it so desires. We, therefore, see no reason why a State Legislature cannot confer additional jurisdiction on existing revenue courts to recover any public dues as arrears of land revenue."

Again after noticing the principles enunciated in Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. P.N. Sharma (AIR 1965 SC 1595) and Dev Singh v. Registrar, Punjab and Haryana High Court [1987 (3) SCC 169], it was further held by the Supreme Court as under:

'15. The Collector exercises powers under the Act which is an Act of the State Legislature. He is invested with the power to decide the controversy between the State and the defaulter. There is in existence a lis between the State and the defaulter. There is assertion and denial. The dispute involves the rights and obligations of the parties which are decided by the Collector. The Collector has the power to sell movable and immovable property of the defaulter. He can even arrest and detain the person up to a period of two years. All these powers of the Collector are the judicial powers of the State. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that the Collector under the Act is a revenue court. Once it is held, as we have, that the Collector is a revenue court then there is no difficulty in holding that Section 52-A of the Act was enacted by the Tamil Nadu Legislature under Entry 11-A List III Schedule 7 Constitution of India.'

A full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court, when called upon to decide whether only loans and advances made by corporations can be recovered under Section 52-A of the Revenue Recovery Act, but not other sums due, the full bench speaking through Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, answered the said question in C.J. Raju vs The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by the District Collector and ors. (AIR 1965 SC 1595) in the following words:

'……….We are unable to make a distinction between "sums due to State-owned corporations on account of other transactions" and "sums due to State-owned corporations on account of loans and advances made by them". Both, in our view, stand on the same footing as State-owned corporations, being public bodies, while recovering either categories of dues, are recovering only public dues…….'

Therefore, the contention canvassed by Sri D. Vijay that the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act cannot be invoked is liable to be repelled.

The learned Senior Counsel would point out that even if it is assumed that the dues are recoverable from the petitioner, it is barred by limitation, when the period is so computed from the date the Chief Engineer has passed final order of adjudication. The learned Senior Counsel would urge that

as per Entry No.113 of the I deviation of the schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed is only three years when the right to sue accrues. On the strength and basis of the above, he would urge that the recovery proceedings now initiated shall be quashed. In this context, it is only appropriate to notice that Clause 39.15 of the terms and conditions of supply, by which the petitioner is bound, has clearly brought out clearly that the acquittal of consumer in criminal proceedings on a ground other than the charge is false shall not bar the proceedings for recovery of the dues. It is, therefore, essential, when a criminal prosecution is launched by the State against the petitioner, the respondents are required to await the result thereof. If a consumer stands acquitted by the Criminal Court on the ground that the charge laid against him is a false one, no dues can be recovered at all from such a consumer. Therefore, even if an assessment of the liability is made either prior to the launching of the prosecution or during the course of its pendency, incidence of accrual of the actual recovery has to necessarily wait for a decision to be rendered by the Criminal Court in the matter. If, ultimately, the Criminal Court were to hold that the charge held against the consumer that he has pilfered electric energy is a false one, then, in such an event, even if the liability of the consumer has already been determined by the competent authority, but nonetheless, such amount cannot be recovered. Even if the amount as determined by the Superintending Engineer is recovered, if the Criminal Court were to declare the charge of pilferage as a false one later on, then, perhaps, the amount so recovered would become liable to be refunded. The choice of recovering first with a prospect to refund it later lies with the Board, but, it is a matter of discretion to be exercised. Hence, the cause for recovery of dues determined by the Superintending Engineer or Circle Engineer, gets deferred till the Criminal Court decides the case. It is no doubt true that the petitioner herein being the first accused in C.C.No.1239 of 1997 was convicted by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sanga Reddy on 21.04.1999, but nonetheless, the said judgment of conviction was the subject matter of appeal in Crl.A.No.64 of 1999 and the learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 09.11.2006 allowed the criminal appeal and acquitted the petitioner and the other accused. It will be further interesting to notice that against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, the State carried the matter in further appeal in Crl.A No.721 of 2008 under Section 378 Cr.P.C. That was decided by this Court on 14.11.2011, making it explicitly clear that the accused in the crime were acquitted by extending benefit of doubt, but not because the charge laid against them is a false one. It is only appropriate to notice the principle spelt out under Section 393 Cr.P.C, that, judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon an appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Sections 377, 378, 384(4) or Chapter XXX of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the right to recover the dues as determined by the Superintending Engineer in the instant case, which order has been affirmed by the Circle Engineer in appeal preferred by the petitioner herein, accrued only after the judgment was rendered by this Court on 14.11.2011 in Criminal Appeal No.721 of 2008. The impugned notice is drawn and served on the petitioner herein on 18.09.2014 and this writ petition is instituted on 15.10.2014, thus, well within the 3 year period reckoned from the date the judgment was rendered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.721 of 2008 affirming the acquittal of the petitioner herein and other accused persons extending the benefit of doubt in their favour. Therefore, the three year period of limitation thus reckoned, having not expired, the petitioner cannot successfully urge that the recovery of the dues from him by the respondents is barred by limitation. I could find no merit in any of the contentions canvassed in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.5,000/- payable to the fourth respondent. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending shall also stand dismissed.