NATARAJAN J.


The interesting question raised in this revision is whether the sisters of a person, who died in a motor accident, can seek impleadment in a petition filed under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and rule 3 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, by the widow and minor child of the deceased, for seeking compensation from the owner of the motor vehicle and his insurer. One K. Nagarajan died in a motor accident. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 herein, who are the widow and minor son of the deceased, Nagarajan, filed MACTOP No. 796 of 1983 against the owner of the lorry involved in the accident and the insurance company, to claim compensation for the death of Nagarajan. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein, who are the sisters of Nagarajan, filed M. P. No. 2045 of 1983 seeking impleadment on the ground that they were being maintained by the deceased, Nagarajan, and as such they also constitute his dependants and, consequently, they are also interested in the proceedings instituted for getting compensation from the owner and the insurer for the death of Nagarajan. The petitioners herein opposed the impleadment of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. But the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has overruled their objection and ordered impleadment of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The correctness of this order is challenged in this revision.


For passing an order in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, the Tribunal has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Perumal v. G. Ellusamy Reddiar 1974 (1) MLJ 292 ; 1974 ACJ 182 (Mad). That was a case where a bachelor died in a motor accident leaving behind him as heirs only his sisters and brothers. When the sisters and brothers filed a petition under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, their claim was resisted by the owner and the insurer on the ground that they are not the legal representatives or heirs and hence they cannot maintain the petition. A Division Bench of this court, consisting of P. S. Kailasam J., as he then was, and N. S. Ramaswami J., considered the matter elaborately and held that the term "legal representative" in section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act will take in all persons covered by the term "representative" occurring in section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act and that the term "representative" occurring in the said Act should be understood as referring to next of kin who were the dependants of the deceased as contemplated under that Act. While N. S. Ramaswami J. went to the extent of saying that the definition of the term "legal representative" in section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code would not include all persons who are entitled to apply for compensation under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act and that rule 2(c) of the Madras Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1961, which provides that the term "legal representative" shall have the meaning assigned to it under clause (11) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is ultra vires the rule-making powers of the Government, Kailasam J., as he then was, held that the term "legal representative" can be construed as including all claimants under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Taking this decision as an authority, the Tribunal has held that respondents Nos. 1 and 2, being the dependent sisters of the deceased, Nagarajan, are entitled to seek impleadment in the petition filed by the petitioners.I am afraid, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. In the very Division Bench decision that has been relied upon, N. S. Ramaswami J., has summed his view in paragraph 48 in the following manner :


"The resulting position from the above discussion is that in respect of applications under section 110A of the Act for the death of a person in a motor accident, the claimants must prove that the accident amounted to a tortious act and if that is proved, compensation can be awarded for loss of benefit to the claimants if they are dependants as contemplated under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and compensation can also be awarded towards loss to the estate of the deceased, whether the claimants are dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act or not." *


Kailasam J., as he then was, has expressed his view in paragraph 66 as under :


"Under sections 110A to 110F of the amended Motor Vehicles Act, the procedure has been made simpler and a suit by the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased on behalf of the claimants has been dispensed with and all the entitled to compensation are enabled to maintain an application under section 110A, thereby giving effect to the extended meaning of the word 'representative' in section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act rendered in Johnson v. Madras Railway Company 1906 (28) ILR(Mad) 473. In the circumstances, the term 'legal representative' can be construed as including all claimants under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act." *


In this context, reference must be made to section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The relevant portion reads as follows :



"Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased." *


Applying this definition, it may be seen that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 being the sisters of Nagarajan will not be entitled to maintain an action for compensation, especially in the presence of the widow and son of the deceased. Nor can respondents Nos. 1 and 2 claim to be the executors or administrators of the estate of the deceased, Nagarajan. In fact, they only seek impleadment on the ground that they were being maintained and supported by Nagarajan during his lifetime and as such they also constitute dependants. It is not every dependant who will be entitled to seek payment of compensation, but only the dependants whom the deceased was bound in law to maintain and support.


Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would say that the first petitioner and Nagarajan had misunderstanding between them and they were living separately and Nagarajan was only providing maintenance and as such, the first petitioner cannot represent his estate. This contention is alien to the controversy on hand. Admittedly, the first petitioner is the wife and

the second petitioner is the son of the deceased, Nagarajan, and as long as that relationship lasts, they are entitled to seek compensation for the death of Nagarajan. Even assuming that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were being maintained by Nagarajan and that they have a right in law to seek a share in the compensation amount that may be awarded against the owner and insurer of the vehicle, they have got to work out their rights in separate proceedings in a civil court. They cannot seek determination of their rights in proceedings under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision is allowed and M. P. No. 2045 of 1983 will stand dismissed. No costs.