V.K. GUPTA, J.

(1.) By this common judgment all the above-mentioned appeals are being disposed of together.

(2.) These appeals filed under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are at the instance of the appellant National Insurance Co. Ltd. and challenge the judgments/ awards passed by learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan given by him with respect to an accident occurring on 18.7.1999 involving bus No. HP 17-4377. In this accident various persons had died and a large number of persons had received injuries. The heirs and legal representatives of the deceased persons had filed the following claim petitions, being the claim petitions shown against the appeals mentioned as herein- below:

SI.No.

F.A.O.(MVA) No.

MAC No.

1.

404 of 2001

69-MAC/2 of 1999

2.

405 of 2001

150-MAC/2 of 1999

3.

406 of 2001

153-MAC/2 of 1999

4.

407 of 2001

203-MAC/2 of 1999

5.

408 of 2001

146-MAC/2 of 1999

6.

409 of 2001

75-MAC/2 of 1999

7.

410 of 2001

99-MAC/2 of 1999

8.

411 of 2001

103-MAC/2 of 1999

9.

412 of 2001

136-MAC/2 of 1999

10.

413 of 2001

155-MAC/2 of 1999

11.

414 of 2001

154-MAC/2 of 1999

12.

415 of 2001

73-MAC/2 of 1999

13.

416 of 2001

89-MAC/2 of 1999

14.

417 of 2001

144-MAC/2 of 1999

15.

418 of 2001

138-MAC/2 of 1999

16.

419 of 2001

156-MAC/2 of 1999

17.

420 of 2001

142-MAC/2 of 1999

18.

421 of 2001

148-MAC/2 of 1999

19.

425 of 2001

95-MAC/2 of 1999

All the aforesaid claim petitions were decided by a common judgment and award by the Tribunal passed on 27.8.2001.

(3.) The following claim petitions, being claim petitions shown against the appeals:

SI.No.

F.A.O.(MVA) No.

MAC No.

1.

140 of 2002

18-MAC/2 of 2000

2.

141 of 2002

196-MAC/2 of 1999

3.

142 of 2002

140-MAC/2 of 1999

4.

143 of 2002

15-MAC/2of 2000

5.

144 of 2002

85-MAC/2 of 1999

6.

145 of 2002

195-MAC/2 of 1999

7.

146 of 2002

198-MAC/2 of 1999

8.

147 of 2002

83-MAC/2 of 1999

9.

148 of 2002

93-MAC/2 of 1999

10.

149 of 2002

17-MAC/2 of 2000

11.

150 of 2002

179-MAC/2 of 1999

12.

151 of 2002

169-MAC/2 of 1999

13.

152 of 2002

87-MAC/2 of 1999

14.

153 of 2002

14-MAC/2 of 2000

15.

154 of 2002

157-MAC/2 of 1999

16.

453 of 2003

81-MAC/2 of 1999

were filed by the injured persons claiming compensation for the injuries received by them in the aforesaid accident. Vide judgment and award dated 26.11.2001, learned Tribunal decided all the aforesaid claim petitions and passed the awards granting compensation to the injured persons.

(4.) All the aforesaid appeals filed by the appellant National Insurance Co. Ltd. relate to both the aforesaid sets of claim petitions, arising out of death cases as well as injury cases in which the Tribunal has granted compensation to the claimants.

(5.) Mr. Ravi Bakshi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant during the course of hearing of these appeals has assailed the impugned judgments and awards on the following common grounds: (1) that the vehicle in question was not being plied in a public place and this entitled the appellant to absolve itself of the liability to pay the award amounts; (2) that the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident did not hold a valid driving licence; (3) that since the bus was overloaded in the sense that persons more than the permitted seating capacity of the bus was being carried in the bus at the time of the accident, this also entitled the appellant to absolve itself of its liability to pay; and (4) that the policy of insurance had limited the liability of the appellant insurer to indemnify the insured only to the extent of 30 passengers in the bus and since at the time of accident, more than 30 passengers were being carried in the bus, the appellant was absolved from its liability to pay to any number of persons, over and above the aforesaid 30 persons. No other point was urged during the course of hearing of the appeals.

(6.) Insofar as the first ground of attack is concerned, 'public place' has been defined in section 2 (34) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It reads thus:

"(34) 'public place' means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;"

The unimpeachable evidence on record merely suggests that the vehicle was being plied at the time of the accident on a kacha road. A bare look at the above referred definition of 'public place' clearly suggests that merely because the road is a kacha road would not render it a place other than a public place because the definition of public place is so wide that it covers every road, every street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not to which the public have a right of access. The only condition (sine qua non) for a place to be a public place is that the public should have a right of access to that place. It is nobody's contention and it was nobody's plea before the Tribunal that the place at which the vehicle was being plied at the time of the accident was such a place to which the public did not have a right of access. The contention of Mr. Ravi Bakshi, therefore, has no merit since admittedly the place in question was a public place.

(7.) Coming to the second ground of attack, namely, that the driver did not have a valid driving licence, the finding of the Tribunal on this issue is that the driver was possessed of a validly issued driving licence enabling and authorising him to drive a 'heavy transport vehicle'. By a Full Bench judgment of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Dharmu, 2005 ACJ 1149 (HP), it has clearly been held that where a driver has been issued a driving licence authorising him to drive a heavy transport vehicle, no additional endorsement for any other purpose is required enabling him to drive the vehicle of the type involved in the present case. Since undoubtedly the driver of the offending vehicle was possessed of valid driving licence enabling and authorising him to drive heavy transport vehicle, undoubtedly the driver of the offending vehicle was possessed of a valid driving licence enabling and authorising him to drive the vehicle involved in the accident. It cannot, therefore, be said that the driver was not possessed of a valid driving licence at the time of the accident.

(8.) Coming to the third ground of attack, namely, that since the bus was overloaded and since the sitting capacity of the bus was only 30 persons and passengers more than this number were being carried in the bus at the time of the accident, I must say that the appellant under a gross misconception of law has raised this ground of attack against the impugned judgment and award, not realising that under section 149 (2) of the Act an insurer of a vehicle has limited defences available to it. In fact the third ground of attack has to be taken along with the fourth ground of attack because in the fourth ground of attack also the issue revolves around the number of passengers, which alone, according to appellant, could be carried in the bus. To appreciate the reasoning of the last two grounds of attack let us first have a look at section 149 (2) of the Act. It reads thus:

"(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely: (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely: (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without sidecar being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular."

(9.) Whether carrying of passengers more than the prescribed or permitted seating capacity is a ground, which can be taken by an insurer to absolve itself of its liability to pay has to be decided only with reference to the conditions finding a mention in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 149 of the Act. The legislature has very advisedly limited the grounds of defences only to such breaches of specified conditions of the policy which the legislature itself has mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 119 of the Act. In clause (a), there are as many as four situations which are related to a condition excluding the use of vehicle as well as the condition excluding the driving of the vehicle by an unauthorised person or a condition excluding liability for the injury caused or contributed by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion. Similarly, in clause (b), the legislature has advisedly laid down and prescribed that an insurer is entitled to defend the action if the policy of insurance is void on the ground that it was obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of a fact which was false in any material particular. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that the overloading of a bus even though it might be a breach of a condition of the registration certificate or the route permit, yet cannot be made the basis of a defence by an insurer because such a breach does not find any mention in either clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 149 of the Act. By now, through a catena of pronouncements of law by various judgments of the Apex Court it has conclusively been established that an insurer is entitled to avoid its liability to pay only if its defences fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 149 of the Act and that an insurer, otherwise than by section 170 of the Act, cannot be permitted to traverse beyond these limited defences available to it under section 149 (2) of the Act.

(10.) Insofar as the question of the policy of insurance being followed only to cover the liability with respect to thirty passengers is concerned, first of all a bare look at section 147 (1) (b) (ii) will show and demonstrate unmistakably the clear legislative intent that every policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the insured against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle. This, read with clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 147 of the Act clearly underscores the paramount and imperative legislative requirement that

the liability has to be unlimited in every case and unlike the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the legislative prescription as well as legislative intent behind the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 clearly is to ensure that every policy of insurance is unlimited in nature and content and that it is neither restricted nor limited in its operation. This legal position apart, as far as the facts of the present cases go, apart from the mere ipse dixit of the appellant we have no material on record whatsoever whereby even remotely the appellant has been able to establish that the policy issued by it covered the risk of only 30 passengers. The appellant did not produce any evidence, either documentary or oral, whereby it can be said that the appellant proved the fact that the policy issued by it covered the limited risk with respect to 30 passengers and no more. (11.) No other point was urged. (12.) The appeals are dismissed but without any order as to costs. (13.) Whatever amounts have been deposited by appellant in this court in all the aforesaid appeals, the Registry is directed to transmit all the amounts with interest accrued thereon uptil date to the Tribunal for disbursement to the claimants in terms of the award. C.M.P. No. 97 of 2003 in F.A.O. (MVA) No. 453 of 2003 In view of the dismissal of the appeals, this application shall also stand disposed of. Appeals dismissed.