The defendant in O.S. No. 752 of 1973, District Munsif's Court, Koilpatty (hereinafter referred to as 'the tenant') is the appellant in the second appeal as well as the appeal against order and the petitioner in the civil revision petition. The circumstances giving rise to these proceedings are briefly as follows : -


The respondent is the owner of the suit property a vacant site measuring 90 cents comprised in Survey Nos. 268/1-A and 268/ 2-A, out of a total extent of 2 acres and 20 cents, in Sankarankoil. That vacant site was leased out by the respondent herein in favour of one Vargese under a registered lease deed dated 1-5-1968 for a term of 10 years on a monthly rent of Rs. 67.50 ps. for the purpose of running a saw mill. The lessee Vargese was unable to carry on the saw mill business in the land leased out to him; but handed over the leased property to the tenant without the consent of the respondent, Later, the tenant and the respondent agreed to allow the tenant to be the lessee of the suit property on the same terms and conditions as in the registered lease deed entered into between Vargese and the respondent herein.The tenant also agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions in the registered lease deed dt. 1-5-1968. According to the terms of the lease deed, the tenant could run only a saw mill and for that purpose, temporary structures could also be put up, but on the expiration of the period of lease, the tenant should vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit property to the respondent. Contrary to the lease arrangement, the tenant, without the consent of the respondent and fabricating certain documents, submitted a plan to the Sankarankoil Municipality for securing its approval for the construction of permanent structures for running a power loom factory in the suit property. Objections were sent by the respondent to the Municipality; but during the pendency of the enquiry, the tenant put up permanent structures, contrary to the terms of the lease and without securing the approval of the Municipality, but with its active connivance. Since the tenant had raised permanent structures contrary to the terms of the lease and has also used the suit property for a purpose other than that for which it had been originally leased out, the respondent terminated the lease by a notice dt. 14-5-1973 and sought recovery of possession of the suit property from the tenant. The respondent also stated that if the Court should hold that the tenant is entitled to continue in possession of the suit property as a lessee till the expiry of the period of 10 years mentioned in the lease deed dt. 1-5-1968, then, the tenant should be prevented by an order of injunction from putting the suit property to any use other than that for which it was leased out.


2. In the written statement filed by the tenant, while admitting the title of the respondent to the suit property and the fact of his having become a lessee subsequent to Vargese, he contended that as Vargese could not fulfil the terms and conditions of the lease, he, with the consent of the respondent herein, transferred the lease to the tenant and he was also recognised as the lessee of the suit property and allowed to remain there by the respondent by a fresh contract in January, 1969. The lease amount, according to the tenant, was Rs. 64/- per mensem, and that ever since then, the tenant has been running his business in the suit property. The tenant, being desirous of starting a new business, viz., a power-loom factory, approached the respondent for his consent and the respondent gave his consent for the same, on the strength of which, the tenant applied to Sankarankoil Municipality for permission to construct buildings and for instalation of machinery therein for running a power-loom factory in the suit property. The tenant also put forth the case that the respondent gave two consent letters, one dt. 31-7-1972 to the Municipality and the other dt. 29-3-1973 to the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board. Concealing the above, the respondent had characterised these consent letters as fabrication. The further case of the tenant was that Sankarankoil Municipality enquired into the matter through its Building Inspector and on his recommendation that permission may be granted subject to the approval of the Town Planning Committee of the Municipality, the objections raised by the respondent to the grant of permission or licence in favour of the tenant were rejected, and by a resolution dt. 31-3-1973, Sankarankoil Municipality resolved to grant permission to the tenant to install machinery and to run a power-loom factory in the suit property. Pursuant to this, the tenant claimed that he had put up buildings and also installed power-loom machinery investing a sum of Rs. 40,000/- and, therefore, the tenant is entitled to run the power-loom factory, which cannot be objected to by the respondent. The tenant further claimed that he had sent a reply notice to the notice of the respondent terminating the lease. An objection that the correct court-fee is not paid and the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, was also taken. Besides, the tenant contended that he had filed an application under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act and, therefore, the respondent is barred from filing the suit. Consistent with the stand so taken, the tenant filed I.A. No. 64 of 1974 on 16-1-1974 claiming benefits under the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act').


3. It is now necessary to refer to the institution of another suit in O.S. No. 229 of 1973 by the respondent herein against Sankarankoil Municipality as well as the tenant, praying for a declaration that the approval of the plan of the tenant by the Municipality for constructing the buildings and for erecting the power-loom factory is mala fide and not binding on the respondent and for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining Sankarankoil Municipality from issuing further licence, such as for installation of machinery and running the industry. In the written statement filed by Sankarankoil Municipality, it raised the plea that the respondent had consented and that this was considered by the Council and thereafter permission was granted to the tenant to put up the buildings to run a power-loom factory, though a licence for running the power-loom factory, as such, had not yet been applied for. The tenant also supported the stand taken by the Municipality that the licence for putting up a building and for erecting the power-loom factory was granted by the Municipality only after making necessary enquiries and observing all the formalities under the provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act and that he had not yet applied for a licence to run the power-loom factory. Thus, the Municipality as well as the tenant prayed for the dismissal of the suit instituted by the respondent in O.S. No. 229 of 1973.


4. By consent of parties, the suits O.S. Nos. 229 of 1973 and 752 of 1973 were tried together and the evidence was recorded in O.S. No. 752 of 1973. By a common Judgment dt. 28-11-1974, in O.S. Nos. 229 and 752 of 1973, the learned District Munsif found that the respondent had not consented to the construction or location of a power-loom factory in the suit property, that the so-called consent letters had been forged, that Sankarankoil Municipality failed to act in accordance with the normal rules and the regulations provided for in the District Municipalities Act, that the buildings were constructed and the machinery were installed only after, and in spite of, the objections raised by the respondent, that the lease in favour of the tenant was properly terminated for violation of the conditions of the lease and, therefore, the respondent is entitled to recover possession of the suit property from the tenant. On the aforesaid conclusions, O.S. No. 229 of 1973 and O.S. No. 752 of 1973 were decreed as prayed for and the grant was given six months' time to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit property. I.A. No. 64 of 1974 filed by the tenant under the provisions of the Act was dismissed on 28-11-1974 as unnecessary, in view of the fact that the provisions of the Act had not been extended to Sankarankoil Municipality with reference to non-residential buildings. Aggrieved by this, the tenant preferred A.S. No. 237 of 1979 before the Sub-Court, Tenkasi, against the decree in O.S. No. 752 of 1973. Sankarankoil Municipality (hereinafter referred to as 'the Municipality' for short) preferred A.S. No. 238 of 1979 against the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 229 of 1973. The tenant also filed I.A. No. 199 of 1979 in A.S. No. 237 of 1979 under S.5 of the Limitation Act, praying that the delay of 821 days in filing an application under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act, may be condoned. Another I.A. No. 200 of 1979 in A.S. No. 237 of 1979 was also filed by the tenant under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act, praying for an order directing the respondent herein to sell the suit property to the tenant for a price to be fixed by Court. The appeals A.S. No. 237 of 1979 and A.S. No. 238 of 1979 as well as I.A. Nos. 199 and 200 of 1979 in A.S. No. 237 of 1979, were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dt. 26-11-1980. The learned Subordinate Judge, Tenkasi, agreed with the conclusion of the trial Court that the consent letters are unreliable and that there was no consent by the respondent either for the location of the power-loom factory or for the construction of the buildings for that purpose, and that the Municipality disregarded the protests of the respondent and the directions of the District Health Officer and violated the regulations provided for in the District Municipalities Act and, therefore, the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 229 of 1973 deserved confirmation. With reference to A.S. No. 237 of 1979, the lower appellate Court found that the respondent was entitled to recover possession of the suit property from the tenant. Dealing with I.A. No. 199 of 1979, the lower appellate Court found that the provisions of the Act (viz., Madras City Tenants' Protection Act) were made applicable to non-residential buildings in Sankarankoil Municipality from 25-6-1975 and the relevant Gazette publication had also been made on 31-5-1975 and that the application claiming the benefits of S.9 of the Act had to be filed within one month from the date of publication of the Act in the Government Gazette and there had been a delay of 821 days in the filing of the application, which had not been satisfactorily explained and, therefore, the delay of 821 days in filing the application cannot be condoned. In that view, I.A. No. 199 of 1979 was dismissed. Consequently, I.A. No. 200 of 1979 was also dismissed. The tenant has preferred S.A. No. 58 of 1981 against the decree and judgment in A.S. No. 237 of 1979, arising out of O.S. No. 752 of 1973 and the Civil Revision and the Appeal against the orders passed in I.A.Nos. 199 and 200 of 1979, respectively.


5. Learned Counsel for the tenant first contended that the suit in ejectment filed by the respondent in O.S. No. 752 of 1973 has to fail, as it has not been established that the lease deed contained a clause prohibiting the construction of buildings for the purpose of establishing and running a power-loom factory and that for breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter. In support of this, learned Counsel drew attention to the decisions in Ambika Prasad v. Beni Madho, 1929 AIR(Oudh) 529(2); Krishna Chandra v. M/s. N.C. and S. Works Ltd., 1957 AIR(Ori) 35; Pramatha Nath v. Prafulla Chandra, 1966 AIR(Ass) 105; Bai Saraswathi v. Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co., 1967 AIR(Guj) 36 and Hari Prasad v. Indira Devi, 1977 AIR(Pat) 208.


6. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that though originally there was a registered lease deed dt. 1-5-1968 on the terms and conditions contained therein for a period of 10 years between the respondent and Vargese, there was no written lease deed between the tenant and the respondent and, therefore, the tenant and the respondent chose to adopt the same terms and conditions contained in the lease deed dt. 1-5-1968 without anything in writing and by operation of S.107 of the T.P. Act, such a lease for a term exceeding one year was invalid in law for want of a registered instrument, and, therefore, the tenancy between the respondent and the tenant was a monthly tenancy and had also been properly terminated by the issue of a notice to quit by the respondent to the tenant and no exception could therefore be taken to the institution of the suit in ejectment or the decree passed therein. Reliance in connection was placed on the decisions in Periaswami Pillai v. Sri Arunjadeswaraswami Temple, (1967) 1 Mad LJ 93 : 1967 AIR(Mad) 257) and Jagat Taran v. Sant Singh, 1980 AIR(Delhi) 7.


7. There is no dispute that originally the respondent leased out the suit property to Vargese and Vargese also executed a registered lease deed in favour of the respondent herein under Ex.A.1 dt. 1-5-1968. Thereunder, the term of the lease had been fixed as 10 years and the monthly rent at Rs. 67.50 payable on or before the 5th of the succeeding English calendar month. The purpose of the lease is stated to be for running a saw mill and to put up buildings for that purpose. Vargese had also agreed, on the expiry of the term of 10 years, to remove all super-structures and machinery and surrender the suit property in the same condition, as before, and receive back the advance of Rs. 300/-. A further provision in Ex.A.1 was to the effect that if Vargese failed to pay that rent for three consecutive months, then the respondent can re-enter the property and realise the arrears of rent. Though the lease deed contained the aforesaid terms and conditions, it is common ground that Vargese did not carry on the business in the suit property on the aforesaid terms and conditions; but that he was obliged to give up that right under the lease. There is also no dispute that the tenant succeeded to the rights of Vargese under Ex.A.1. Indeed, the tenant, examined as D.W. 2, in the course of his cross-examination, admitted that he is enjoying the suit property pursuant to the terms and conditions in the lease deed executed by Vargese with the respondent and that there is no agreement between him and the respondent in writing. He has also further accepted that there was no new agreement. The evidence of the respondent in the course of his cross-examination is to the effect that there is no provision for the termination of the lease, if the lessee started another business. It is thus clear from the evidence of D.W. 2 that he had come into possession of the suit property on the same terms and conditions, as Vargese, under Ex.A.1. Admittedly, the arrangement between the respondent and the tenant is oral. That is why the tenant had accepted that the respondent and himself agreed to be governed by the terms and conditions in Ex.A.1. As noticed earlier, in Ex.A.1, the only purpose for which the lessee can put up buildings is for running a saw mill and not any other. There is no provision in Ex.A.1 to the effect that if constructions are put up for other purposes, the respondent will be entitled to re-enter or to treat the lease as determined. The only right of re-entry reserved with the lessor under the terms of Ex.A.1 is, when the tenant committed default in the payment of rent for three consecutive months. If, therefore, the terms and conditions, upon which the suit property was allowed to be enjoyed by the tenant as a lessee were the same, as between Vargese and the respondent, as found in Ex.A.1, then it follows that there is no right of re-entry reserved in favour of the respondent in the event of the tenant putting up other buildings for the purpose of running a business other than saw mill business. It is true that in the absence of a specific condition in the lease deed that the tenant cannot put up buildings for a business other than the saw mill business and that if he does so, the lessor shall have a right of reentry, the respondent cannot claim such a right. This is indisputable and is established by the several decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the tenant. Even so, in order to ascertain what are the terms of the lease between the respondent and the tenant, we have to fall back upon the terms of Ex.A.1 and that was a lease for a period of 10 years and it is the definite case of the tenant that the lease in his favour was subject to the same terms and conditions, as in favour of Vargese. One of the provisions in the lease deed Ex.A.1 states that the lease is for a period of 10 years. The evidence of D.W. 2, referred to already, is to the effect that there is no agreement in writing between him and the respondent and it therefore follows that the tenant is a lessee for a period of 10 years or so, under the respondent on payment of rent. Under S.107 of the T.P. Act, a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year, can be made only by a registered instrument. Therefore, the oral lease set up by the appellant on the same terms and conditions as between Vargese and the respondent cannot be a valid lease at all for want of registration. Under S.106 of the T.P. Act, a lease of immovable property for a purpose other than agriculture or manufacturing purpose, shall be deemed to be a lease from a month to month, terminable by 15 days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. The lease in this case is not for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and has therefore to be regarded only as a lease of immovable property for any other purpose and has to be taken only as a lease from month to month.It is thus seen that though the respondent and the tenant might have intended to be governed by the terms of the lease deed under Ex.A.1, between the respondent and Vargese, in the absence of a registered instrument in writing, the tenancy has to be regarded only a monthly tenancy between the respondent and the tenant and not any other. In that event, it follows that it would suffice, if the tenancy is determined by a proper notice to quit under S.106 of the T.P. Act, as under S.111(h) of the T.P. Act, a lease of immovable property determines on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of an intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. It is thus seen that though on the facts in the present case, there could be no question of any determination of the lease by forfeiture by putting up buildings for a power-loom factory, yet such a determination by a notice to quit may result, having regard to a monthly tenancy created between the tenant and the respondent in the absence of a registered lease deed in writing. That this is the position is clearly laid down in the decisions in Periasami Pillai's case, (1967) 1 Mad LJ 93 : 1967 AIR(Mad) 257) and Jagan Taran's case, 1980 AIR(Del) 7.


8. The next question, which has to be considered is whether, there was a proper notice determining the monthly tenancy and calling upon the tenant to surrender possession in accordance with S.106 of the T.P. Act. According to S.106, in the absence of a contract or local law or usage, to the contrary, a lease of an immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be from month to month, terminable on the part of either the lessor or lessee by giving 15 days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. It is not the case of the parties that there is some local law or usage to the contrary. There is also no contract to the contrary established, containing clear, specific and unequivocal stipulations regarding the notice. There is nothing to indicate that the parties contemplated that no notice is necessary or that they had agreed specifying a particular period of notice, which may be more than the period of 15 days or even specifying such notice is not required to expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. Under those circumstances, the lease in favour of the tenant could be properly determined by a valid notice to quit issued by the respondent terminating the tenancy is Ex.B.1 dt. 14-05-1973. Thereunder, the respondent had referred to the execution of a registered lease deed dt.01-05-1968 by Vargese in his favour and the tenant having come into possession and enjoyment of the suit property on the same terms and conditions in the lease deed dt. 01-05-1968. After referring to the unauthorised constructions put up by the tenant and the contravention of the terms of the lease by erecting constructions without the consent of the respondent, in para 3 of Ex.B.1, the respondent had clearly stated that the lease in favour of the tenant is determined. Ex.B.1 winds up by saying that the tenant is called upon to vacate the suit property and give vacant possession thereof on 31-05-1973. Ex.A.8 is the reply sent by the tenant to Ex.B.1, wherein the tenant had justified the constructions put up by him on the ground that the respondent had given his consent and had also stated that there has been no violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. There is nothing in Ex.A.8 to show that the tenant had demurred to the determination of the lease in favour of the tenant, or, to its validity. It is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with the idea of finding fault with it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed at res magis valeat quam pereat. It would be useful to recall the observations of Lord Justice Lindley, L.J. in Sidebotham v. Holland, (1895) 1 QB 378, that the validity of a notice to quit ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw. In Bhagabandas v. Bhagwandas, 1977 AIR(SC) 1120, 1977 (1) RCJ 572, 1977 (1) RCR 754, 1977 (1) RentLR 770, 1977 (2) SCC 646, 1977 (3) SCR 75, 1977 UJ 194, the Supreme Court pointed out that a notice to quit must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pedantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way. What is material is, what it would mean to a tenant, presumably conversant with all facts and circumstances, though it may not mean anything at all to an utter stranger. Viewed in this manner and giving the contents of Ex.B.1 a plain as well as a natural construction, it is obvious that the respondent had terminated the tenancy in favour of the tenant by employing the expression that he is so determining the lease and further making the intention to determine the lease clear by a demand for delivery of vacant possession of the suit property from the tenant. There is no dispute that there is clear 15 days' notice and consequently, the lease in favour of the tenant had been, on the facts and the circumstances of this case, properly determined and only thereafter, the suit in ejectment had been laid on 12-12-1973, long after the tenant had declined to surrender possession pursuant to the notice to quit. Thus, on a consideration of the nature of the lease in the light of Ss. 106, 107 and 111(g) and (h) of the T.P. Act, the conclusion is irresistible that the lease in favour of the tenant was only a monthly tenancy and had also been properly terminated by the respondent by the issue of the notice to quit under Ex.B.1 and therefore, the suit in ejectment had also been properly laid. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant has therefore to be rejected.


9. Learned Counsel next contended that the delay in the filing of the application by the tenant claiming the benefits of S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act before the lower appellate Court, should have been condoned, as having been satisfactorily explained. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel upon the affidavit of Sri A. Ramasami Iyer to the effect that owing to a bona fide mistake, an appeal against the order in I.A. No. 64 of 1974 was omitted to be filed. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the filing or non-filing of an appeal against the order in I.A. No. 64 of 1974 was of no consequence, as at that time, when I.A. No. 64 of 1974 was either filed or disposed of by the trial Court, the provisions of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act were not extended to Sankarankoil Municipality with reference to non-residential buildings and that what would be relevant and material for consideration would be, whether the tenant had satisfactorily explained the admitted delay of 821 days in filing the application under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act before the lower appellate Court after the extension of the provisions of the Act to Sankarankoil Municipality.


10. The filing of I.A. No. 64 of 1974 by the tenant even before the trial Court during the pendency of O.S. No. 752 of 1973, on 16-1-1974, has already been referred to. Though this application claiming the benefits of the Act was filed by the tenant even before the filing of the written statement in the suit on 11-2-1974, it is seen that on the date of filing of the application under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act, the provisions of the Act had not been extended to Sankarankoil Municipality in respect of non-residential buildings. It was on account of this that while granting a decree in O.S. No. 752 of 1973 on 28-11-1974, I.A. No. 64 of 1974 was dismissed as unnecessary. That order was allowed to become final. Though it is now claimed by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the counsel by oversight did not prefer an appeal it is difficult to accept the same. In any event, even if an appeal had been preferred in time on 6-2-1975, along with A.S. No. 237 of 1979, that would not have in any manner altered the position and assisted the tenant, for, even by then, the provisions of the Act had not been extended to Sankarankoil Municipality in relation to non-residential buildings. Therefore, the non-filing of an appeal is of no consequence. However, what should be taken note of is the filing of an application by the tenant claiming the benefits of S.9.(1)(a)(i) of the Act 821 days after its extension to non-residential buildings in Sankarankoil Municipality by G.O.Ms. No. 1285 Rev. dt. 31-5-1975 with effect from 25-6-1975. Whether there was any justification at all for the delay of 821 days in the filing of an application claiming the benefits of S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act has now to be considered. Under the provisions of the Act, as they then stood, an application claiming the benefits of the Act has to be filed within one month from the date of the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1955, coming into force, or, the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the Municipal town or village, in which the land is situate, and in this case, the extension of the Act was admittedly made on 25-06-1975 and the right to apply accrued only on that date and the application should have been filed on or before 25-07-1975; but it had been filed on 26-09-1977, admittedly after a delay of 821 days. In the affidavit filed by the tenant, after referring to the extension of the provisions of the Act in relation to nonresidential buildings in Sankarankoil Municipality, the tenant proceeded to state that he was under the impression that his counsel would have filed an appeal against the order in I.A. No. 64 of 1974; but that it was not filed and that he had been advised to file a separate application in order to secure the valuable statutory right. The only statement made by the tenant is that the non-filing of the application within time was bona fide. The tenant has further stated that he was under the impression that the appeal against the order in I.A. No. 64 of 1974 would be sufficient, though that appeal was not factually filed. As noticed earlier, it was wholly unnecessary for the tenant to have filed an appeal against the order passed in I.A. No. 64 of 1974, for, at the time of filing of that application on 16-01-1974, as well as its dismissal on 28-11-1974, the tenant could not have claimed any right for the sale of the suit property in his favour, as the provisions of the Act had not been extended in respect of non-residential buildings in Sankarankoil Municipality. If at all the tenant secured a right in that regard, it was after the extension of the provisions of the Act to non-residential buildings in Sankarankoil Municipality by reason of the G.O.M. referred to above

and under the provisions of the Act, the application had to be filed within one month from the date of extension. Therefore, the filing or non-filing of an appeal against the order in I.A. No. 64 of 1974 has no bearing or relevance on the question of the delayed filing of the application. The only reason given is the delay was bona fide. How such inordinate delay of 821 days was bona fide is not in the least attempted to be explained by the tenant. The Court below was therefore quite right in its conclusion that the tenant had not established sufficient cause or justification for the delay in the filing of an application only on 26-09-1977, as he had not made any attempt at all to explain the inordinate delay and such unexplained delay cannot be condoned. The dismissal of I.A. No. 199 of 1979 does not therefore deserve to be interfered with in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S.115 of Civil P.C. 11. Lastly, learned Counsel for the tenant attempted to sustain I.A. No. 200 of 1979 filed under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act, relying upon the provisions of Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979 (Act 2 of 1980). By S.5 of the Amending Act, in item (i) of Cl.(a) of sub-sec.(1) of S.9 of the principal Act, for the expression 'within one month of the date of the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1955, coming into force or of the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the Municipal town, township or village in which the land is situate', the expression 'within one month of the date of the publication of Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979 in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette or of the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the Municipal town, township or village in which the land is situate', was introduced. By reason of S.1(2) of the amending Act, Act 2 of 1980, the amendment referred to above in S.9(1)(a)(i) shall be deemed to have come into force on 9-1-1974. In relation to non-residential tenancies situate in Sankarankoil Municipality, the provisions of the Act had been extended by G.O.Ms. No. 1285 Revenue, dt. 31-5-1975 with effect from 25-6-1975. Thus, even giving effect to the amendment to S.9(1)(a)(i) effected by S.5 of the amending Act (Act 2 of 1980), the application claiming the benefits of the Act should have been made within one month from 25-06-1975. That however was not done. That presumably was also the reason why the tenant filed an application in I.A. No. 199 of 1979 for condoning the delay. Thus, the application in I.A. No. 200 of 1979 filed by the tenant cannot be sustained, even under the amended provisions of the Act, as stated above. If the delay in the filing of the application under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act cannot be condoned, it follows that the application in I.A. No. 200 of 1979 under S.9(1)(a)(i) of the Act cannot be entertained. The rejection of that application also by the Court below is quite in order. No other point was urged. 12. Consequently, S.A. No. 58 of 1981, C.R.P. No. 4288 of 1985 and A.A.O. No. 866 of 1985 are all dismissed with costs. Order accordingly.