Alagumalai learned counsel for the petitioner, raised a very interesting point in these petitions, which have been filed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. praying for the return of the goods seized on the ground that there had been no licence obtained by the aggrieved petitioner herein. In this view, Mr. Alagumalai contends that the power given under S. 482 Cr.P.C. is wide enough to order these applications in spite of the fact that there is a section, viz. S. 6-E introduced in the year 1976 in the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) which says generally that the court's jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of a tribunal or authority is not to have its influence before actually the executive authorities mentioned in the enactment are moved by the concerned person, who is aggrieved of any order, including the order of seizure of the goods. In the instant case 37 tins of vanaspathi and 16 tins of oil have been seized, and they are now in the custody of the respondent. It is further submitted by Mr. Alagumalai that though a writ petition praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus or similar writ or order by this court is pending and it is to be actually heard within two or three days, yet it is not as if that this court is prevented from making an order in favour of the petitioner in spite of the pendency of the said writ petition, which is admittedly filed for the issuance of the challan relating to this transaction. What is more. Mr. Alagumalai submits it is not as if that the petitioner has been carrying on business in vanaspathi without obtaining a proper licence. As a matter of fact, licence is available for the period concerned and it is quite in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act that this seizure has been effected


2. Mr. Alagumalai further submits that the High Courts are actually created by the Organic Law of the land, viz., the Constitution of India and especially when Art. 214 of the Constitution is in existence in the Organic law of the land, it is but necessary that this court, viz., High Court of Judicature at Madras, which was originally a Chartered High Court in that it was also one which was the subject matter dealt with by the Charter issued by the British Empire during the reign of Victoria as a chartered High Court, should have superintendence and also power vested with it so as to have overriding influence over any order in order to see that justice is done. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner herein by Mr. Alagumalai that neither the pendency of a writ petition regarding the issuance of a challan nor the existence of the provision of S. 6-E in the Act 10 of 1955, will bar the jurisdiction of this court under S. 482 Cr.P.C


3. On the other hand, Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned Government advocate No. III, submits inter alia that when there is a section, viz., S. 6-E introduced in the Act 10 of 1955, viz., the Essential Commodities Act, by way of an amendment in the year 1976, which enumerates that whenever an essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under S. 3 of the Act 10 of 1955, in relation thereto the Collector as the case may be the judicial authority appointed under S. 60 shall have and notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, any other court, tribunal or authority shall not have jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of such property


4. Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned Government Advocate No. III, inter alia further contends that 'any other court' (which) occurs in this Section 6-E, which was inserted as new section by Section 7 of the amended Act 92 of 1976, in this parent Act viz., Act 10 of 1955, clearly bars the jurisdiction of the courts including the High Court and as such neither the coming into existence of this High Court, viz., the High Court of Judicature at Madras by the charter issued by the British realm or that it is now that a subject dealt with under the Organic Law of the land, viz., the Constitution of India, subsequent to the promulgation of this country as a sovereign democratic Republic, yet the very same concept in the law viz., that including the High Court is only a court of law and as such it has to interpret the law and it is not above law. Because it is only the legislature that is a sovereign body which can legislate and the court does not legislate and therefore when an amendment has been introduced in this enactment specially prohibiting the jurisdiction of any other court, the same includes High Court at Madras also


5. The point for consideration in this application filed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. by the aggrieved petitioner is whether this court can exercise the power vested in it under S. 482 Cr.P.C., which states that nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court otherwise to secure ends of justice. It is relevant in this connection to note that what is contemplated under S. 482 Cr.P.C., is only with respect to the inherent powers of this court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code and 'this Code' necessarily means 'Code of Criminal Procedure', and not the Essential Commodities act or the new provision, viz., S. 6-E that has been inducted in by way of amendment in the year 1976, the concept of which has been extracted above. There is absolutely no indication either in the provisions of the Essential commodities Act viz., Act 10 of 1955 or in the amendments that were introduced in the year 1976 to show that this power of the executive authorities with respect to the seizure can be questioned under the provisions of S. 482 Cr.P.C. The Section 6-E of the Essential Commodities Act prohibits any order being made by any court regarding distribution, delivery, custody and disposal of commodity. If a report has been sent to the Collector by a competent authority for confiscation, as in the instant case, it is clear that no court can pass any order regarding the same. What is more, when there is a hierarchy of judicial and quasi judicial forums (which) are contemplated to deal with an order regarding delivery of the commodity seized, the aggrieved party cannot directly move this court for a favourable order under S. 482 Cr.P.C. No order can be made in favour of such an aggrieved party, because what is contemplated under S. 482 Cr.P.C. is only the 'order' made under this Code and not 'any' other 'order' that has been made under any other enactment. Therefore, when this application is confined only under provisions of Section 482, it is seen that S. 482 does not confer jurisdiction to a court to review the proceedings relating to the seizure made by a competent executive authority


6. Mr. Alagumalai, learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage, wants to withdraw these petitions submitting that these petitions are being withdrawn in the interests of his client, because there is a writ petition already filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India pending and as such the observations made by this court may have an indirect effect on that order that may be pronounced so far as that writ petition is concerned. But this court is not inclined to give an order in respect of an individual. This is a court of law and as such it promulgates law for the entire citizens who are within its jurisdiction and as such it is not concerned with respect to the interests of a particular person, but when once it pronounces an order it is for the benefit of the persons who are residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. As such the oral request made for withdrawal is refused


7. Further Mr. Alagumalai, learned counsel for the petitioner, cites Traders Syndicate v. State of Bihar, 1971 AIR(Pat) 133 : 1971 CrLJ 770 (2)), and several other authorities and those authorities are distinguished so far as the facts of this case are concerned. This is a seizure that had been contemplated by the provisions of the Act 10 of 1955, and when a competent authority had seized the articles and a procedure has been prescribed under S. 6-E it is that procedure that has to be followed because it is a special enactment which has been more or less inducted by the Central Legislat

ure under the doctrine known as the police powers which has got the effect and control over the health of the nation. Police power does not include the health of the nation and in that capacity when an enactment has prescribed a procedure that has to be followed with respect to the remedial measures through the hierarchy of executive authorities before actually a court has to be approached and when the expression used is 'any other court', this court holds that 'any other court' includes also this court and therefore merely because of the existence of S. 482, it does not mean that the petitioner herein can come and have his remedy, which he could have had if he had moved other authorities contemplated under the provisions of the Act, which evidently he has not done but has rushed to this court. Under these circumstances, there is no merit in these petitions and they are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed. No costs.