DAVID ANNOUSSAMY, J.


This is a writ petition filed by the detenu himself for the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, directing the respondents to set him at liberty.


2. The order of detention was passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, represented by the first respondent on 1-8-1986 in exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 3(1)(iii) and 3(1)(iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 52 of 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Thereupon the second respondent represented by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of finance, Department of Revenue, issued a declaration under Section 9(1) of the Act declaring that the detenu is likely to engage in concealing and keeping smuggled goods in Madras, which is an area highly vulnerable to smuggling as defined in Explanation 1 to S. 9(1) of the Act.


3. The grounds on which the order of detention was passed are succinctly as follows : On 8-3-1986 the Officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Madras, intercepted the detenu when he alighted from the Howrah Madras Mail at Madras Central Railway Station. After enquiry, a search on the person of the detenu was conducted which resulted in the recovery of 8 gold biscuits with foreign markings each weighing 10 tolas, 6 gold biscuits were kept concealed in the shoes and two gold biscuits were kept concealed in the packet of undergarment and they were valued approximately at Rs. two lakhs. The detenu in his statement first stated that his name was G. D. Khem, a son of S. D. Chowdhury, but afterwards revealed that his real name was Ram Avtar Khanderwal. Learning that gold biscuits purchased at Calcutta and sold at Sowcarpet Madras, would yield considerable profit, the detenu purchased gold biscuits, from one Babu Bhai, a broker at Sona Patti at Calcutta, and paid Rs. 23, 000/- for a ten tola biscuit. The address given by the detenu, viz., 20 Armenian Street, Calcutta, was found to be wrong and from the records of the school where his daughter was studying, the correct address was ascertained to be 160 Maniktola Main Road, Calcutta.


4. This order of detention is challenged by the learned counsel for the detenu on various grounds. The first and foremost ground is that S. 9(2) of the Act empowering the Advisory Board to give its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the continued detention of the detenu was violative of the provisions of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution and it was therefore prayed that S. 9(2) of the Act be struck down. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the power and responsibility of the Advisory Board, as per the Constitution, is to give its opinion whether there is sufficient cause for the act of the detention of any person and not in respect of the duration of the detention, that S. 9(2) requiring the Advisory Board to give its opinion on the 'continued detention' vested the Advisory Board with a power, which it does not possess, namely, that of giving an opinion on the continuance of detention, or in other words on the duration of detention. He placed reliance on three decisions viz., Dattatraya Moreswar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, 1952 AIR(SC) 181, 1952 SCR 612, 1952 CrLJ 955 : 1952 AIR(SC) 181, 1952 SCR 612, 1952 CrLJ 955 : 1952 AIR(SC) 181, 1952 SCR 612, 1952 CrLJ 955) ); Puranlal Lalhanpal v. Union of India, 1958 AIR(SC) 163, 1958 (64) CRLJ 283, 1958 SCJ 510, 1958 (1) SCR 460 : 1958 AIR(SC) 163, 1958 (64) CRLJ 283, 1958 SCJ 510, 1958 (1) SCR 460), and A. K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 AIR(SC) 710, 1982 CrLR(SC) 176, 1981 (4) Scale 1904, 1982 (1) SCC 271, 1982 SCC(Cr) 152, 1982 (2) SCR 272, 1982 (88) CRLJ 340, 1982 BLT 164, 1982 MLJ 524, 1982 MLJ(Cri) 524, 1982 SCC(Tax) 152, 326 US 207 : 1982 AIR(SC) 710, 1982 CrLR(SC) 176, 1981 (4) Scale 1904, 1982 (1) SCC 271, 1982 SCC(Cr) 152, 1982 (2) SCR 272, 1982 (88) CRLJ 340, 1982 BLT 164, 1982 MLJ 524, 1982 MLJ(Cri) 524, 1982 SCC(Tax) 152, 326 US 207).


5. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent is that the Act was well in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and he relied in support of his contention on the decision of the Supreme Court last quoted by the petitioner. He also relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Satar Habib v. K. S. Dilip Singh, 1986 AIR(SC) 418, 1986 (1) Crimes 370, 1986 CAR 37, 1986 CrLR(SC) 84, 1985 (2) Scale 1429, 1986 (1) SCC 544, 1986 SCC(Cr) 91, 1985 (S3) SCR 1061, 1986 (1) UJ 444, 1986 (92) CRLJ 378, 1986 (8) ECC 133 : 1986 AIR(SC) 418, 1986 (1) Crimes 370, 1986 CAR 37, 1986 CrLR(SC) 84, 1985 (2) Scale 1429, 1986 (1) SCC 544, 1986 SCC(Cr) 91, 1985 (S3) SCR 1061, 1986 (1) UJ 444, 1986 (92) CRLJ 378, 1986 (8) ECC 133 ), which was also referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and which, according to him, was not helpful since it did not go into the question of constitutionality of Section 9(2) of the Act


6. To deal with the rival contentions of the parties, it is first necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Constitution regarding preventive detention to become clearly aware of the scheme contemplated by the Constitution. The relevant provisions, viz, cls. (4) and (7) of Art. 22 of the Constitution read as follows -


22(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless -


(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are entitled to be appointed as Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention;


(b) Such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-cls. (a) and (b) of cl. 7;


(7) Parliament may be law prescribe -


(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board in accordance with the provisions of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (b);


(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes be detained under any law providing for preventive detention and .......... (c).


From the above constitutional provisions, the following propositions emerge : (1) There are two classes of detention contemplated; (2) A person may be detained without reference to Advisory Board for a period less than three months in the first class of cases and for a period longer than three months in the second class of cases (3) The matter will not be brought before the Advisory Board when ab initio it is contemplated by the detaining authority to detain a person for a period less than three months in the first class of cases and for a specified period longer than three months in the second class of cases. (4) The maximum period of detention may be different for the first and second class of cases; (5) The duration of the detention is not within the scope of the enquiry and report by the Advisory Board. (6) The Government is the sole authority to decide about the duration within the maximum prescribed by the Parliament in each class of cases.


7. Let us now extract the relevant provisions of the Act


"8. Advisory Boards : For the purposes of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4), and sub-cl. (c) of cl. (7) of Art. 22 of the Constitution -


(a)


(b) Save as otherwise provided in S. 9 the appropriate Government shall, within five weeks from the date of detention of a person under a detention order make a reference in respect thereof to the Advisory Board


(c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under cl. (b) shall ......... prepare its report specifying in a separate paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned and submit the same within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned.


(f) in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith." *


9. Cases in which and circumstances under which persons may be detained for periods longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of Advisory Board.


(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any person (including a foreigner) in respect of whom an order of detention is made under this Act at any time before the 31st July 1987, may be detained without obtaining, in accordance with the provisions of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, the opinion of an Advisory Board, for a period longer than three months but not exceeding six months from the date of his detention, where the order of detention has been made against such person with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and the Central Government or any Officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of an Additional Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purpose of this section by that Government, is satisfied that such person - (a) smuggles or is likely to smuggle goods into, out of or through any area highly vulnerable to smuggling; ........... and makes a declaration to that effect within five weeks of the detention of such personExplanation 1


Explanation 2


(2) In the case of any person detained under a detention order to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply, S. 8 shall have effect subject to the following modifications, namely -


(i) in cl. (b), for the words 'shall, within five weeks' the words

"shall within four months and two week's shall be substituted


(ii) in clause (c). -


(1) for the words 'the detention of the person concerned' the words 'the continued detention of the person concerned' shall be substituted;


(2) for the words 'eleven weeks' the words 'five months and three weeks' shall be substituted;


(iii) in cl. (f) for the words 'for the detention' at both the places where they occur, the words 'for the continued detention' shall be substituted


10. Maximum period of detention :- The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of S. 9 do not apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of Section 8 shall be a period of one year from the date of detention or the specified period, whichever period expires later and the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of S. 9 apply and which has been confirmed under cl. (f) of section 8 read with sub-section (2) of S. 9 shall be a period of two years from the date of detention or the specified period, whichever period expires later." *


8. Let us now proceed to examine the merit of the above contention. It is seen that this Act is one of the Acts providing for preventive detention which contemplates the two classes of detention envisaged by the Constitution. For the purpose of identification of these two classes of detention, the first class is called 'detention' and the second class is called 'continued detention'. When the Advisory Board is called upon to give its opinion regarding the second class of detention, it should be aware that the detention is one belonging to that second class, because in such a case it has got four months and two weeks to make the report under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22. The Board should also know that if it gives a positive opinion, the detention may be to a maximum period of two years. Since the second class of detention is more severe in nature than the first one, the Board should also go into the decision converting the detention into one of second class, viz, the declaration made by the concerned authority under Section 9(1) of the Act expressing its satisfaction of smuggling activities in areas highly vulnerable to smuggling. For the safeguard of the detenu. It should be ensured that the Advisory Board had become alert that the detention belongs to the second class. Therefore, the reference to the Advisory Board as well as the opinion of the Advisory Board should disclose that the Advisory Board had become aware of the class of detention. It is for this purpose that the law maker has differentiated both classes of detention by calling the first one as 'detention' and the second one as 'continued detention'. Therefore, when the Advisory Board gives an opinion whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 'continued detention' of the person concerned, it does not give an opinion whether there is sufficient cause for the continuance of the detention or for the detention to be continued, but whether there is sufficient cause for the second class of detention called for the sole purpose of identification 'continued detention'. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner springs out of a misreading and misunderstanding of the phrase 'sufficient cause for continued detention of the person concerned' in construing it as if it was for 'sufficient cause for the continuance of the detention'. If the words 'continued detention' are construed properly there is no violation of the Constitutional provisions; on the contrary, proper safeguard that different provisions for different classes of detention envisioned by the Constitution are properly followed.


9. Let us now turn to the decisions on which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed much reliance. In the decision first cited, viz., Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, 1952 AIR(SC) 181, 1952 SCR 612, 1952 CrLJ 955 : 1952 AIR(SC) 181, 1952 SCR 612, 1952 CrLJ 955), a contention was raised that it was imperative on the part of the Government when it confirmed the order of detention passed under Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, to specify the period to which the detention was to continue. While dealing with that contention their Lordships observed as follows -


"The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. It is neither called upon nor is it competent to say anything regarding the period for which such person should be detained." *


In the second case cited, viz., Puranlal Lakhanpal v. Union of India, 1958 AIR(SC) 163, 1958 (64) CRLJ 283, 1958 SCJ 510, 1958 (1) SCR 460 : 1958 AIR(SC) 163, 1958 (64) CRLJ 283, 1958 SCJ 510, 1958 (1) SCR 460), the appellant's contention was that sub-section (1) of S. 11 of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 in so far as it permitted the appropriate Government to continue the detention of the person concerned beyond a period of three months without a specific report from the Advisory Board that there is sufficient cause for his detention for more than three months is ultra vires, because it does not conform to sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, nor does it give effect to the true meaning of the expression 'such detention' occurring in the said sub-clause. Repelling that contention the Supreme Court held as follows -


".... The matter before the Advisory Board is the subject of detention of the person concerned and not for how long he should be detained ...... When the case of a detained person is placed before the Advisory Board, under such law it must be assumed that the Advisory Board knows that if it reports that the detention is justified the detenu may be detained for more than three months and up to the maximum period provided by the law. The expression 'such detention' in Art. 22(4)(a) refers to preventive detention and not to how long the person is to be detained." *


In the third case cited viz., A. K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 AIR(SC) 710, 1982 CrLR(SC) 176, 1981 (4) Scale 1904, 1982 (1) SCC 271, 1982 SCC(Cr) 152, 1982 (2) SCR 272, 1982 (88) CRLJ 340, 1982 BLT 164, 1982 MLJ 524, 1982 MLJ(Cri) 524, 1982 SCC(Tax) 152, 326 US 207 : 1982 AIR(SC) 710, 1982 CrLR(SC) 176, 1981 (4) Scale 1904, 1982 (1) SCC 271, 1982 SCC(Cr) 152, 1982 (2) SCR 272, 1982 (88) CRLJ 340, 1982 BLT 164, 1982 MLJ 524, 1982 MLJ(Cri) 524, 1982 SCC(Tax) 152, 326 US 207the contention raised before the Court was that the Advisory Board must decide whether it is necessary to keep the person in detention any longer after the date of its report and the court repelling that contention observed as follows -


"The inquiry necessarily involves the consideration of the question as to whether there was sufficient cause for the detention of the person when the order of detention was passed, but we see no justification for extending the jurisdiction of the Advisory Board, to the consideration of the question as to whether it is necessary to continue the detention of the person beyond the date on which it submits its report or beyond the period of three months after the date of detention." *


The above decisions make clear that the role of the Advisory Board is to give its opinion on the propriety of the detention and not on its duration, the latter being within the exclusive realm of the detaining authority. If those principles are applied to the second class of detention contemplated in the Constitution and provided in the Act, one has to conclude that the Advisory Board is to give its opinion on the propriety of this second class of detention and not on the duration of that class of detention. Once the question of detention with the aggravation brought about by a declaration under Section 9(1) of the Act is answered in the affirmative, it is for the Government to decide how long within the maximum provided under the Act that the person should be detained. It is therefore found that the petitioner arises merely out of misconstruction of the word 'continued detention'. It is mistaken for the continuance of the detention whereas it refers only to the aggravated class of detention provided in the Act, which aggravated class is contemplated in the constitution as well, as stated at the outset. Therefore, as per the rulings relied of the Supreme Court, the provisions of S. 9 of the Act, understood as it should be, are not in any manner, violative of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution.


10. With the real meaning and purport of the phrase 'continued detention' in mind let us approach the recent decision of the Supreme Court viz. Satar Habib v. K. J. Dilip Singhji, 1986 AIR(SC) 418, 1986 (1) Crimes 370, 1986 CAR 37, 1986 CrLR(SC) 84, 1985 (2) Scale 1429, 1986 (1) SCC 544, 1986 SCC(Cr) 91, 1985 (S3) SCR 1061, 1986 (1) UJ 444, 1986 (92) CRLJ 378, 1986 (8) ECC 133 : 1986 AIR(SC) 418, 1986 (1) Crimes 370, 1986 CAR 37, 1986 CrLR(SC) 84, 1985 (2) Scale 1429, 1986 (1) SCC 544, 1986 SCC(Cr) 91, 1985 (S3) SCR 1061, 1986 (1) UJ 444, 1986 (92) CRLJ 378, 1986 (8) ECC 133), which the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted us not to follow as being against the line of decisions of larger Benches and as not considering the constitutional validity of the Act, and in which we can read the following sentence -


"In other words, the Advisory Board is to state its opinion not merely whether detention in necessary but whether 'continued detention' is necessary. The Advisory Board will necessarily have to go behind the declaration under Section 9(1) to consider the question whether there is sufficient cause for 'continued detention'." *


It is obvious that 'continued detention' refers to the second class of detention contemplated in the Act and does not mean continuance of detention. It is thus clear that this decision is in perfect accord with the line of decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that its novelty consists only in that it points out the difference between the two classes of detention and that it stresses the constitutional duty of the Advisory Board in respect of the second class of detention. The first ground fails.


11. The second ground urged before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the occurrence took place on 8-3-1986 and the order of detention was passed on 1-8-1986 nearly after five months and that therefore the order of detention passed after such a long delay is not sustainable. In this connection, he placed before us three decisions of the Supreme Court : Md. Sahabuddin v. District Magistrate, 1975 (4) SCC 114, 1975 (2) UJ 430, 1975 CRLR 185, 1975 SCC(Cri) 368, 1975 AIR(SC) 1722, 1975 SCC(Cr) 368, 1975 CrLJ 1499 : 1975 (4) SCC 114, 1975 (2) UJ 430, 1975 CRLR 185, 1975 SCC(Cri) 368, 1975 AIR(SC) 1722, 1975 SCC(Cr) 368, 1975 CrLJ 1499), Rabindra Kumar v. State of W. B., 1975 (81) CRLJ 1235, 1975 (4) SCC 111, 1975 UJ 451, 1975 CRLR 288, 1975 SCC(Cri) 365, 1975 SCC(Cr) 365, 1975 AIR(SC) 1408 :1975 (81) CRLJ 1235, 1975 (4) SCC 111, 1975 UJ 451, 1975 CRLR 288, 1975 SCC(Cri) 365, 1975 SCC(Cr) 365, 1975 AIR(SC) 1408) and Jagannath Biswas v. State of W. B., 1975 AIR(SC) 1516, 1975 (4) SCC 115, 1975 SCC(Cri) 369, 1975 SCC(Cr) 369, 1975 CrLJ 1329 : 1975 AIR(SC) 1516, 1975 (4) SCC 115, 1975 SCC(Cri) 369, 1975 SCC(Cr) 369, 1975 CrLJ 1329). In the first decision it was found that the delay of nearly seven months after the occurrence without any explanation whatsoever rendered the detention illegal, because the subjective satisfaction has no proximate rational nexus with the prejudicial act. In the second decision cited, it was held that the chain of action between the dangerous activities involved and the detention order passed was snapped by the long and unexplained delay of about three months. In the third decision cited, there was an unexplained delay of six months and such a delay was considered as fatal to the plea of subjective satisfaction.


12. It is well settled law that in matter of delay unless the yardstick has been prescribed in an absolute manner by the statute itself, there is no hard and fast rule. Each case has to be considered in the light of the attending circumstances. One of the most important circumstances is the nature of the act in which delay has occurred. For instance, while the person concerned is already detained, if the delay occurs in considering his representation, the matter has to be viewed very seriously. In fact, once the detenu has made his representation, the order of detention is under challenge and is allowed to survive as a matter of convenience till the representation is considered and only for the purpose of such consideration. Therefore each day's delay in considering his representation will amount to his illegal detention and in such circumstances each day's delay has to be explained satisfactorily. In the absence of such explanation it will have to be held that the order has become extinct at some point of time, on account of absence of consideration of the representation.


13. If the delay occurs in taking the decision of detention the matter is entirely different. First the concerned authority should not act mechanically and hastily and pass the order of detention whenever an act of smuggling or any correlated act is detected. It has to check the antecedents of the person concerned, the connections he has been having and all other circumstances in order to find out whether it is necessary under the scheme of the Act to detain the person. This will necessarily require some time. But if the decision is taken after too long a time a doubt would arise whether the detention is connected with the incident narrated or with any other alien consideration not disclosed in the grounds. In such a case the order would be tainted with ulterior motive and would have to be considered illegal. On the other side, if the delay is longer than necessary in the normal course, one would also be led to think that the authorities concerned are not really motivated by the circumstances of the case of detain the person concerned and they have acted in a routine and casual manner. In fact the act of detaining a person is an act infringing one of the fundamental rights and it is possible only within the four corners of the constitutional provisions authorising such a detention. Therefore, the order of detention should have a nexus with the grounds disclosed and the time taken in passing the order, which would depend on the circumstances of the case, should be such as not to raise reasonable doubt regarding nexus. It is found from the records in this case that the detenu, who was involved in transporting gold biscuits with foreign marks worth Rs. 2 lakhs, has given false name and false address and that his connections in Calcutta had to be traced out after an elaborate enquiry. The Customs authority sent the report to the detaining authority on 19-6-1986 and the detaining authority passed its order on 1-8-1986. Though one would have liked each of the limbs of the Government to have acted with more promptitude in a matter of this nature, it cannot be said that in the circumstances of the case the delay is such as to throw doubt on the nexus between the incident and the order. This contention is also repelled.


14. The third ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that only a single act of dealing with smuggled goods was detected by the detaining authority and that the single act would not justify the detention order under the Act. To buttress his contention he quoted the following two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision was Debu Mahto v. State of W. B., 1974 (80) CRLJ 699, 1974 (4) SCC 135, 1974 UJ 182, 1974 CRLR 226, 1974 SCC(Cri) 274, 1974 SCC(Cr) 274, 1974 AIR(SC) 816 : 1974 (80) CRLJ 699, 1974 (4) SCC 135, 1974 UJ 182, 1974 CRLR 226, 1974 SCC(Cri) 274, 1974 SCC(Cr) 274, 1974 AIR(SC) 816) in which the Court observed as follows -


"The order of detention is essentially a precautionary measure and it is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention." *


It was held in the circumstances of that case that it consisted of a single incident of wagon breaking and there was therefore no basis for making of the order of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.


15. The second decision was Ra

mveer Jatav v. State of U.P. 1987 AIR(SC) 63, 1986 (3) CRIMES 654, 1987 CAR 7, 1987 (93) CRLJ 321, 1986 (2) Scale 837, 1986 (4) SCC 762, 1987 CRLR 109, 1987 SCC(Cr) 10 : 1987 AIR(SC) 63, 1986 (3) CRIMES 654, 1987 CAR 7, 1987 (93) CRLJ 321, 1986 (2) Scale 837, 1986 (4) SCC 762, 1987 CRLR 109, 1987 SCC(Cr) 10) and the ruling of the Supreme Court may be summarised as follows - "Where the order of detention was passed against the detenu on the basis of the only ground alleged against him, that he, along with others, jointly committed murder in broad daylight, but it was difficult to infer from the solitary ground set out in the grounds of detention that the act alleged to have been committed by the detenu would have disturbed public order as distinct from law and order or that one single act committed by the detenu was of such a character that it could reasonably be inferred by the detaining authority that if not detained, the detenu would be likely to indulge in such activity in future, the order of the detention passed against detenu would not be sustainable." 16. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent in support of his contention that even a single incident may justify detention is the one in Shivratan Makim v. Union of India, 1986 AIR(SC) 610, 1986 (1) CRIMES 465, 1986 CAR 32, 1986 CrLR(SC) 89, 1985 (2) Scale 1504, 1986 (1) SCC 404, 1986 SCC(Cr) 74, 1985 (S3) SCR 843, 1986 CRLR 89, 1986 (92) CRLJ 813 : 1986 AIR(SC) 610, 1986 (1) CRIMES 465, 1986 CAR 32, 1986 CrLR(SC) 89, 1985 (2) Scale 1504, 1986 (1) SCC 404, 1986 SCC(Cr) 74, 1985 (S3) SCR 843, 1986 CRLR 89, 1986 (92) CRLJ 813) wherein it was observed that the facts stated by the detenu in his written statement could legitimately give rise to the inference that he was a member of a smuggling syndicate and merely because only one incident of smuggling came to light, it did not mean that this was the first and only occasion on which the detenu tried to smuggle gold, and it was held that from the facts the detaining authority was justified in reaching the satisfaction that the detenu was engaged in smuggling gold. 17. From the above decisions it can be safely concluded that whether a single incident would suffice for an order of detention or not depends on the circumstances of the case. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is worth noting that the detenu brought gold worth Rs. two lakhs and that too concealing in shoes and inner garments. We do not find anything palpably wrong in the detaining authority coming to the conclusion that the detention order is warranted as far as the present detenu is concerned, even though he was caught only once. 18. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. After the judgment was pronounced, the learned counsel for the petitioner has made and oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. As we are of the view that this case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance, leave refused.