This is a revision petition against the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, passed in M.P. No. 199 of 1977 in C.C. No. 28095 of 1976, dismissing the complaint for an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. and discharging the accused on a preliminary point raised under S. 197 Cri.P.C


2. The facts leading to the present petition are - The petitioner is a newspaper magnate, who filed a complaint against the accused, who is the Principal Information Officer, Government of India, New Delhi, for an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. alleging that the 'hand out' issued by him on 24-7-1976 and on 26-7-1976 (Annexures A and B, attached to the complaint) are only defamatory statements with intent to lower his estimation in the eye of general public and with malice aforethought


3. The respondent herein filed a petition before the learned Magistrate, stating that he was a public servant within the meaning of S. 197 Cri.P.C., and is removable from his office only with the sanction of the Central Government. The alleged offence said to have been committed by him is in his capacity as Principal Information Officer, Government of India, New Delhi. The acts alleged are the acts by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. He did not act in his individual capacity and he urged before the lower court that the alleged offence could not be taken cognizance of except with the previous sanction of the Central Government


4. The learned Magistrate, after considering the points raised by both the respondent and the petitioner before him passed an order as stated above, dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused, upholding the preliminary objection raised by the accused. Against this order the present revision is directed


5. Mr. Rangavajjula, appearing for the petitioner, herein argued that committing an offence under S. 500, I.P.C. is not an act done in the official capacity of the respondent and it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence or it is not every act done by a public servant that requires sanction. No protection can be asked for and given under S. 197 Cri.P.C. where the acts complained of plainly are outside the duty or purported duty of the public servant In support of his contention. He relied on a decision in B. P. Srivastava v. M. P. Mishra, reported in particularly the extract from Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, wherein it is held


"It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under S. 197(1), Crl.P.C., nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties ........." *


In this case, there is nothing to show that the part attributed to the appellant in that case, a civil surgeon, was directly connected with the performance of his official duty. That was a case where a doctor asked his cook to forcibly turn another Doctor out of the operation theatre


6. The next decision relied on by him is, Baijnath Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradegh reported in where it is held -


"It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under S. 197(1) Cri.P.C., nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of his office then sanction would be necessary." *


It was held that sanction was not necessary for the prosecution for an offence under S. 409 I.P.C. because the act of criminal misappropriation was not committed by the appellant while he was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties and it has no direct connection with the duties as a public servant


7. The last decision relied on by the petitioner's counsel is Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in where it is held -


"The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty" *


It was a case of cheating and it was held that it has no connection with the act committed in the performance of the duties of a public servant


8. Mr. Govind Swaminathan, appearing for the respondent, stated that on the date of the offence and even today he is a public servant within the meaning of S. 197 Crl.P.C., and is removable from his office only with the sanction of the Central Government. The act of handing over the hand outs for publication is done in his capacity as the Principal Information Officer, Government of India, New Delhi. These are all acts done by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. The sanction to prosecute him, he said, is a necessity, before the complaint be taken cognisance of by a court of law. In support of his contention he relied on a decision in Pukhraj v. State of Rajastan, reported in. In particular, he drew my attention to the passage at page 2592 (of AIR) : (at pp. 1796, 1797 of Cri LJ) which reads as follows -


"The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitute the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purports to be done in the execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by any one else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are. done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty." *


9. He also relies on the extracts incorporated in the above decision from Hori Ram Singh's case reported in 1939 AIR(FC) 43 : 1939 (40) CrLJ 468) and 1948 AIR(PC) 128 : 1948 (49) CrLJ 503). He also referred to me a decision of our High Court by Maheswaran J. reported in Ramachandran In re 1979 Mad LW (Cri) 180 : 1980 CrLJ 349). The learned Judge, after referring to a number of cases under S. 197 Cri.P.C. has observed at page 184 (of Mad LW) (Cri) : (at p. 353 of Cri LJ) -


"I must point out that the act complained of must have some nexus with the duty so as to give rise to a reasonable conclusion that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty and the accused will be entitled to the protection of S. 197 Crl.P.C." *


There is a plethora of decisions on the application of S. 197 Crl.P.C. but ultimately the test to be applied, whether the sanction is needed or not, depend on circumstances of each case. The learned counsel for the respondent brings to my notice the official functions and duties of the Principal information Officer, Press Conference Bureau, Government of India -


"Advising Government on the requirements of publicity through the medium of press in respect of various ministries, Disseminating information on the policies and activities of the Government; Maintaining liaison with press : the reporting to Government public policies and perfor

mance as reflected in the Dress." * 10. Thus it is seen that the handing over of the hand outs for publication is undoubtedly characteristic of the official duty of the respondent. I have no doubt that the acts complained of are so interrelated with the official duty of the Principal Information Officer, so as to attract the protection afforded by S. 197 Crl.P.C. The acts are so integrally connected with the duty attached to the officer it is not possible to separate them. At any rate, there is a reasonable connection between the act alleged by the respondent and his official duty. What has been alleged against him is certainly something to do with his official duty. Under these circumstances, opposing the principles laid down in the decisions referred above, I feel the order passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is correct. The revision fails and it is dismissed.