NATARAJAN, J.


This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, Gayathri, for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the production of the body of her husband Sundaram alias Mylapore Sundaram, who is undergoing detention at the Central Prison, Madras, in consequence of an order of detention passed against him under the National Security Act by the first respondent


2. On 30-4-1981, an order of detention was passed against the said Sundaram by the first respondent and he was taken into custody. The grounds of detention and the documents referred to in the said grounds, were furnished to the detenu on 3-3-1981 (3-5-1981 ?). The detenu submitted his representations, to the Advisory Board against the order of detention; but having failed to convince the Board, the detenu's wife has come forward with this petition


3. In the grounds of detention, three grounds have been set out in respect of the order of detention against the detenu. The first is, that on 19-2-1980 at about 10 a.m. the detenu along with his associates, Ashokan, Basha and Chandran, attacked a tea stall by name Easwari Tea Stall at R. K. Mutt Road, Mylapore, threw soda water bottles and caused heavy damage to public properties and injuries to the members of the public resulting in a case being registered against the detenu and others in Crime No. 605 of 1980 under Sections 440, 448, 427 and 336 read with S. 34 I.P.C., of Mylapore police station and by reason of the said incident, the detenu had terrorised the shop-keepers and the order members of the public in the area and disrupted normal public life. The second ground is, that on 24-6-1980, there were clashes between two groups, one headed by the detenu and the other headed by one Seelan of Srinivasapuram, which lasted almost for a week. These clashes were a sequel to certain earlier incidents, which had occurred due to the unlawful activities of the detenu and his group of followers. In the clashes, which occurred, one Kuttian alias Joha, who was working as an attack seller under the detenu was murdered and a case had been registered relating to the death of Kuttian in Mylapore police station Crime No. 1887 of 1980 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302, I.P.C. on 24-6-1980. Following the murder, rioting on a large scale flared up between the two groups. The detenu along with his associates formed an unlawful assembly and attacked the police force, who were at the spot to quell the riots. The detenu questioned the authority of the police and attacked the police force and the attack resulted in a Sub-Inspector of Police and a Grade I police constable being injured. Consequently, the police had to register a case in Mylapore police station in Crime No. 1888 of 1980 under Ss. 147, 148, 149 and 332 I.P.C. Due to the riots and the attack on the police force, the entire area was terrorised and the members of the public became panicky. The residents of the locality were afraid of coming out of their houses even to purchase milk and other essential articles and many of the shops had remained closed during the period. There was total disruption of public order. The third ground read as follows -

"Sundaram alias Mylapore Sundaram's lawless activities continue unabated and the victims do not come forward to lodge complaints for fear of physical harm and reprisal at his hands." *


In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner has assailed the order of detention on various grounds. Briefly stated, the order of detention is assailed on the following grounds - (1) All the documents referred to in the grounds of detention and which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority to pass the order of detention, must be supplied to the detenu; but in the instant case, all the documents have not been furnished and hence the order is vitiated; (2) The incidents referred to in ground No. 1, which had culminated in the police filing a charge sheet against the detenu and others ought not to have been taken into consideration, because the case had ended in acquittal. There is no mention in the grounds of detention about the acquittal of the said case and hence there has been material suppression of facts to the detenu. Moreover, the grounds do not show whether the detaining authority was aware of the acquittal of the detenu in the said case and whether in spite of such awareness, he had deemed it necessary to pass the order of detention. (3) In any event, the incidents referred to in grounds 1 and 2 were old incidents and are so far removed in point of time from the date when the detention order was passed that they could not have afforded reasonable material for the first respondent to pass the impugned order. The third ground said to have weighed with the first respondent, is totally devoid of details and the averments are so vague and general that the detenu cannot be expected to meet the ground properly and effectively. Furthermore, there has been material suppression of not only facts, but also grounds and this vitiates the entire order of detention. Even if the grounds relied on ny the first respondent are genuine ones, they can only have a bearing on the law and order situation and can never affect the maintenance of public order and as such, they cannot afford materials for an order being passed under the National Security Act. Lastly, there has been considerable delay in the passing of the detention order and the said delay has not been satisfactorily and properly explained. Hence, on the ground of delay alone, the detention order deserves to be quashed


4. The several averments contained in the petitioner's affidavit have been met by the respondents in a detailed counter-affidavit filed by them. As we will be referring in detail to portions of the averments contained in the counter-affidavit, we do not think it necessary to refer in extenso at this juncture to the various statements contained in the counter-affidavit. Suffice it to say that grounds 1 and 2 are characterised as truthful occurrences and affording adequate justification for the passing of the detention order. As regards grounds No. 3, it has been stated that though no recorded incident affecting maintenance of public order has been cited in the ground, mention has been made bout the lawless activities of the detenu subsequent to the two earlier incidents and the gravamen of the ground has been based on the entires on records in the dossier sheet maintained for detenu. The dossier sheet, itself was not furnished to the detenu as it was considered not desirable to furnish the same in public interest. It is also stated that the acquittal of the detenu in the case referred to in the first ground was known to the first respondent before the passing of the detention order, but even so, the first respondent had deemed it fit to place reliance on that ground also to pass the order of detention. Lastly, it has been stated that the impugned order has been passed in strict conformity with the provisions of the National Security Act, and as such, the order is not liable to be assailed by the petitioner


5. In support of the petitioner's contentions, Mr. Kumar Rajaratnam advanced various arguments and also cited several authorities before us. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents advanced counter-arguments to sustain the order and placed for our consideration certain authorities in support of his contentions. We shall now proceed to deal with the arguments of the learned counsel on both sides and the authorities cited by them


6. The petitioner's counsel assailed each of the three grounds and also advanced certain arguments of a general nature. We shall first proceed with the arguments relating to each of the three grounds and then deal with the general criticisms levelled by the counsel


7. The first argument was that the incidents referred to under grounds Nos. 1 and 2, had taken place long prior to the passing of the detention order and as such, those incidents could and have created a reasonable belief in the mind of the first respondent that an order of detention should be passed against the detenu in the interest of public order. In support of this argument, the petitioner's counsel cited Rabindrakumar v. State of W.B. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel. It is no doubt true that the incidents referred to in grounds 1 and 2 have taken place several months before the order of detention was passed. But merely on that score, it is not open to the detenu to say that the subjective satisfaction formed by the first respondent is an illusory one. As pointed out in Golam Hossain v. Police Commr., Calcutta, and Gora v. State of W.B., the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention ..... The prejudicial act of the detenu may in given case be of such a character as to suggest that it is a part of an organised operation of a complex of agencies collaborating to clandestinely and secretely carry on such activities and in such a case, the detaining authority may reasonably feel satisfied that the prejudicial act of the detenu which has come to light, cannot be solitary or isolated act, but must be part of a course of conduct of such or similar activities clandestinely or secretely carried on by the detenu and it is, therefore, necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from indulging in such activities in the future. If the previous incidents were sufficient to make and detaining authority believe justifiably and bona fide that the detenu was a confirmed troublemaker and the incidents relating to him were not isolated or sporadic acts, but were reflective of dangerous behaviour of a sustained nature, it is open to the detaining authority to take note of these incidents in spite of the fact that they had not occurred immediately before the passing of the order of detention


8. The second argument was, that, in any event, the first incident ought not to have been taken into consideration because the case registered against the detenu relating to that incident, had ended in acquittal. In our opinion, this argument must also fail, because it proceeds on the mistaken assumption that preventive detention and prosecution are synonymous which is not the case as pointed out in Haradhan v. State of W.B., The nature of the two proceedings is different; in a prosecution, an accused is sought to be punished for a past act; in a preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu. It is therefore open to an authority to pass an order of detention against the detenu on the basis of an incident even after lodging a first information report and initiating steps to prosecute him under the Criminal P.C. On account of this position it has been held by the Supreme Court in M. S. Khan v. C. C. Bose, that the discharge of a detenu in a criminal case, cannot deter a detaining authority from passing an order of detention against him; if the detaining authority felt that the evidence would not be adequate to secure a conviction, but nevertheless the activities of the detenu were of such a nature that the passing of an order of detention would be justified in the interest of the public


9. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia argued that the grounds served on the detenu did not refer to the acquittal of the detenu of the case registered on the basis of incident No. 1, and this omission vitiated the order in a twofold manner, namely, that the detenu was kept in the dark about his acquittal in the case, and secondly the detaining authority may have passed the order without realising that the detenu had been acquitted in respect of that case. Both these arguments are devoid of merit, because the detenu cannot plead ignorance of his acquittal in the case. More than any one, he would have had knowledge about his acquittal in the case and hence it is futile to say that the detaining authority should have brought to him notice the factum of acquittal in the case registered on the basis of the first incident. As regards the second criticism, the first respondent has stated in the counter-affidavit that he was aware of the acquittal of the detenu in the first case, but in spite of it, he deemed it necessary to pass the order of detention. It cannot, therefore, be said that the first respondent had passed the impugned order without a full knowledge of all the facts and without proper application of mind


10. The next argument of the petitioner's counsel was, that even if grounds 1 and 2 can be said to afford materials to the detaining authority to pass the impugned order, there has been delay in the passing of the order, in that, the order has been passed only on 30-4-1981, whereas the National Security Ordinance, 1980, was promulgated on September 22, 1980 and the National Security Act was passed on December 27, 1980. The argument does not carry conviction, because the first respondent has stated in the counter-affidavit that he was conferred with powers to take action under the Act only late in December, 1980. Thereafter it has taken time for the first respondent to collect the materials against the detenu and the official machinery would have certainly required a reasonable amount of time to move in the matter. Moreover, the authority may have also watched the detenu for some time to see whether there was any change in the behaviour of the detenu after the passing of the Act. On account of these factors, we are unable to sustain the contention that the detaining authority has acted in a lethargic manner and the lack or promptness is itself a strong factor to reject the contention of the State that the order had been passed in the bona fide belief that the detenu's detention was considered necessary in the interest of public order


11. As regards the incident mentioned in ground No. 2, it was submitted that the detenu could not have had a hand in the causing of the death of Kuttian alias Seelan, since he is alleged to be a member of the detenu's own group and furthermore, the detenu's name does not find a place in the first information report that had been registered with reference to that incident. The infirmity contained in the argument is, that the detenu is not charged for causing the death of Kuttian; but is accused of having instigated the clash that followed the death of Kuttian and to have incited his followers to attack the police party. According to the Stage, on account of the instigating made by the detenu, there were violent clashes and the members of the police party were attacked and a Sub-Inspector of Police and a Grade I constable and sustained injuries. In the first information report a copy of which has been given to the detenu, it has been stated that there was disturbance between the people of Srinivasapuram and Karakuttai, that on receipt of information as policy party rushed to the place, that a crowd of 100 persons had assembled there who were behaving violently, that the trouble-makers were armed with soda water bottles and deadly weapons that the members of the police party were attacked and that a Sub-Inspector and a constable were injured, that the mob was chased by the police and that three of the trouble-makers viz., Seelan, Panchanathan and Shabmugham were caught hold of. In such circumstances, the names of the three apprehended persons alone have been mentioned in the first information report. Merely because the detenu's name does not find a place in first information report of the cannot contend that he had nothing to do with the incident. On the foot of the first information report, a case was registered in crime No. 1888 of 1980, and the injured Sub-Inspector and constable had been examined. In their statements under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C., they have clearly stated that the detenu instigated the crowed to attack the police. These statements have been recorded on 24-6-1980 itself, i.e., on the same day on which the case was registered. Copies of these statements have been furnished to the detenu. In such circumstances, it is not open to the detenu to say that he had nothing to do with the incident and this may be seen from the fact that this name does not find a place in the first information report. In the case diary also, the Inspector has stated that search was made for the detenu and other accused; but they could not be apprehended, as they had gone into hiding. Hence even though the detenu's name is not mentioned in the first information report, his active involvement in the incident, has come to light during the investigation that had started immediately after the case was registered. It has been held in Samir v. State of W.B that merely because the detenu's name did not figure in the first information report, but his participation in the unlawful activities came to light during the investigation of the case, the detenu cannot be heard to say that the concerned incident ought not to have been taken into consideration and in any event, the incident cannot form the basis for a detention order being passed, since the ground suffered from the vice of vagueness


12. So far as the third ground is concerned, Mr. Kumar Rajaratnam made a forceful attack on the wording of the ground as well as the manner in which it has been made use of for passing the detention order. We have already extracted ground No. 3 in an earlier portion of this order. The attack on the ground was that the wording is vague nd general, that though the facts of the alleged unlawful activities could have been withheld under Section 8(2) of the Act on the ground of public interest, the nature of the unlawful activities should have been disclosed and the failure to do so will constitute material suppression of grounds and will vitiate the entire order. It was then argued that in the counter-affidavit, there is reference to the dossier maintained against the petitioner being looked into by the first respondent with reference to ground No. 3; but a copy of the dossier has not been furnished to the detenu and on that score also, the order is vitiated. These criticisms have been met in the counter-affidavit as follows -


"As regards the contention raised in para 13 of the affidavit, I submit that as stated earlier the detenu would not be entitled to know the contents of the History sheet as per the provisions of Section 8(2) of the National Security Act and as it is considered the disclosed of the contents of the History sheet to the detenu would be against public interest and therefore the exception has been taken in strict conformity with the provisions under S. 8(2) of the National Security Act, which provide 'Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose the facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose'." *


Having regard to the nature of the ground, we do not think the detenu can make an issue of the fact that the details of his lawless activities and the names of the victims had not been disclosed to him and this would constitute a serious irregularity affecting the validity of the detention order. When victims are afraid to complain about the unlawful activities of the detenu and the harm and damage sustained by them at his hands, it will be unrealistic to expect the police authorities to give the detenu the details and facts of his unlawful activities. Such disclosure would put the timid and helpless victims ad complainants at great dis-advantage and make them vulnerable to further attacks by the detenu and the members of his group


13. The petitioner's counsel referred to Mohd. Alam v. State of W.B., Bablu Das v. State of W.B., Golam v. State of W.B., and Mohd. Yusuf v. State of J. & K., to buttress his argument that when the ground set out in the detention order, in the instant case ground No. 3, is vague, then it would amount to not affording a proper opportunity to the detenu to make effective representation against the order of detention passed against him. We have given our careful consideration to this argument; but we find the grievance of the detenu is unsustainable. As is well known in these cases, the question as to whether the grounds furnished to a detenu contain adequate materials to enable him to make an effective representation or whether the grounds are so vague as to deprive the detenu of proper opportunity to make his representation, is always one of fact and the question has to be decided with reference to the facts of each case. Viewed from this angle, we find that the safely of the victims and the maintenance of public order, both of which would constitute public interest, have stood in the way of more details being given to the detenu in ground No. 3 than what are contained in the memo given to the detenu. That apart, the detenu himself does not appear to have felt handicapped in making representations regarding ground No. 3 and the grievance of lack of opportunity has been projected for the first time in the affidavit filed by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu. We are led to make this observation, because the detenu has not complained of vagueness as regards ground No. 3, when he submitted his representation to the Advisory Board. In para 10 of his representations, he has met ground No. 3 as follows -

"I respectfully submit apart from two instances sighted (sic) to which I have referred to above, there has been wild allegations made against me about my activities. I submit it is very easy for the police to make allegations without even establishing a prima facie case. These allegations are not based on facts. It is purely the opinion of the police and has been done to tarnish may image and arises out of mala fide consideration. I unconditionally state that in the event of my release I shall not in any way disturb the public order. I have in this petition confined myself purely on the question of facts and I am not in any way implicated in a court of law with respect to the other allegations of may unruly behaviour. If these allegations were true, certainly the authorities could have fled a case against me and I would have an opportunity to prove my innocence. In these circumstances, it is impossible for me to prove my innocence with respect to the other allegation stated in the memorandum except to deny them as totally false." *


In view of the manner in which the detenu himself had understood ground No. 3 and made representations, it appears to us that the grievance expressed by Mr. Kumar Rajaratnam about the ground being vague is more imaginary than real. Moreover, the law does not also require that irrespective of the interests of the State the entire materials in the possession of the detaining authority must be brought to the notice of the detenu. The right of a detenu under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution to be furnished particulars relating to grounds of detention, is subject to the limitation contained in Art. 22(6) whereby disclosure of facts considered to be against public interest, cannot be required. This position is well settled and we need only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence D'Souza v. State of Bombay, The wording in S. 8(2) of the National Security Act is almost identical with the wording contained in Art. 22(6) of the Constitution of India. It is also apposite to mention here the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the question whether all the particulars considered by the State Government while approving the order of detention passed by an officer duly empowered in that behalf, should be communicated to the detenu to enable him to make effective representation and whether the failure to furnished all these particulars will vitiate the order of detention. Before we refer to the dictum of the Supreme Court, we may extract sub-section (4) of S. 3 of the National Security Act. Section 3 is the relevant section, under which an order of detention may be passed by the Central Government or the State Government or by an officer empowered in that behalf. Sub-section (4) reads as follows :-

"3(4). When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars, as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government." *


14. The identical words occurring in S. 3(3) of the M.I.S.A., came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in Khundiramdas v. State of W.B., The Supreme Court held that in addition to such basis facts and materials which constitute the grounds of detention, the District Magistrate is also required to send to the State Govt. under S. 3(3) such other particulars as in his opinion have bearing on the matter. The Supreme Court observed that, 'obviously', these 'other particulars' would be different from the basic facts and materials, which constitute the grounds of detention and would not be the material which has gone into the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and there is nothing in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution or in any provision of the Act, which requires that these 'other particulars' should be communicated to the detenu. Having regard to these facts, we cannot countenance the argument of Mr. Kumar Rajaratnam that ground No. 3 is vague and devoid of particulars and these factors have caused prejudice to the detenu and hence the order of detention should be quashed


15. Yet another argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel was that the first respondent had passed the impugned order on the basis of not only the grounds and documents furnished to the detenu, but also on the basis of the affidavit, filed by Thiru S. P. Somasundaram, Inspector of Police, Prohibition enforcement Wing Mylapore police Division, in Cri.M.P. No. 1 of 1981, and a copy of that affidavit has not been furnished to the detenu and hence there has been suppression of material facts and the omission goes to the root of the matter. This contention has been raised, since the detention order mentions about the first respondent having read the affidavit of Thiru S. P. Somasundaram, Inspector of Police and the documents in support thereof before passing the order of detention. In the counter-affidavit also, it has been stated as follows

"I was appraised of the activities of the detenu through an affidavit filed by Thiru S. P. Somasundaram, Inspector of Police, Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Mylapore division, Madras city, only on 29-4-1980. I, after having carefully gone though the affidavit and supporting documents and after verifying the same, had come to the subjective satisfaction and passed the order of detention on 30-4-1981." *


16. On a reading of the order and the abovesaid portion of the counter-affidavit, we do not think that the counter-affidavit can be considered as a material document in the case and that a copy of the affidavit should also have been furnished to the detenu. The affidavit, as the very name suggests, should have only formed a covering letter and it could not have contained more particulars than what is contained in the documents furnished to the detenu. Moreover, the first respondent has clearly stated that he had gone through the documents relating to the detenu and satisfied himself about the correctness of their contents and thereafter only passed the order of detention. Moreover, in his representation to the Government, the detenu has not complained that he had not been furnished with a copy of the introductory affidavit ad the said omission having handicapped

him in any manner 17. The last ground urged by the petitioner's counsel was that even if the grounds levelled against the detenu were true, they would only disclose that the detenu was in the habit of creating law and order problems and it can never be a case of the detenu being a hazard to the public order by his being at large. On that assumption, the counsel referred to an authority viz., Nagen Murmu v. State of W.B., and argued that there was not warrant for the first respondent to have passed the impugned order. On going thought the judgment, we find that the facts in the case were entirely different. In the instant case, the grounds mentioned against the detenu are not incidents relating merely to the disruption of law and order, but constitute acts which would have an adverse effect on the even tenor of society life affecting the interests of large section of the public. In the very decision cited by the counsel, the words 'public order' have been construed to mean 'the even tempo of community life in a locality or substantial section of society'. We may pertinently refer to another decision of the Supreme Court on this question, viz., Ram Bali v. State of W.B., It was held by the Supreme Court therein as follows :- "Public Order is necessarily an elastic concept, which is, in any case, wider than the 'security of the State' ..... a category separated in the Act from it by the disjunctive 'or'. It is true that, in some cases, the facts may so clearly indicate that an ordinary criminal prosecution would suffice that the necessary to order the detention of an offender for one of the objects of the Act could not be said to be reasonably made out. The case before us, however, is not one of these cases. We have to be careful to avoid substituting our own opinion about what is enough for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authorities with which interference can be justified only if it is clear that no reasonable person could possibly be satisfied about the need to detain on the grounds given, in which case, the detention would be in excess of the power to detain. The required satisfaction must have reference to a need to prevent what is anticipated from the detenu. The past conduct or activity is only relevant so far as it furnishes reasonable grounds for an apprehension. Prevention and punishment have some common ultimate aims; but their immediate objective and modes of action are distinguishable." * In view of this pronouncement, we cannot accept the argument that the grounds set out against the detenu would at best necessitated action being taken for maintenance of law and order and not for preserving the safety of public order 18. Having dealt with all the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find that the none of the contentions is a tenable one. We are therefore of opinion that the impugned order passed by the first respondent does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity so as to merit the setting aside of the order by us. The petition has therefore to fail and will accordingly stand dismissed.