The State has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul, acquitting the accused who has been charged for offences under Sections 7(i) and 16(1)(a) read with S. 2(ia)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act


2. P.W. 1, Govindan, Food Inspector of Palani Municipality, purchased nine bottles of orange crush from the shop of the accused on 28-9-1977 at about 11 a.m. for analysis. He divided them into three equal parts and bottled them in three clean dry bottles and sent one such bottle to the Public Analyst and the other two to the Local Health Authority. The report of the Analyst, Ex. P. 4, showed that the sample contained saccharin in excess of the permitted limit to the extent of 120 parts per million. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate followed a ruling of this court in State by Public Prosecutor v. Pandian Pillai, 1976 Mad LW (Cri) 156 and acquitted the accused on the ground that the addition of saccharin was of negligible quantity. The State challenges the orders of acquittal


3. I may straightway point out that this judgment of the learned Magistrate acquitting the accused is not sustainable for this court in State v. Harirama Nadar, 1979 Mad LW (Cri) 31, has held that the maxim 'de minims non curat lex' (law does not concern itself about trifles) is not applicable when once adulteration is found. In that case it was further held that the Act does not provide for exemption of marginal of borderline variation of the standards from the operation of the Act and in such circumstances to contend that the variation is negligible would virtually alter the standard itself fixed under the Act. In State of Kerala v. Parameswaran, 1975 CrLJ 97 (FB), the learned Judges of the Kerala High Court have held that even marginal or borderline variations of the prescribed standards under the Act are matters of serious concern for all, and as public interests are involved in them, the maxim 'de minimis non curat lex' does not arise. The appeal is allowed and the order acquitting the accused is set aside and the accused is convicted under Sections 7(i) and 16(1)(a) read with S. 2(ia)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act


4. As regards the sentence, Mr. Sriramulu, learned counsel for the accused pointed out that the accused is a first offender, that the offence committed is trivial in nature and it was committed about four years back and therefore the court may take a

lenient view on the question of sentence. Taking those circumstances into consideration, I feel that the ends of justice would be met by sentencing the accused to rigorous imprisonment for three months. The accused is therefore sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months.