This revision deals with an important question with reference to the withdrawal of cases by the public Prosecutor


2. The facts in this case are that the Inspector of Police, Thiruvottiyur filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner herein under Sections 341, 323, 427 and 506(ii) I.P.C. and the case was numbered as C.C. No. 605 of 1978. The case was taken up and the prosecution closed its evidence. Thereafter, the case was posted for examination of defence witnesses. The Assistant Public Prosecutor II at that stage filed a memo for withdrawal of C.C. No. 605 of 1978 against the petition herein the view of G.O.Ms. No. 216 Public (Law and Order-B) Department Dt. 25-1-1980. On 4-10-1980 A.P.P. II file the following memo which is as follows :-


"The above case is withdrawn from prosecution as per the Order in R.C. No. 140657/14/80 Dt. 5-8-80 and in C. No. 52375/1/1733/80 and also a petition for permission is filed along with this" *


This memo did not contain the provision of law and hence another memo was filed on the same day by A.P.P. II praying for withdrawal of the case under Section 321 Crl.P.C. which is as follows :-



"It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to permit the prosecution to withdraw the above case against the above accused, as it is being ordered to be withdrawn by R.C. No. 14065/C4/80 Dt. 5-8-80 and C. No. 52375/C1/1733/80 dt. 18-8-1980." *


At this stage, P.W. 1 Rathnaswamy filed Crl.M.P. No. 10161 of 1980 in C.C. No. 605 of 1978 objecting to the withdrawn of the case in C.C. No. 605 of 1978 pending before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee. He filed an affidavit to the effect, that he is the first witness on behalf of the prosecution, that he was assaulted by the accused/petitioner on 25-5-1978 at the Madras Rubber Factory and this fact was investigated by the first respondent which has led to the filing of the aforesaid case against the petitioner herein. It was the further contention of P.W. 1, that A.P.P. II, without applying his mind has acted only on the executive direction in filing a petition for withdrawal which is opposed to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court, that the consideration for withdrawing the prosecution should be in the interest of the administration of justice and not on political favours and that the petition for withdrawal is not maintainable. Thus P.W. 1, filed a lengthy affidavit objecting to the withdrawal of the case contending that he is the person aggrieved and the complainant in the case, who has suffered injuries and has been humiliated and the executive authority under the circumstances ought not to have directed the A.P.P. II to withdraw the case without any reference to him and the withdrawal sought for is not in the interest of the administration of justice. It was further contended that the prosecution having closed its case and when the case was posted for defence, the State ought not to have directed the A.P.P. II to withdraw the case. In short, the withdrawal petition filed by A.P.P. II was objected to by P.W. 1, who was the complainant in the aforesaid C.C. No. 605 of 1978


3. The accused/petitioner filed a counter on 11-10-80 contending that P.W. 1, has no locus standi to object to the petition filed by A.P.P. II and the petition of P.W. 1 is not maintainable. It was contended that in matters of withdrawal the Government alone should decide, in the first instance, whether it should be beneficial to launch or continue the prosecution and the Court in such a situation elicits the reasons for withdrawal and after satisfying itself, permits withdrawal of the case by the prosecutor. It may also be stated that Crl.M.P. No. 10160 of 1980 was filed by A.P.P. II to P.W. 1's petition as and by way of counter, on 14-10-1980 which is as follows :-



"I submit that in C. No. 52375/CI/1733/80 of 15-8-80 the Superintendent of Police. Chengalpattu (East) Proceedings have sanctioned withdrawal of the instant case, kind reference is invited to the G.O.Ms. 216, Dt. 25-1-1980 copy of which is enclosed herewith for perusal, according to which the Government has issued certain direction for withdrawal of cases pending against industrial workers. I submit that I have clarified with the papers and connected records and after applying my mind to the facts of the case on the instruction of the Inspector of Police basing on the sanction order of the Superintendent of Police CHE (East). I have filed the memo for withdrawal in the instant case." *


A reply was also filed by P.W. 1 to the counter filed by A.P.P. II. After hearing the arguments and on the basis of the materials placed before Court, the sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee, passed an order on 31-10-1980 holding that on the materials place before it, the court is not inclined to grant consent to withdraw the case. Thus, the memo filed by A.P.P. II in Crl.M.P. No. 10160 of 1980 Dt. 4-10-1980 for the withdrawal of the case was dismissed and the petition filed by P.W. 1, objecting to the withdrawal of the case was allowed. It is against this common order, Dt. 31-10-1980 the above revision has been filed by the accused/petitioner


4. To repeat the facts again, the petitioner herein was working as a worker in Madras Rubber Factory. He was the Joint Secretary of the Labour Union. P.W. 1 was working as a vehicle driver in the factory. There was a strike by the workers in the Factory. While there was a strike P.W. 1 was carrying on his work as a driver. The allegation is, that while P.W. 1 was working, he was threatened and his shirt was torn by the petitioner, in and by which P.W. 1 lost his watch. This has resulted in P.W. 1 lodging a complaint which has led to the filing of the above case before the Magistrate. After the witnesses were examined, A.P.P. II filed the memo mentioned supra before the Court, for the withdrawal of the case keeping in view the contents of G.O.Ms. No. 216 Public (Law and Order-B) Department Dt. 25-1-1980 which is as follows :-



"The Government have been considering for some time past the question of withdrawal of pending cases against


1. Industrial workers


2. Members of various political parties except certain special categories of cases with a view to create an atmosphere of goodwill in the State. The Government after careful consideration have now decided to withdraw all the cases against (1) Industrial workers and (2) cases registered against members and workers of various political parties on or after 15-9-1972 which have been charge-sheeted and are pending in Courts, except those cases involving murder, attempt to murder, grave violence and serious damage to property


2. All the Collectors, Director General of Police, Madras and the Commissioner of Police, Madras are requested to take immediate action with reference to the instruction above. A detailed reply (report ?) of the cases withdrawal should be sent to Government immediately." *


5. Two senior eminent counsel have argued this matter. The question that requires consideration is, whether the impugned order of the Magistrate, on the facts of the case, dismissing the petition filed by A.P.P. II for withdrawing the prosecution case, is justified or is contrary to law


6. In Subbash Chander v. State it has been observed as follows (at page 325 of Cri. L.J.) :-


"When a case is pending in a criminal Court, its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statutes. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a Court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The function of administering justice, under our constitutional order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the Court's process is S. 321, Crl.P.C. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor, and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the Court. The consent of the Court under S. 321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. Consent will be given only if public justice in the larger sense is promoted rather than subverted by such withdrawal. That is the essence of the nolle prosequi jurisprudence. Invested by the statute with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him to apply an independent mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so, he acts as a limb of the judicative process, not as an extension of the executive. The decision to withdrawn must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those where displeasure may affect his continuance in office


The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the Executive, however high the accused, however sure Government feels a case is false. However unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble considerationMay be, the executive, for plural concerns and diverse reasons, may rightfully desire a criminal case to be scotched. The fact that broader considerations of public peace, larger considerations of public justice and even deeper considerations of promotion of long lasting security in a locality of order in a disorderly situation or harmony in a factious milieu or halting a false and vexatious prosecution in a court, persuades the Executive, pro bono public sacrifice a pending case for a wider benefit, is not ruled out although the power must be sparingly exercised and the statutory agency to be satisfied is the Public Prosecutor, not the District Magistrate or Minister. The concurrence of the court is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false basis for the criminal proceeding may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal. For the Court should not be misused to continue a case conclusively proved to be a counterfeit." *


The Supreme Court in the said case has pointed out that the decision to withdraw a case must be of the Public Prosecutor and not of other authorities. The Court is monitor, not servitor, and must check to see if the essentials of the law are not breached or overruled. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the Public Prosecutor has to keep in mind whether the considerations are germane and whether the actual decision was made or only obeyed by the Public Prosecutor. It has been further observed by the Supreme Court at page 427 : (At p. 327 of Cri LJ) that


"The Public Prosecutor is not the executive, nor a flunky of political power, Invested by the Statute with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him to apply an independent mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so, he acts as a limb of the judicative process, not as an extension of the executive." *


From this decision, it is clear that, if the facts are germane for withdrawal, the Public Prosecutor can withdraw and the position of the Public Prosecutor is such that the acts as a limb of the judicative process and not as an extension of the executive. This decision was considered in Rajendar Kumar v. State wherein it has been observed as follows (At p. 1091 of Cri. L.J.) :-


"It shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompt the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of Criminal justice and so has the Public Prosecutor its "Minister of justice". Both have a duty to protect the administration of Criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Executive by resort to the provisions of S. 321, Crl.P.C." *


That was a case where the accused were charged for offences under Sections 121-A I.P.C. 120-B I.P.C. read with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 5(3)(b) and 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884. The evidence of the approvers was recorded and the case was adjourned for further proceedings. At that stage, the Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 321 Crl.P.C. for permission to withdraw from the prosecution. The contents of the application were as follows :-


"It is submitted on behalf of the State as under :-


1. That on 24-9-1976 the Special Police Establishment after necessary investigation had filed a charge-sheet in this Hon'ble Court against Shri George Mathew Fernandes and 24 others for offences under Sections 121-A I.P.C., 120-B I.P.C. r/w. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 5(3)(b) and 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884, as well as the substantive offences


2. That besides the accused who were sent up for trial two accused namely Shri Bharat C. Patel and Rewati Kant Sinha were granted pardon by the Hon'ble Court and were examined as approver under Section 306(4) Crl.P.C


3. That out of 25 accused sent up for trial cited in the charge-sheet, 2 accused, namely Ladli Mohan Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders by the Hon'ble Court


4. That in public interest and changed circumstances the Central Government has desired to withdraw from the prosecutions of all the accused


5. It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may accord consent to withdraw from 26th March, 1977." *


The fourth reason mentioned in that case, for withdrawal was, that in public interest and changed circumstances the Central Government has desired to withdraw from the prosecutions of all the accused. The Supreme Court considering several decision cited before it, considered the powers of the Public Prosecutor in a case for withdrawal from court in para 13-A and has observed in para 14 at page 1517 : (para 14 at p. 1091 of Cri.L.J.) as follows :-


"Wherever issues involve the emotions and there is a surcharge of violence in the atmosphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence, to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may follow the storm. To persist with prosecution where emotive issues are involved in the name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter-productive. An elected Government, sensitive and responsive to the feelings and emotions of the people, will be amply justified if for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of goodwill or for the purpose of not disturbing a calm which has descended, it decides not to prosecute the offenders involved or not to proceed further with prosecutions already launched." *


It was also observed by the Supreme Court that the independence of the judiciary requires that once a case is prosecuted and the facts are placed before court, the Court and its officers alone must have control over the case and decide what is to be done in each case. The court has to elicit information and the reasons for withdrawal and not only the Court but the Prosecutor has also to be satisfied, that it was a fit case for withdrawal from prosecution for good and relevant reasons. In the last paragraph of the decision at page 1521 the Supreme Court has observed as follows (At p. 1096 of Cri. L.J.) :-



"Before bidding farewell to these cases it may be appropriate for us to say that criminal justice is not a plaything and a criminal court is not a playground for politicking. Political fervour should not convert prosecution into prosecution, nor political favour reward wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortunes are allowed to be reflected in the procession of the Court very soon the credibility of the rule of law will be lost. So we insist that Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should apprise himself from the Government and thereafter apprise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases, but under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyone's stooges." *


In State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra it has been observed by the Supreme Court as follows (At p. 776 of Cri.L.J.) :-


"It is not sufficient for the Public Prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He has to make out some ground which would show that the prosecution is sought to be withdrawn because inter alia the prosecution may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that the prosecution does not appear to be well founded or that there are other circumstances which clearly show that the object of administration of justice would not be advanced or furthered by going on with the prosecution. The ultimate guiding consideration must always be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touchstone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn." *


On the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions cited above, the learned counsel Mr. Vanamamalai appearing for the petitioner contends that the Court has to see the material placed before it for withdrawal of the instant case and the duty of the Public Prosecutor is to inform the Court and it is equally the duty of the Court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompt the Public Prosecutor to file petitions to withdraw from prosecution. It is the contention of the petitioner's counsel that on the basis of the petitions filed by A.P.P. II in the instant case and on the basis of the Government Order placed before Court, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee, after satisfying himself ought to have held that the function of A.P.P. II has been properly exercised and that the action of A.P.P. II is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes and the dismissal of the withdrawal petition filed by A.P.P. II is illegal and contrary to law. The learned counsel contends before me, that labour disputes which had led to the criminal cases, when settled, are in the interests of public justice in the broader sense of connotation which warrants withdrawal of the case from the prosecution, and the Public Prosecutor has rightly considered the G.O. issued by the Government and has filed a memo for withdrawal


7. The second contention of Mr. Vanamamalai was that when a petition for withdrawal is filed by A.P.P. II, it is for the A.P.P. II to convince the Court and the Court has to satisfy itself about the reasons mentioned therein for withdrawal. Such being so, one of the witnesses like P.W. 1, has no locus standi at all to oppose or to object to the withdrawal of the case. To substantiate his argument he relies on a decision reported in Chandrasekhara Reddi v. T. Ramanujulu Reddi (1972 Mad LJ (Cri) 596). A Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while discussing about the powers of a private citizen or the complainant who has lodged the complaint has observed p. 599 as follows :-

"That apart, it is the State that is the prosecutor and custodian of the public peace, charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. Where the State through its authorised representative, the Public Prosecutor, or A.P.P., as the case may be, decided to withdraw the offence and allows the offender to let go, it is not open to the private citizen or complainant, even if aggrieved by such withdrawal, to raise an objection to wreak his private grudge or vengeance against the alleged offenders. It is pertinent to notice that such a private citizen may at the most bring it to the notice of the concerned authorities of the State and persuade them to prosecute the accused on the ground that it was not a fit and proper one for withdrawal, or such withdrawal is not in the interest of public peace or advancement of welfare of the State. However, he should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor which in our considered opinion, is neither warranted in law nor based on any just or valid grounds. We may also add that it is not every person that is competent to prefer a revision under Section 435 r/w. S. 439, Cr.P.C. or a Criminal Appeal except, the person or persons aggrieved by the impugned order or orders, as the case may be. The material on record reveals that there existed a faction between the first respondent and his supporters on the one hand and the petitioners and his followers on the other. True, as stated by Sri Chennakesava Reddy, that it was at the instance of the petitioners, that the order of eviction of Yenadis, the occupants, of the Donka Poramboke, was passed by the Tahsildar and the present alleged offence had occurred when the Revenue Inspector accompanied by the Police and vetties sought to execute the order of eviction. In view of the facts and circumstances referred to earlier it cannot be stated that the petitioner is an aggrieved party, as he is neither the owner of the land nor the complainant in the present case. In such circumstances, the petitioner should not be allowed to wreak his vengeance against the first respondent and his supporters and particularly when respondents 2 to 14 who are poor and helpless Yenadis occupied the Government Poramboke by raising small sheds and huts for their living. Simply because, respondents 2 to 14 happened to be the followers or supporters of the first respondent against whom the petitioner has an axe to grind, he should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor and proceed against the respondents in this Crl.R.C. Judged from any angle, we are satisfied that the petitioner has no locus standi to prefer the present Criminal Revision Case." *


8. In Amar Narain v. State of Rajasthan 1952 AIR(Raj) 42) : 1952 CrLJ 375), it has been observed by a Bench of the Rajasthan High Court that in cases where the Public Prosecutor appears, it is for him to decide whether he would continue with the prosecution or withdraw from it, that if he comes to a decision on the facts of the case to withdraw, he has the power to apply to the Court for giving consent to his withdrawal and that this power cannot be subject to the wishes of a third person even though he might be interested directly in the case. On the basis of these decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that P.W. 1, who is only the complainant, has no right to object to the withdrawal of the case and he should not be permitted to take the role of a prosecutor


9. On the other hand. Mr. Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent contends that in the instant case by filing a memo for withdrawal more particularly at a time when the case was posted for examination of defence witnesses, the executive function of A.P.P. II has not been properly exercised and that it is an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice, for it is so obvious that on a reading of the memo, proper and sufficient reasons have not been mentioned in it for the withdrawal of the case. Mr. Chitale further contends, that the A.P.P. II should not allow himself to be dictated to by his administrative superiors to withdraw from the prosecution an A.P.P. II has not clearly mentioned as to what has prompted him to file a memo for withdrawal of the case and under the circumstances the trial Court was justified in dismissing the petition filed by A.P.P. II for withdrawal of the prosecution and that there is no illegality or error of law to warrant interference by this Court in the revision


10. In M. N. S. Nair v. P. V. Balakrishnan the Supreme Court has held at page 603 (of SCR) : (at p. 304 of Cri LJ) as follows :-


"The power contained in the Section gives a general executive direction to withdrawn from the prosecution subject to the consent of the court which may be determined on many possible grounds and is therefore wide and uncontrolled by any other provision in the Code nor is it in pari material with S. 333 which enables the Advocate General at any stage in a trial by the High Court and before the return of the verdict to inform the Court if he thinks fit on behalf of the Government that he will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge and on such information being given the case against the accused comes to an end. This power of entering a nolle prosequi under Section 333 Cr.P.C. is not dependent upon any permission of the Court. A reading of S. 494 would show that it is the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the case that must ask for permission of the Court to withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of one or more of the offences for which he is tried. This permission can be sought by him at any stage either during the enquiry or after committal or even before the judgment is pronounced. The section does not however, indicate the reasons which should weigh with the Public Prosecutor to move the Court for permission, nor the grounds on which the Court will grant or refuse permission. Though the Section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecution agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case." *


From the observations of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the Public Prosecutor can seek permission either during the enquiry or after committal or even before the judgment is pronounced and the only question that has to be considered by the Court, when the Public Prosecutor seeks permission to withdraw from the prosecution is, that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before the prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent that when the prosecution evidence is over and when the case was posted for examination of the defence witnesses, the Prosecutor cannot at that stage file a petition for withdrawal of the prosecution, cannot hold good


11. The learned counsel, Mr. Chitale appearing for the second respondent, relying on the observations of the Supreme Court reported in Subbash Chander v. State and Rajender Kumar v. State contends that there is nothing in the memo filed by A.P.P. II to come to the conclusion as to whether he has applied his mind for the withdrawal of the case, that the Government Order G.O.Ms. No. 216 Public (Law and Order-B) Department dt. 25-1-1980, considering the facts in this case, is not in public interest, that no substantive and sufficient materials are place before the Court by A.P.P. II for withdrawal, that the withdrawal is neither germane nor relevant nor has it been brought to the notice of the court about the necessity for withdrawal of the case and under the circumstances, the court is justified in dismissing the withdrawal petition filed by A.P.P. II. The further contention of the learned counsel Mr. Chitale is, that there is nothing in the memo filed by A.P.P. II to show that the bitterness in the industrial dispute would be softened if the matter is withdrawn and that the A.P.P. II has not given details in his withdrawal memo as to why he is withdrawing the case, and under the circumstances, the dismissal of the petition filed by A.P.P. II is justified and there is no illegality. With reference to the contention of the petitioner's counsel that the second respondent cannot object to the withdrawal of the case, the learned counsel Mr. Chaitale contends that the second respondent has been made as a party to the criminal revision case and when once he is made as a party to the criminal revision, it cannot be contended that he has no locus standi to argue the case before this Court


12. As far as the first respondent is concerned, the Public Prosecutor in this case before me supports the arguments advanced by the petitioner's counsel and also contends that the counter filed by A.P.P. II on 14-10-1980 makes it very clear that A.P.P. II has applied his mind and filed a memo for withdrawal and, therefore, the dismissal of the petition filed by A.P.P. II, by the trial Court, contrary to law


13. I have heard the arguments of the respective counsel and I have also gone through the order of the Court below and the decisions cited in this case. It cannot be denied that a case can be withdrawn "at any stage of the proceedings", as pointed out by the Supreme Court in M. N. S. Nair v. P. V. Balakrishnan The facts in this case show that there was a complaint by P.W. 1 and the first respondent has taken the complaint on file and initiated proceedings against the petitioner herein under the sections mentioned supra. P.W. 1, as stated above, is a diver in the factory and the petitioner is a worker. In short, both are workers in the factory. Though the two earlier memos filed by A.P.P. II on 4-10-80 for withdrawal are not specifically clear as to why he is seeking permission to withdraw the case nevertheless in the counter filed by A.P.P. II on 14-10-1980 he has clarified his stand and has stated that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and has thereafter file the memo for withdrawal. Therefore it cannot be contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent that the memo does not make it clear as to why A.P.P. II is filing the petition for withdrawal nor can it be said that A.P.P. II has not applied his mind. The main consideration appears to

be G.O.Ms. No. 216 Public (Law and Order-B) Department dated 25-1-1980 wherein it is mentioned that the Government have been considering for some time past the question of withdrawal of pending cases against industrial workers and members of various political parties except certain special categories of cases with a view to create an atmosphere of goodwill. It is also mentioned in the G.O. that the Government, after careful consideration, have decided to withdraw all the cases against the industrial workers and the cases registered against the members and workers of various political parties on or after 15-9-1972 which have been charge-sheeted and are pending in Courts. It is evident from the facts of the case, that the petitioner and the second respondent are workers in a factory and the G.O. squarely applies in order to create an atmosphere of goodwill among the industrial workers in the factory. I am of the view that though the two earlier memos filed by A.P.P. II are not clear the counter filed by A.P.P. II on 14-10-1980 clarifies the position as to why he has filed the petition for withdrawal. The A.P.P. II has considered the G.O. passed by the Government and has applied his mind to the facts of the case and has thereafter filed the memo for withdrawal. The trial court ought to have taken into consideration the facts of the case and the dispute pending before him with reference to the memos and the counter filed by A.P.P. II for withdrawal. Just because P.W. 1 is an aggrieved person and he objects to the withdrawal of the case, it cannot be held that the case should not be withdrawn. What has influenced the mind of the trial Court in dismissing the petition for withdrawal of the case was that P.W. 1 is the aggrieved person and he objects to the withdrawal of the case. That cannot be a ground for dismissing the petition for withdrawal. The observation of the Supreme Court extracted by me at Page 10 of my judgment makes it clear that "the decision to withdraw must be of the public prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those where displeasure may affect his continuance in office" * Similar is the observation of the Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which observed that it is not open to the private citizen or complainant, even if aggrieved by such withdrawal, to raise an objection to wreak his grudge. A duty is also cast on the Court to see, on the facts of the case before it, whether the memos or other particulars furnished and filed by A.P.P. II deserve consideration for withdrawal. I have perused the records and I have also gone through the decisions of the Supreme Court cited by either of the counsel and I am of the view that the order passed by the trial court has to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. This revision is allowed and the matter is remitted to the trial court to grant permission to the Public Prosecutor the first respondent herein to withdraw the case 14. The learned counsel, Mr. Alagumalai, appearing for the second respondent, orally seeks permission of this court to file an appeal in the Supreme Court under Art. 134-A of the Constitution of India against the judgment pronounce by me in the above matter. Since the matter is covered by decisions of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that this is not a fit case where leave has to be granted. Hence the oral request of Mr. Alagumalai is rejected and leave is refused.